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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is centred around the experiences of traders and 
taximen in Qwaqwa, the smallest of South Africa's 'homelands'. It 
aims to investigate the extent to which small-scale entrepreneurs 
of various kinds can be seen to be participating in processes of 
class formation within the homeland. The focus adopted directs 
attention away from the issue of poverty which has dominated 
rural research over the past decade. The thesis also seeks to 
contribute to existing studies of class formation in the 
homelands, which address the problem from the perspective of 
'state' and 'capital'. This study seeks to broaden this focus 
through a historical analysis of social processes at the local-
level. It argues that traders and taxirnen in Qwaqwa cannot simply 
be regarded as the recipients of state initiatives, but are 
agents in forging their own opportunities and relationships. 
NOTES ON TERMINOLOGY. 
In this study all names are fictious, except those of public 
figures. This is in deference to the wi$hes of many of my 
informants who preferred to remain anonymous. and because it is 
the first responsibility of the anthropologist to protect the 
identity of the people with whom he or she works. 
Many of the quotations attributed to the traders and taximen in 
the text are interpreter's translations from Sesotho or Zulu. 
Such translations have often been liberally transcribed and 
edited. Where Sotho phrases or words have been used I use the 
official orthography. I also use the term 1 homeland 1 rather than 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is centred around the experiences of small traders 
and taximen in Qwaqwa, the official homeland of the South Sotho 
'ethnic national unit'. The aim of the study is to trace the 
emergence of a small business sector in Qwaqwa since the 1970s 
and to understand the implications of this development for the 
process of class formation within the homeland. The central 
questions posed by the thesis are: To what extent can small 
business operators in Qwaqwa be seen to constitute part of an 
emerging homeland petty bourgeoisie? What are the most important 
economic and political factors that govern opportunities for 
accumulation within the small-scale sector? How do these factors 
promote or inhibit processes of class formation in Qwaqwa7 
In attempting to answer these questions the thesis addresses the 
experiences and responses of storekeepers, shebeen owners and 
taximen to changing economic and political conditions in Qwaqwa 
d~ring the 1970s and 1980s. The selection of these three 
categories of business operators for investigation is an attempt 
to cover the three major areas of consumer spending in Qwaqwa 
food, transport and recreation. In adopting this focus a 
conscious effort was made to transcend the existing tendency to 
focus either on licensed traders (Hart 1972, Southall 1983} or 
on small illicit operators (cf. Jacobs 1982, Cross & Whyte 1983, 
Nattrass 1984} in the homelands. This polarisation has served to 
project an image that there are essentially two kinds of sma 11 
business operators in the homelands: successful, licensed 
traders, who by virtue of their legal protection are able to 
cont r o 1 re 1 at i v e 1 y 1 a r g e econ om i c markets, and u n success f u 1 
unlicensed operators, who compete for subsistence returns in 
1 
stagnant markets. By focusing on a wide variety of licensed and 






diversity of operations evident in both 
explicit emphasis on processes of social 
differentiation seeks to redress a broader imbalance that has 
emerged in rural research over the past decade. In addressing the· 
recent literature on the homelands, it is evident that most of 
these studies have concentrated on the related questions of 
relocation, unemployment and poverty (cf. Carnegie Enquiry 1984). 
While these issues are central to the experiences of the vast 
majority of rural people in South Africa, it is also important to 
note that the fruition of the homeland policy has brought with it 
increasing differentiation in the rural periphery. Closer 
settlement villages, with their aspect of human suffering and 
misery, are not simply dumping grounds for the dispossessed, they 
are also havens for petty capitalists, corrupt bureaucrats and 
power-hungry chiefs. In broadening our knowledge of the rural 
life in South Africa, it is also necessary to focus more closely 
on the local beneficiaries of the homeland system. 
The third major objective of the thesis is to contribute to an 
understanding of the regional specificity of processes in the 
rural periphery. The extensive coverage given to the Transkei in 
. recent historical studies (Peires 1981, Beinart 1982, Bundy & 
Beinart 1987) and contemporary analyses of the rural reserves 
(Hammond-Tooke 1975, Stultz 1980, Streek & Wicksteed 1981, 
Southall 1983) has served to support an image of the Transkei as 
the typical South African homeland. Yet, when compared with other 
areas where rural settlement patterns are more congested and 
access to agricultural resources virtually non-existent, it 
2 
becomes clear that it is necessary to differentiate these areas 
systematically from each other. To achieve this it is necessary 
for scholars to engage in detailed historical and contemporary 
analyses in a variety of different areas. This study seeks to 
contribute to this project by attempting to explain the 
experiences and responses of traders in Qwaqwa through an 
analysis of local-level historical processes. 
Conceptions of the Homeland Petty Bourgeoisie 
In recent years there has been renewed theoretical interest in 
tte 'middle class' in advanced capitalist countries. This 
interest has emerged primarily from the realisation that white-
collar workers, located in large capitalist corporations and in 
the bureaucracy, have become an increasingly large and affluent 
segment of the work force in these societies. Most studies 
dealing with these new groups have evoked Weberian notions of 
bureaucratic rationalisation and middle-class development as 
basic conceptual tools and have refuted marxian conceptions of 
white-collar workers as part of the industrial proletariat (cf. 
Mills 1951, Dahrendorf 1959, Giddens 1971). In 1975, however. 
Poulantzas renewed interest among neo-marxists in the 'middle 
class' in advanced capitalist societies by attempting to 
rejuvenate Marx's original concept of the petty bourgeoisie, used 
consistently in his writing to refer to a transition class of 
small traders, artisans and craftsmen trapped between the 'two 
great hostile camps', the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The 
petty bourgeoisie was seen as a class without independent 
political identity that oscillated between support tor the 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat. For Marx this class would 
3 
eventually be eclipsed with the development of the forces of 





in his reconsideration of the 
both Weberian notions that the 
petty 
new 
intermediary strata in capitalist society can be seen to form an 
independent middle class, and neo-marxian suggestions that these 
strata can be subsumed within the working class (Renner 1953, 
Croner 1962). Instead he argues that the new strata of white-
collar workers can be designated as a 'new' petty bourgeoisie on 
the basis that, unlike the industrial working class who are 
engaged in generating surplus-value directly through 'productive 
labour', this group is separated from the working class by virtue 
of their involvement in 'non-productive' labour (1975: 209-24). 
Poulantzas suggests that this group is also separated from the 
bourgeoisie because, "they have neither economic ownership nor 
possession of the means of production" (Ibid: 210). After 
identifying the 'new petty bourgeoisie', Poulantzas connects it 
with its smaller and less significant counterpart, the 
'traditional' petty bourgeoisie, comprised of small owners, by 
suggesting that "they both have in common that they neither 
belong to the bourgeoisie nor to the proletariat" (Ibid: 206). He 
contends that this negative basis for association "does not just 
have a simple excluding role; it actually produces economic 
'similarities' which have common political and 
effects" (p.208). 
ideological 
Although Poulantzas' interpretation has come under criticism from 
other analysts of class formation in advanced capitalist 
countries (Carchedi 1977, Hirst 1977, Wright 1978), the renewed 
interest in the petty bourgeoisie has had an important impact on 
analyses of class and state in post-colonial Africa. The 
4 
pioneering works of Leys (1975), Mamdani (1976), Shivji (1976) 
and Saul (1979) in this field argue that the Africanisation ·of 
state structures in post-colonial East Africa has resulted in the 
emergence of a petty bourgeoisie located principally within the 
state apparatus. This class is seen to comprise a class of 
military officials, Lureaucrats, intellectuals, teachers and 
traders. The material basis of this petty bourgeoisie takes the 
form of large government salaries, loans and, in the case of 
traders, direct state protection. But in spite of the ability of 
this class to use the state as a lever for the accumulation of 
property and wealth, they are unable to transform themselves into 
a fully fledged 'national bourgeoisie' as a result ot the 
constraints placed on them by metropolitan capital, which retains 
control over the major industrial assets in these countries. In 
these terms the African petty bourgeoisie finds itself in an 
ambivalent position insofar as it is able to control the state, 
but not the economy. Leys (1979), in reviewing the literature on 
the new African petty bourgeoisie, maintains that: 
The petty bourgeoisie so defined is thus a diff~rent concept from 
that of Marx. This does not necessarily mean it is inept, but it 
does mean that its political implications cannot be taken for 
granted. Whereas Marx's petty bourgeoisie played an ambivalent 
political role vis-a-vis the developing bourgeoisie and 
proletariat, it is less likely to be true for the 'petty 
bourgeoisie' as the term is used [in the East African debates] 
(1979: 46). 
For Leys (1979) this petty bourgeoisie, by virtue of its position 
within the state, is politically more conservative and 
economically more mobile than its earlier European counterpart. 
In this context the central que,tion tor participants in the East 
African state debate is where, and under what conditions, will 
this petty bourgeoisie be able to transform itself into a 
'national bourgeoisie' by manipulating the resources within the 
5 
state to seize control of major economic assets? Of particular 
significance in this regard is the extent to which the African 
ruling class or classes is prepared to collaborate with the 
interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie (cf. Sandbrook 1982: 
81-120). 
Although the literature on class formation in the homelands is 
both sketchy and regionally specific, there is a clear continuity 
between the latter discussions and those which focus on the 
homelands. Besides the early work of Charton (1976} on the 
Transkei, which attempts to explain the increased social 
stratification in the homeland in terms of elite theory 
political and economic development is manifested in growing 
competition between a 1 traditional 1 and 'modern' elite - the 
other works in this area (Innes and O'Meara 1977, Southall 1977, 
1983) draw direct inspiration from the East African state 
debates. Innes and O'Meara (1977), in attempting to avoid the 
pitfalls of Charton's analysis, which conceptualises local 
elites in the Transkei outside of their relationship with the 
South African state, develop a class analysis based on the 
changing position of the lranskei in the South African political 
economy. In line with Molteno's (1977) distinction between the 
• Reserve and the Bantustan strategies, Innes and O'Meara suggest 
that since the 1960s the South African state's attempts at 
restructuring the relations of exploitation in the rural 
periphery have spawned processes of class formation similar to 
those which have occurred in other African countries. They argue 
that the Africanisation and expansion of the local bureaucracy, 
designed to assist the tribal elite with political repression and 
labour control have. formed the basis for the emergence of a 'new' 
petty bourgeoisie in the homeland. This group, comprised of 
6 
bureaucrats and teachers. is seen to exist in alliance with a 
'traditional' petty bourgeoisie, comprised principally of rural 
storekeepers, whose activities were directly sponsored and 
protected by the state-run Development Corporations. Innes and 
O'Meara suggest that members of the new petty bourgeoisie in the 
Transkei existed in an ambivalent relationship with the South 
African state, representing the interests of white capital: On 
the one hand, the interests of both fractions of the petty 
bourgeoisie are increasingly tied to the apartheid state, 
other, the failure of the state to act decisively in 
on the 
their 
interests through a commitment to the expansion of existing 
services and facilities may generate severe antagonisms towards 
the state (1977: 78). 
In addition to the two petty bourgeois groups, these authors 
argue that by 1976 a small 'collaborationist bourgeoisie' had 
emerged in the Transkei, comprised of landholding chiefs engaged 
in capitalist agriculture. This group were seen to receive 
unambiguous support for the state and. therefore, tended to be 
poliJically more compliant than their lesser class allies. 
Finally, Innes and O'Meara conclude by investigating the 
possibility of a 'national bourgeoisie' emerging in the Transkei, 
but reject the notion by suggesting that the prerequisite process 
of large-scale capital investment in the Transkei seemed unlikely 
given the continued status of the area as a labour reserve for 
white capital. 
Southall (1983), in his more recent analysis of the Transkei 
endorses the above viewpoint, but places less emphasis on the 
importance of capital accumulation in the class formation 
process. He argues that the upper strata of Transkeian society 
can be seen to constitute an 'auxilary bourgeoisie' comprised of 
7 
chiefs and politicians. In broadening the definition of this 
group, Southall rejects Innes and 0 1 Meara 1 s suggestion that their 
material basis is founded in capitalist agricultural production. 
Instead, he maintains that, as a political elite, they are 
primarily dependent on the financial resources that circulate in 
the form of salaries, loans and contracts (1983: 175). He notes, 




Transkei have increased fivefold between 1964 and 1977 
174). This core collaborationist group is seen to be 
by various petty bourgeoisie elements, including 
professionals, traders, teachers and bureaucrats, who render 
support and legitimacy to the ruling class in return for material 
rewards, either directly through state salaries or indirectly 
through patronage and protection. In his analysis of these 
groups, Southall discards Pcultanzas' distinction between the 
'new' and 'traditional I petty bourgeoisie, by maintaining that 
these elements tiave hitherto remained relatively fragmented 
(1983: 195). He suggests that the importance of organisations, 
such as the exclusive Public Servants Association and the 
Transkei Chamber of Commerce in negotiating the material benefits 
of collaboration serves to exacerbate occupational fragmentation 
in this class. Southall concludes his analysis by suggesting 
that, while the structural position of the petty bourgeoisie in 
the Transkei necessitates collaborationist politics, the 
possibility of a class alliance between elements on the fringe of 
this class, migrant workers and school pupils cannot be excluded. 
Although the above analyses provide a useful profile of class 
formation in the Transkei, these studies have at least two major 
limitations. The first relates to the preoccupation with 
assessing whether or not the Transkei is susceptible to the 
8 
formation of a 'national bourgeoisie'. This question, while of 
some importance in countries like Kenya and Uganda, seems to· be 
of very little relevance to our understanding of the South 
African homelands, since the answer is both too obvious and too 
narrow. It is obvious because, as Wolpe and Legassick (1977) have 
pointed out, as long as the homelands retain their function as 
labour reserves to the wider South African economy local class 
formation must occur within this framework. This is standpoint is 
supported by Southall (1983) who argues that, in spite of Innes 
and O'Meara earlier suggestions, while certain fractions of the 
homeland petty bourgeoisie are increasingly becoming engaged in 
sustained accumulation in agriculture, the motor tor class 
formation in the post- 1 Independence 1 period remains disposable 
state salaries and home loans. The second problem with this 
question relates to its explicit emphasis on 'national' economic 
development. In the South African context, where intense economic 
interaction occurs between the rural reserves and the urban 
metropolitan areas, this becomes a dangerous endeavour. One 
cannot, it seems, analyse rural class formation in South Africa 
without considering the resources and skills, such as education 
and capital, which are imported from urban areas. 





to show that the South African state has gone to great 
during the 1960s and 1970s to ruralise the urban African 
bourgeoisie. 
This raises the other major problem with these studies, namely 
that they seek to explain class formation purely in terms of 
changing state initiatives in the Transkei. This statist focus 
directs attention away from the dynamic of class at the local 
level, and ignores the possibility of small-scale capital 
9 
accumulation outside of state patronage. The latter limitations 
are clearly demonstrated by conditions in Qwaqwa, where business 
lic~nsing and state support have been restricted to select 
categories of commercial undertakings. In this context the use of 
a state-based analysis fails to recognise the existence of local 
entrepreneurs in unprotected economic markets. Indeed, the very 
nature of state protection for rural entrepreneurs is open to 
question. Nolutshungu (1982) has, for instance, recently denied 
that the creation of a black 'middle class' outside of the 
bureaucracy has been a conscious aim of state policy in the 
homelands. He suggests that this process has largely been an 
unintended consequence of attempts to rationalise broader 
capitalist development and to control black labour. Although 
Nolutshungu (1982) has been criticised for stating the point too 
strongly (Hirsch 1984), it nevertheless remains true that a 
significant number of black entrepreneurs in rural areas are 
engaged in processes of capital accumulation against the grain of 
state policy. 
In addition to the failure of state-based analyses to consider 
the emergence of petty bourgeois elements outside of state 
structures, this type of analysis also errs insofar as it 
attempts to deduce class and occupational consciousness solely 
from the relationship of different homeland beneficiaries with 
the South African state (ie. chiefs are strongly collaborationist 
because the state has guaranteed them handsome material rewards, 
while teachers are more likely to seek alliances with migrants 
and students because their material rewards have been less 
generous). 
occupational 




understand class or 
terms alone. Class 
consciousness and· action can only be arrived at through an 
10 
historical analysis of the local level experiences and responses 
of class agents. As E. P Thompsons so eloquently puts it: "Class 
is defined by men and women as they live their own history, and 
in the end this is its only definition" (1963:10). Attempts to 
deduce the political consciousness of the homeland petty 
bourgeoisie from the perspective of state policy, denies the 
extent to which these individuals forge their own opportunities 
and identities at the local-level, and ignores the kinds of 
relationship they develop with other classes or groups. 
In view of the above criticisms the present study seeks to 
elucidate the process of class formation at the local level by 
engaging in a detailed analysis of 80 small traders and taximen 
in Qwaqwa. I make no assumptions about the class position or 
political consciousness of these operators, but rather pose these 
as central questions for investigation and as issues that can 
only be illuminated through the actual experiences of the 
operators themselves. 
My analysis of these groups focuses specifically on the 1970s and 
early 1980s, a period characterised by mass population relocation 
in Qwaqwa and the rapid unfolding of homeland self-government. 
Through an an~lysis of this period I will attempt to explain the 
conditions under which commercial opportunities who emerged in 
Qwaqwa, and consider how they have been shaped by the South 
African state, the Qwaqwa administration and the interests of 
white capital. I will focus on the kinds of individuals who have 
been able to exploit these opportunities by investigating their. 
origins and exposure to changing conditions in the homeland. More 
importantly thougl1, the thesis will address the ways in which 
these business operators have struggled individually and 
11 
collectively to retain and expand their control of scarce 
resources. In attempting to understand th~se struggles, I 
consider tt1e various social and economic relationships business 
operators established with other groups and classes within and 
beyond Qwaqwa. This multifaceted analysis of the experiences of 
traders and taximen in Qwaqwa aims to transcend the tendency in 
existing studies of homeland class formation to distill the 
process through a generalised analysis of capital and state in 
South Africa. By looking beyond the mere structural determinants 
that govern life in rural areas, and taking seriously the ways in 
which individuals formulate their own strategies and responses to 
these conditions, the present study seeks to enhance our 
understanding of both the regional specificities and the 
generalities of class formation in the rural periphery. 
Qwaqwa: Some Basic Characteristics 
Qwaqwa is located at the juncture of Lesotho. Natal and the 
Orange Free State (see map 1.1). It is the smallest of the South 
African homelands and covers an area of 48 234ha (480 sq kms) of 
mountainous terrain. At present gradual attempts are being made 
to triple the size of the homeland through the incorporation of 
white farmlands in the Harrismith, Kestell and Golden Gate areas 
(see map 1.2). 
The pressing need for more land in Qwaqwa must be seen in terms 
of the massive influx of population into the area over the past 
15 years. In 1970 Qwaqwa's de facto population was officially 





at 215 669, although local officials suggested 
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Martiny's (1984: 4) more recent estimate, based on reliable local 
informants, suggests that the population had risen to 
approximately 500 000 by 1983. In others words, Qwaqwa's 
population has grown by nearly 2 000% since 1970, and assuming 
that only half of the reserve's mountainous terrain i s 
inhabitable, it would have a populations density close on 2 000 
people per sq. kilometre. 
The massive influx of people into the area derives from two major 
sources: farm removals and urban relocations. The vast majority 
of the new immigrants in Qwaqwa, possibly as many as 80%, arrived 
in the area as refugees from white-owned farms, where they had 
been made redundant with the introduction of mechanised farming 
techniques (cf. Sharp 1982). These individuals were settled in 
closer settlement camps, of which there were 76 in 1984 (Niehaus 
1987: 18). Most of the remaining population arrived in the area 
as a result of various forms of urban relocation and were housed 
in Phuthaditjhaba, the only town, and the capital of Qwaqwa 
(Robins 1982, Bank 1984). This location of urban refugees in the 
town, close to labour recruiting points and a number of local . 
industrial job opportunities, has enforced a broader division in 
the homeland between town and country. 
The system of political control in Qwaqwa is based on the 
existence of two tribal authorities and a general Legislative 
Assembly, created in 1969. The Batlokwa and Bakwena tribal 
authorities were constituted in 1951 under the Bantu Authorities 
Act and the Legislative Assembly in 1969 when Qwaqwa became a 
Territorial Authority. In 1974 the homeland entered the second 
phase of self-government and was given powers to pass its own 
legislation (subject to Pretoria's approval). In 1975 elections 
were held for positions in the Legislative Assembly. These 
14 
elections were dominated by the Dikwankwetla party, who returned 
to power in 1980 and 1985 under the incumbent Chief Minister T.K. 
Mopeli. 
Economic development in Qwaqwa since 1970 has been slow. The 
creation of an industrial area on the outskirts of Phuthaditjhaba 
has been the main achievement in this sphere. In 1984 local 
factories employed approximately 4 500 people at low wages (60% 
earning less than R60 a month). The rest of Qwaqwa's population 
gain their livelihood through migrant and commuter employment 
outside the homeland. In 1981 central government sources claimed 
that there were 3 7 5 Ou mi grants i n Q w a q w a and On v e rw a ch t, an 
unincorporated enclave of the homeland near Thaba'Nchu (Sharp &. 
Martiny 1984: 10). There ~Jere also an estimated 2 500 commuters 
travelling from Qwaqwa to the neighbouring towns of Harrismith 
and Bethlehem on a daily basis (Ibid). In the sphere of local 
commercial development, 477 business licences had been granted to 
Qwaqwa citizens by 1984. The services of these individuals were 
augmented by a number of white commercial firms, who provided 
both wholesale and retail facilities in the area. Their 
activities were closely linked up with the Qwaqwa Development 
Corporations shopping centre programme, launched in 1980. 
Outline of the Thesis 
In the light of my commitment to understanding the experiences of 
small traders within my sample in their local historical context, 
this thesis begins with a broad historical overview of the three 
commercial sectors 'Under consideration. This discussion seeks to 
trace the origins and development of the retail, transport and 
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liquor sectors in Qwaqwa since the turn of the century, paying 
particular attention to the rapid changes in consumer demand and 
black commercial participation after 1970. 
Chapter Two leads from this discussion of economic change in 
Qwaqwa by focusing specifically on the role of traders in the 
political development of Qwaqwa. The chapter concentrates on the 
changing and unstable relationship between traders, the ruling 
Dikwankwetla party and the Qwaqwa Development Corporation (QDC) 
in the--,,period 1974 to 1984. On the basis of these two contextual 
chapters the thesis addresses itself to experiences of taximen 
and traders within the sample. Chapter Three deals with the ways 
in which individuals from different social and economic 
backgrounds were seen to enter commerce in the homeland. By 
looking at the experiences of different categories of 
individuals, the chapter seeks to periodise commercial access 
within the homeland since 1970. Chapter Four concentrates on the 
experiences of traders and taximen once they are established in 
business. It seeks to explain some of the structural forces 
governing processes of capital accumulation in the homeland, as 
~ell as the economic responses of individuals to these forces. 
Chapter Five focuses specifically on the position of women in 
commerce. It considers the extent to which women are restricted 
in commercial participation by overlapping systems of male 
domination and seeks to explore some of the strategies devised by 
them to circumvent these limitations. 
Chapters Six and Seven address themselves to the relationships 
traders and taximen have developed with other social groups and 
classes in Qwaqwa. In this discussion I introduce the notion of 
patronage as a tool whereby different kinds of social and 
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economic interactions can be analysed. The conclusion draws 
together the central arguments of the thesis by comparing class 
formation in Qwaqwa and the Transkei. I will attempt to highlight 
some of the important economic and political difference 
associated with the emergence of a commercial petty bourgeoisie 
in these areas. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
CHANGING PATTERNS OF TRADE: 
AN OVERVIEW OF THREE COMMERCIAL SECTORS* 
This chapter has two major objectives. Firstly, it seeks to 
provide a broad historical overview of the three commercial 
sectors under discussion in this dissertation by tracing their 
roots back to the days when Qwaqwa was a small, insignificant 
appendage to the larger Basotholand labour reserve. The purpose 
of this discussion is to demonstrate the regional specificity of 
commercial developments in Qwaqwa, which will facilitate 
comparison with other areas. The second objective of the chapter 
i, s to c 1 a r i f y so me of the i mp o r tan t s ho rt term h i s tor i ca 1 c ha n g es 
which have influenced conditions in the retail, transport and 
liquor trades in Qwaqwa since the advent of homeland self-
government in 1969. The latter discussion will concentrate on the 
crucial role of mass population relocations to Qwaqwa in the 
1970s in generating commercial opportunities, and will highlight 
the impact of changing licencing procedures on the structure of 
commercial opportunities in the region. This selective local-
level historical analysis is intended to provide more than a 
simple historical introduction to commerce in Qwaqwa; it attempts 
to provide a structured context for the more detailed theoretical 
and ethnographic discussion presented in subsequent chapters. 
The chapter will be divided into three sections corresponding to 
each sector of commerce under consideration. This technique is 
* The data presented in this chapter are Lased on a combination 
of oral testimonies, government commissions, missionary reports 
and secondary sources. In view of the limited objectives set out 
in the chapter, it was considered unnecessary to consult detailed 
archival material. 
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necessitated by the very specific and contrasting conditions that 
have governed the development of the retail, liquor and transport 
trades in the homeland. In the conclusion I will highlight some 
of the common patterns that emerge from these separate 
discussions and place them in a comparative framework. 
THE RETAIL TRADE 
~@1At11ng 1n W1ts1eshoek 1913-50 
The first itinerant European traders arrived in Witsieshoek 
shortly after the establishment of an Dutch Reform mission 
station in the re serve i n 1 8 7 4 to b a rte r b l a n k et s and 
agricultural implements for hides, wool and skins [l]. These 
traders seldom entered the reserve but set their wagons up on 
adjacent white-owned farms. Among the earliest of these traders 
was an Englishman, Arthur James Gray, who entered the Witsieshoek 
barter trade in the late 1870s after his wool-washing business 
had gone bankrupt in Harrismith. Gray's knowledge of Sesotho and 
his experience in the wool trade enabled him to establish a close 
rapport with the incumbent Bakwena Paramount Chief Paulus Mopeli, 
who offered him a site in Namahadi village in 1886 to set up the 
first white trading store in Witsieshoek. Chief Mopeli's interest 
in establishing white traders in the reserve, as Badenhorst 
(1944) points out, derived largely from the profits he was 
generating by reselling European merchandise across the 
Drakensberg. In 1878 Paulus Mopeli was allegedly questioned by 
the Harrismith police for his involvement in smuggling hats and 
concertinas into Basotholand (Ibid: 145). 
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The Witsieshoek trade in the 1880s was, however, not confined to 
trinkets and the periodic flow of agricultural goods across the 
Basotholand border. Keegan (1986: 204) notes that the opening up 
of a market for foodstuff on the ~/itswatersrand in 1886 resulted 
in an unprecedented increase in the grain trade in northern 
Basotholand. He maintains that in April 1889 some 650 wagons were 
passing through Senekal with bought or bartered Basotho grain 
(Ibid). In combination with this development, local missionaries 
in Witsieshoek pointed out that the expansion of the mission also 
stimulated consumer demand. Rev Ross, Head of the NG mission in 
the 1880 s, noted that: 
The mission brought civilisation and civilized ideas, and these 
ideas encouraged trade, and increased trade assisted the state. 
One shopkeeper once explained to me that: 11 If it was not for the 
work of the mission I would not be able to do as much business as 
I am doing in Witsieshoek. I sell more clothes now than ever 
before, as well as all sorts of other things 11 [translation from 
Afrikaans] (Ross 1930: 90). 
But if local trade in Witsieshoek was being stimulated during the 
1880s, it grew more rapidly after 1890 with the growth of the 
wool trade in the northern eastern OFS and Basotholand. The 
completion of the rail connection between Harrismith, some 40 kms 
from the reserve, and Durban in 1894 provided new opportunities 
for participation in the export wool market to augment increasing 
grain profits. As a result of this development new white traders 
were attracted to Witsieshoek and in the early 1890s Charles 
Stevens, a leading entrepreneur from Aliwal North, opened a store 
in Witsieshoek. Keegan (1980: 207) notes that, after 1889, "with 
the help of a loan of 4 000 pounds from his father, a London 
merchant, Stevens quickly became the most important trader in the 
northern districts [of Basotholand] 11 • The incorporation of 
Witsieshoek into a wider trading network by 1890 also opened up 
opportunities for black entrepreneurs, especially in the area of 
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transport riding. According to local informants, most of the 
senior chiefs in Witsieshoek from the mid-1890s onwards owned 
wagons, which they hired out for the transfer of grain and wool 
to llarrismith [2]. 
By 1900 trading conditions in Witsieshoek had, 
deteriorate. This was related primarily to 
effects of drought and rinderpest in northern 
however, begun to 
the devastating 
Basotholand, but 
was also i~fluenced by the election of Ntsane Mopeli as the new 
Bakwena Paramount in 1897. Ntsane Mopeli, unlike his predecessor, 
was opposed to all forms of white intervention in Witsieshoek. 
His antagonistic attitudes, Badenhorst (1944: 220) suggests, 
emerged after the OFS Volksraad evicted 233 Basotho families from 
the reserve in 1898 to meet the labour demands of Harrismith 
farmers. The spread of white trading interests into the 
inaccessible Basotho highlands during this period also came as a 
severe blow to Witsieshoek traders, who relied heavily on Basotho 
wool and grain caravans from the Mokotlong district (Walton 1958: 
44). However, while these factors decreased white trading 
interests in Witsieshoek, they seem to have stimulated local 
en~repreneurial activity. From the end of the Anglo-Boer war, it 
is reported that groups of women, many of them liquor traders, 
hired wagons to transport fresh produce, baskets, calabashes and 
pottery into the locations of neighbouring towns to exchange for 
second-hand clothes, blankets and cooking ware. These activities 
were, however, only conducted on a seasonal basis [3]. 
By the time of the 1913 Land Act, Keegan (1986: 214) notes that, 
the orientation of white trading stores in Basotholand was being 
transformed by the decline of the Basotho peasantry and the 
growth of labour migration. In Witsieshoek the shift towards a 
labour migrating and food-importing economy was already evident 
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by 1914 with the influx of farm workers into the reserve. Chief 
Ntsane complained to the 1914 Beaumont Commission that: 
I would very much like the people outside to come to Witsieshoek, 
but there is no land available for ploughing. I have heard that 
some of my tribal people outside the reserve are very much ill-
treated, and I would like them to come here, but there is no 
place for them to plough (UG 22-14: 66). 
Reporting to the same commission, Acting Commandant Clark, 
explained that landlessness was leading to greater labour 
migration to the mines. He explained that poor wages and working 
conditions on the farms had resulted in unmarried men travelling 
to the Transvaal to earn higher wages to buy cattle (Ibid). The 
formation in 1914 of the Leihlo ~ Sechaba Association, designed 
to safeguard the interests of absent migrants, provides further 
evidence of expanding labour migration (Quinlan 1985: 25). But in 
spite of increased cash flow and rising consumer demands, trading 
profits were disrupted by supply shortages during the war (1914-
18) and the influenza epidemic that claimed 400 lives in 
Witseshoek in 1918 (Ross 1930: 72). In response to these factors, 
Charles Stevens sold his store in the reserve in 1916 [4]. 
After the war conditions improved dramatically. The rejuvenation 
of the Basotholand wool trade, as well as the death of Ntsane 
Mopeli in 1917, :provided new incentives for white traders to 
invest in the reserve. In 1918 George Brand, an ex-serviceman 
from the Eastern Cape, struck an agreement with Baklokwa 
chieftainess Eva Mota to set up a store in Tseseng village. A 
year later the Bannock family set up another store at Elands' 
Drift in the vicinity of Namahadi. The Gray family also expanded 
their activities in the Bakwena area by opening two new stores in 
Matsoekeng and Makeng in the early 1920s, and by 1925 they owned 
four of the six trading stores in the reserve (see Table 3.1). 
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But the ascendency of the Gray family emerged in the context of 
declining Bakwena power in the reserve. In 1925, for instance, 
Eva Mota managed to exploit a personal dispute with the Bakwena 
Paramount to obtain a 1 Batlokwa 1 territorial identity in the 
reserve (Quinlan 1987: 34). This development restricted the 
Grays, who had aligned themselves with Bakwena political 
interests, from expanding further in the reserve and enabled the 
Brands to consolidate their interests in the Batlokwa area. This 
division of trading interests along ethnic lines caused 
considerable tension between the two families. 
The disputes between the Grays and the Brands revolved around the 
wool trade, although growth did occur in the local consumer 
market. Ross highlights this in his characterisation of the state 
of reserve agriculture in 1930: 
Now ••• the reserve is full of bare patches, the roads are pothol!d 
and the best top soil has been wash~d a~ay. The. land 1s 
increasingly unfertile, and not enough 1s being cult1vated to 
feed the reserve's population [translation from Afrikaans] (1930: 
5 ) • 
The 1932 Native Economic Commission reached similar conclusions, 
in noting a 20% drop in agricultural yields since 1914 and a 
sharp decline in the quality of stock kept {UG 22-32:177). These 
conditions were exacerbated by a steady inflow of 'old and poor' 
farm workers who increased the population from 5 000 in 1913 to 
8 000 in 1930 (Ibid: 88). 
But in spite of growing proletarianisation, the main interest of 
white traders in the 1930s remained focused outside Witsieshoek 
in the Basotholand wool trade. During the 1930s the number of 
livestock grew phenomenally in Basotholand: in 1935 the Director 
for Agriculture claimed that there were twice as many stock being 
kept as the country could hold {Smit 1968: 35). This greatly 
stimulated the seasonal influx of Basotho merchants into the 
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reserve, resulting in separate negotiations by the Brand and Gray 
families with representatives of the Native Board in Witsieshoek 
for grazing camps along the key mountain passes. In the mid-1930s 
the Board agreed to allow them access to 20 morgan grazing camps 
along entry points from Basotholand in their respective areas (UG 
26-51:28). The concentration of commercial undertakings in 
Witsieshoek in the hands of these families after 1920 is 
illustrated in the following table: 




Owner name \ Location I Size \ acres Date of occupation 
------------------------------------------------------------------
Storekeeper G. Brand I Tseseng 20. 5. 1917 
Storekeeper W.H.Bannock* I Elands-drift 10 12. 3. 1919 
Storekeeper G. Gray Matsoekeng 10 3.12. 1920 
Storekeeper C.M. Gray Makeng 10 28. 7. 1923 
Storekeeper H.S. Elliot+ Thaba Tsoeu 12 1930 1 s 
Blacksmaith G • Gray Namahadi 12 4. 4. 1935 
Storekeeper G. Brand Makheneng 10 28. 7 • 1935 
------------------------------------------------------------------
[Source: Badenhorst 1944:7] 
Notes: * This store was taken over by D. Vorster, husband of 
Connie Gray, during the 1920 1 s 
+ Oral evidence suggests that H.S. Elliot managed this 
store on behalf of George Brand during the 1930 1 s 
The ability of the above two families to dominate the retail 
market in Witsiesh0ek was also related to the restrictions OFS 
licensing authorities placed on black commercial advancement [5]. 
Local dissatisfaction with licensing procedures was expressed at 
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the 1939 meeting of the Witsieshoek Native Board. The incumbent 
Bakwena paramount, Charles Mopeli, claimed that the situation had 
gone beyond the need for equal opportunities: 
It is the earnest desire of the native that he should be 
protected by legislation from the white traders who are anxious 
to monopolise business and trade in the area (Badenhorst 
1944: 197). 
Chief Ratsane Mopeli, local headman and competitor of Charles 
Mopeli, stated: 
If I were in power I would not allow local traders to occupy any 
more sites than those they presently occupy, because there are 
natives who desire ~o trade (Ibid). 
These complaints, together with growing ministerial pressure on 
OFS local authorities, resulted in the first licensed black 
trading stores being set up in Witsieshoek: one butcher and two 
general dealers in 1939 {Ibid:7). But these concessions made 
1 i t t 1 e i nip act on the prof i ts of w hi t e traders. Kok ( 19 6 5 : 6 9 ) 
maintains that between 1945 and 1947 more than 750 000 pounds of 
wool and 26 000 pounds of mohair were brought across the Namahadi 
pass from Basotholand. In addition, the white traders enjoyed 
locational advantages over their undercapitalised black 
competitors. They also controlled extensive credit networks which 
obliged consumers to use their stores. Cha~les Mopeli had 
anticipated that black entrepreneurs would not advance unless 
they could do so at the expense of entrenched white interests. 
His prediction was validated in the 1940s when declining yields 
associated with agricultural 'betterment', land redistribution 
and cattle culling prevented those black farmers with land from 
ploughing agricultural profits into commerce. 
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fh@ ~@e11ne of White Commerce after the Witsieshoek Rebellion 
By the late 1940's the growing discontent among reserve 
inhabitants with state imposed 'betterment' schemes generated 
powerful anti-white feeling in Witsieshoek. This was manifested 
in the growth of African Independent Churches, described by 
missionaries as having 1 bolshevik 1 leanings, and the 
establishment of a new militant faction of Leihlo le Sechaba, 
Lingangele ['Those who stand firm'] (Quinlan 1987:34). Intervie~s 
with white traders revealed that they were often threatened by 
radical groups, especially Lingangele whose blanketed horsemen 
would often stop their vehicles on local roads. Heightened local 
resistance to 'betterment' culminated in the Hitsieshoek 
Rebellion in 1950 led by local Bakwena chief Atwell Mopeli (cf. 
Maroney 1976, Hirson 1977, Lodge 1983). The Rebellion, dubbed by 
Lodge (1983) as "a desperate final act of resistance to 
proletarianisation", saw the death of more than twenty local 
inhabitants at the hands of an SAP commando, and scores of others 
fleeing to Basotholand to avoid police follow-up operations. 
From the point of view of white traders in the reserve, the 
Rebellion marked the end of a prolonged era of prosperity and 
growth. The association of white traders with the activities of 
the state resulted in a partial consumer boycott of white stores 
in 1951. More significant for the white traders than this minor 
interference were the recommendations of the Commission of 
Enquiry into the Witsieshoek disturbances, which stated that 
white trading concerns should be abolished in the region as their 
activities were inhibiting black entrepreneurial development (UG 
26-51). The Commission of Enquiry also maintained that local 
residents of Witsieshoek were vehemently opposed to the wool 
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trade, and pointed out that the regular n1ovement of Basotholand 
herders into the reserve depleted grazing resources and 
interfered with agricultural production (Ibid). 
As a result of these recommendations SAP patrols were set up at 
the Namahadi and the Monontsha passes in the mid-1950s to 
restrict entry into the area. Wool merchants wishing to enter the 
reserve were now required to carry a letter of authorisation from 
their village chief providing a description of their merchandise 
(Mapena 1970: 16). Faced with these restrictions, which exposed 
them to bribes from both border post officials and local chiefs, 
wool merchants began to look to the marketing structures 
available in Basotholand (Smit 1968: 39). Mapena (1970: 17) notes 
that by the 1960s, only the modingwana (dagga) merchants from the 
Mokgotlong district continued to evade police patrols on the 
Namahadi pass. 
The turn about in the wool trade significantly reduced the 
advantage white traders had over their local competitors. The 
Gray family, who suffered most from the border restrictions, 
attempted to salvage their interests in the trade by purchasing 
three OFS farms - Rhebok, Highlands and Caledonia - accessible to 
merchants crossing the border near the Golden Gate Nature 
Reserve. But this attempt to divert the wool trade was thwarted 
in 1966 when Basotholand took its independence and tighter border 
controls were introduced. The waning profits of white traders 
were further threatened by the activities of the Bantu Investment 
Corporation (BIC), which sought to hand over all individually 
owned white trading stores to local residents. In 1967, after the 
death of George Albert Brand in Tseseng, negotiations began for 
the transfer of Brand's holdings to the BIC. This transfer was 
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finally concluded in 1972 (QLA 1974). Gray family interests were, 
however, registered under the Companies Act and as such could not 
be expropriated. But, in spite of their survival, the family 
business was in rack and ruin by the late 1960s. Arthur Gray 
(Jr), presently manager of Qwaqwa store, maintained: 
At the end of the 1960s the family business was on the verge of 
collapsing. Most of the family were moving out of Qwaqwa because 
they felt that we would be ruined without the wool trade. It was 
a very difficult time for the us. I am sure that without the 
changes that occurred after the 1970s we would have gone 
bankrupt. 
The gradual eclipse of white trading interests during the 1950s 
and 1960s, however, was not accompanied by rapid commercial 
expansion Ly local entrepreneurs. Retail licensing for blacks in 
Witsieshoek proceeded extremely slowly after 1939. Indeed, by the 
late 1960s there were still only about half a dozen licensed 
black storekeepers in the Reserve (Mapena 1970). The formation of 
the BIC, heralded Ly Molteno (1976) and Southall (1983) as a 
driving force behind black middle-class formation in the 
Transkei, did little to promote black traders in Witsieshoek. 
Informants and parliamentarians were unanimous in their 
condemnation of the BIC, depicting it as an exploitative arm of 
the white state which collaborated with conservative white 
licensing officials to control homeland commerce. I quote some 
perceptions of the BIC recorded during my research: 
I would like to state emphatically that the BIC is here for its 
own good and not f9r ours - Qwaqwa trader 1974. 
Applications by the BIC to set up businesses here have not 
.reached the tribal authorities at all, yet their concerns are all 
over and will continue to be all over Qwaqwa if nothing timely is 
done - Bakwena chief, 1974. 
I would like to know why it happens when one applies for a 
certain business, then, when you wipe your eyes, you see the BIC 
is opening such a business - Qwaqwa NP, 1974. 
The policy [of Separate Development] is that we have to rule 
ourselves according to our customs. But whilst we are trying the 
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BIC comes along and does what it pleases ••• We have been given the 
BIC to develop us so that when we are developed it can destroy 
us - Qwaqwa MP, 1974. 
The BIC was like a hawk among chickens ••• it was a monster here to 
swallow us - Qwaqwa storekeeper, 1984. 
As these remarks suggest the chief aim of the BIC in Witsieshoek 
was to co-ordinate and preside over 'development' rather than to 
stimulate class formation. Its main achievements, consequently, 
lay not in the sphere of retailing where there was little need 
for centralisation, but in the transport and agriculture sectors 
which were more suited to state control. Small black retailers, 
for the most part, struggled along on their own resources and 
consciously avoided becoming indebted to the BIC. The failure of 
the BIC to stin1ulate black commercial development in Witsieshoek, 
however, ultimately had less to do with their inability to 
support black traders rather than with their reluctance to crush 
white commercial interests in the area (for comparison with the 
XDC in the Transkei see Stultz 1980, Southall 1983). 
Relocation and Retailing in Qwaqwa after 1970 
The demographic, political and economic profile of Witsieshoek 
underwent profound changes during the 1970s with the arrival of 
homeland self-government. In 1969 Witsieshoek accepted self-
government under Baklokwa Paramount Wessels Mota and was given 
powers to legislate on behalf of its citizens, to administer its 
own funds, and to associate independently with other nations. 
These developments offset massive population relocation to Qwaqwa 
as OFS farmers and urban administrators used political change in 
the reserve to justify the expulsion of thousands of 'South 
Sotho' families from common South Africa. The impact of 
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population relocation to Qwaqwa was both immediate and largely 
unanticipated. In 1972 Councillor Sekonyela claimed that: 
There are already too many people in the homeland. The areas set 
aside for residential development are overcrowded and new 
arrivals are being settled on agricultural land. Our resources 
are so exhausted that people will soon have to eat one another in 
Qwaqwa (QLA 1972: 42). 
Chief Councillor Mota expressed similar fears when he claimed 
that if the South African government did not grant Qwaqwa more 
land it would eventually have to build high-rise dwellings in the 
area to accommodate all the new immigrants (Ibid: 39}. 
But neither land nor large scale employment creation schemes were 
forthcoming. By 1974 when Mota's successor T. K. Mopeli accepted 
further self-governing powers, the Qwaqwa population had already 
doubled in the previous five years. The homeland was rapidly 
becoming a massive rural slum with sprawling 'closer settlement' 
villages over-running the remaining agricultural land. Most of 
the new arrivals in the early 1970's were Basotho families 
evicted from white farms in the north-eastern OFS. On arrival 
these families were settled in transit camps, while government 
bulldozers worked overtime to clear more land for 'closer 
settlement' villages to be established. These villages were 
designed around urban density land use patterns and lacked all 
basic amenities, with the single exception of communal water 
taps. Other refugees from the urban areas with Section 10.1 (a) 
and (b) qualifications were resettled in the new town of 
Phuthaditjhaba, built to accommodate some 25 000 people. The pace 
of relocation did not abate throughout the 1970s with an average 
of about 3 800 people arriving in the area every month [6]. 
Between 1970 and 1983 the overall population of Qwaqwa grew from 
about 40 000 to an estimated 500 000 (Sharp 1982) [for more 
detailed discussion of population relocation see Sharp 1982, 
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Robins 1983, Krause 1983,. Salo 1984 and Niehaus 1984]. 
The impact of this demographic explosion on the slow moving 
homeland retail trade was profound. Within the space of a few 
years Qwaqwa moved from a state of marginal over-trading to being 
one of the most chronically under-traded homelands in South 
Africa. In the early 1970s Qwaqwa's commercial resources were 
concentrated in established villages such as Namahadi, Tseseng' 
and Monontsha, while in the new closer settlement areas trading 
stores were virtually non-existent. This is not surprising given 
that at least one new store was needed every month to keep pace 
with relocation. It has been noted, for instance, that residents 
of Tseki village, settled in 1974, were forced to wait three 
years for their first licensed trading store (Niehaus 1984:11). 
In Phuthaditjhaba the situation was even worse as developers 
consistently argued that commercial expansion could only begin 
once the main residential zones in the town were complete. 
Consequently, the first families to settle in the Maqhekung 
segment of the town waited six years for the establishment of 
trading stores (cf.Robins 1982). 
While disjuncture between residential and commercial development 
in Qwaqwa in the early 1970s was clearly related to the 
relocation process, evidence suggests that applications for 
business licenses were frequently refused by the Harrismith 
municipality, still the controlling body of licensing in the 
homeland. In 1976 the Qwaqwa Minister of Interior pointed to the 
difficulty traders were experiencing in obtaining licences: 
Complaints have been lodged over a very long period by Basothos 
because they experience some difficulty with the issuing of 
licences for whi~h they apply. There have been recommendations 
made by the tribai authorities that licences should be issued to 
certain people but this has never been done (QLA 1976: 684). 
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The tardiness of licensing procedures was compounded by strict 
health regulations imposed on black traders. One trader explained 
that health officials were blatantly discriminatory in their 
practices: 
In Witsieshoek every shop that belongs to a black man is a modern 
shop • Thi s i s be ca u s e he has to consul t the Department of Heal th 
Services before he builds the shop. But we find that the 
inspectors do not even enter the shops belonging to whites, and 
they do not inspect them. Had these shops been inspected, these 
people would have been told to close their businesses long ago 
and to leave. These whites carry on their businesses in shelters 
knocked together with pieces of corrugated iron, they are 
windowless and dark inside (QLA 1976: 914). 
The difficulties black traders experienced obtaining licences 
during the early 1970s spawned a thriving illicit trade in the 
homeland. Evidence from Tseki and Phuthadithjaba suggests that 
backyard retailing and hawking operations mushroomed during this 
period. In the Diappolo and Maqlekung segments of Phuthaditjhaba 
virtually every third house was engaged in retailing of some 
description, be it shebeening, fresh produce hawking or coffin 
selling. But these enterprises were typically small and under-
capitalised, and were most often run by women. The town was also 
filled with brokers, who acted as on-the-spot agents for white 
traders from Bethlehem and Harrismith. More direct forms of 
outside intervention were seen in the daily trips of nearby 
farmers into Qwaqwa to sell vegetables, low grade meat and milk. 
The shortage of these basic items resulted in their trucks being 
swamped on arrival. One woman explained that it seldom took 
farmers more than five minutes to dispense of their wares in 
Phuthaditjhaba. 
In the villages food shortages were more acute, as were the 
resources individuals had with which to purchase them. Incoming 
trucks loaded with basic needs items seldom got further than 
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villages situated on the outer perimeter of Qwaqwa. Residents 
settled in areas like Tseki were consequently forced to walk 
miles to purchase goods. Many waited in Phuthaditjhaba for days, 
while supplies of bread and meal were delayed. Others travelled 
to Harrismith and Bethlehem to take advantage of lower prices and 
the greater variety of goods offered there. In 1976 it was 
estimated that more than two million rand was spent annually by 
Qwaqwa citizens in Harrismith and Bethlehem (QLA 1976). In this 
context it is not surprising that the Harrismith municipality was 
reluctant to issue licences to Qwaqwa residents. 
But the difficulties experienced by village consumers were partly 
alleviated by the growth of illegal stores in these areas. A 
survey conducted by the Ministry of Health in Qwaqwa in 1977 
revealed that in the seven major Bakwena villages there were at 
least 17 stores operating without licences. Many were owned by 
individuals who had their business applications nominally 
accepted by the tribal authorities, but refused by the Harrismith 
municipality (QLA 1977: 520). These illegal storekeepers did not 
lead an easy life in the villages, since SAP patrols were 
frequently sent into the villages to rout unlicensed dealers and 
confiscate stock (cf. Bank 1984: 72-73). 
Licensing conditions in Qwaqwa improved after 1976 with the 
passing of the Qwaqwa Trading and Business Undertakings Act which 
transferred the control of business licensing to the Qwaqwa 
government. The formation of the Qwaqwa Development Corporation 
in December 1975 also contributed to the new trend towards 
licensed commerce (cf. Chapter 2). The following table indicates 
the cumulative growth of business licensing in Qwaqwa between 
1976 and 1984. 
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Table 1.2: Cumulative Growth of Business Licensing in Qwagwa 1976-84 
I 1976 I 1978 I 1980 I 1982 I 1984 I 
--------------------------------------------------------
General Dealers 12 43 60 88 124 
B 
A Cates 4 21 38 43 61 
s 
I Ft. & Veg./Hawkers 5 10 21 27 47 
C 
s Rest. (Take-ai,,ays) 1 6 11 15 26 
Wood & Coal 3 12 29 40 74 
--------------------------------------------------------
Specialised s~ops* I 1 5 11 26 48 
Other** \ 10 I 22 I 37 I 58 I 97 I 
-~~;;~--------------,-;~---1-i~~--\-;~;--\-;;;--1-;;;--1 
* Under specialised stores I have included shoeshops, record 
bars, butcheries, bottlestores, furniture dealers, hair salons, 
home appliance stores and watchmakers. 
** This category includes such licences as livestock speculators, 
~and and brick merchants and funeral parlors. 
The new drive towards licensed commerce was understandably 
concentrated on basic needs items. Between 1976 and 1980, 134 
licences or 78% of the total issued were concerned with the 
provision of basic needs items. Of these 61% were either general 
dealer or cafe licences. According to an ex-secretary of the 
Bakwena tribal authority, most of the new owners were elderly 
household heads from the farms who entered business on money 
earned from stock sales. After 1970 the Qwaqwa government 
insisted that farm refugees sold their cattle on arrival to avoid 
overstocking. The ex-secretary explained the tribal authorities' 
predicament in giving ex-farm workers licences: 
The tribal authority was reluctant to give these men licences 
because they realised they were illiterate and did not have 
tiusiness experience. But the Bakwena chiefs had no choice: the 
people were complaining that they were suffering without shops. 
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Although ex-farm workers predominated among the new licensees, a 
number of traders from urban areas also acquired licences in the 
'closer settlements' in response to advertisements on Radio 
Sesotho. These owners, prepared to brave 'closer settlement' life 
for quick profits, soon emerged as the leading retailers in the 
villages. They also, as we will see in Chapter Two, were more 
politically aware than their rural counterparts and established 
themselves as leading representatives of the Qwaqwa Traders 
Association in the late 1970s. 
As the 1980s approached relocation began to abate. For the first 
time bureaucrats and administrators were given a chance to 
reflect on the changes of the preceding decade and consciously 
plan the future. In the field of retailing two important policy 
shifts were brought to fruition. Firstly, licensing prodecures in 
Qwaqwa were overhauled with the establishment of the 
Phuthaditjhaba Licensing Board which replaced the ad hoc 
screening procedures of the late 1970s. Secondly, the Qwaqwa 
Development Corporation was given the go ahead to proceed with 
its Tripartite Agreement System to rationalise retailing. 
practices in the area [9]. Consequently, the late 1970s saw the 
arrival of South African companies such as SASKO, Toyota, Plate 
Glass and Frasers Wholesalers, supposedly to serve the interests 
of local traders. In 1979 these initial steps were followed by 
the inauguration of a series of shopping centre projects, 
specifically designed to house large South African retailing 
concerns. These endeavours, as we will see in the following 
chapter, sparked off a strong political reaction from existing· 
traders, but at the same time prompted retailers to engage in a 
more diverse spread of commercial undertaking. The centrepiece of 
the QDC rationalisation programme was the Setsing complex 
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constructed in Phuthaditjhaba in 1979. The new complex housed 35 
stores structured around a large white-owned supermarket. This 
venture was followed in the 1980s by other similar projects in 
Namahadi, Makwane, Tseki and Tseseng. 
Although the QDC heralded its new commercial vision as an attempt 
to return to Qwaqwa profits previously lost to white traders in 
Bethlehem and Harrismith, there is little doubt that the brunt of 
its endeavours was borne by rural traders in the homeland. 1he 
spread of white-financed supermarkets into the closer settlement 
villages in the 1980s produced in its wake mounting cases of 
bankruptcy among ordinary general dealer and cafe owners, who 
were unable to compete with the lower prices offered in 
supermarkets. Stores began to change hands rapidly as previously 
successful retailers were forced to lease out their premises to 
avoid complete bankruptcy. The other major consequence of the 
shopping centre schemes was that they introduced greater numbers 
of specialised stores (hair salons, watch repair stores, clothing 
shops etc) into Qwaqwa. This hastened the decline of the 
struggling rural petty-bourgeoisie which by the mid-1980s was 
increasingly giving way to a more professional urban trading 
fraternity (these changes will received close attention in 
Chapter Four). 







and the decline of rural 
that my research into 
retailing as a 
this sector was 
I interviewed 40 licensed traders in 
Phuthaditjhaba, Namahadi, Tseseng, and Tseki - 31 of these owners 
were general dealer-and cafe owners, while nine owned specialised 
stores. In addition to these interviews, discussions were held 
with representatives of the Qwaqwa Chamber of Commerce. licensing 
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officials, QDC representative and local bookkeepers. Although 
the actual number of traders interviewed represented 
approximately 10% of the total number of licensed retailers in 
Qwaqwa, the selection of the owners was not based on a random 
sampling technique. Owners were rather selected on a regional 
basis to allow for a comparative focus to be built into the 
research both within the retailing sector and with other 
commercial sectors. 
In the following sections I will turn my attention to changing 
conditions in the transport and liquor markets in Qwaqwa. 
THE TRANSPORT TRADE 
The Rise of a Black Transport Business in Witsieshoek 
With the exception of a few studies that concentrate on the role 
of black transport riders in the peasant economies of the Eastern 
Cape and Natal (see especially Nasson 1982), little has been 
written about the rise of rural black transport entrepreneurs in 
South Africa during the first half of this century. Although 
Charles van Onselen (1982) recently published a study of the 
early taxi cab business on the Witwatersrand, this work is 
neither rural nor predominantly concerned with black 
entrepreneurs. This gap in revisionist history in South Africa 
reflects not only the widespread obsession with African 
proletarianisation and white capital accumulation. but also the 
tenacity of dependency theory which rests on the assumption that 
development and underdevelopment are reverse sides of the same 
coin. This section focuses mainly on the rise and demise of a 
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black bus business in Witsieshoek after the 1930s. 
The rise of black transport riders in Witsieshoek can be traced 
back to the emergence of a thriving farming economy in Harrismith 
district during the late nineteenth century (cf. Steytler 1932, 
Bundy 1979, Keegan 1984). Rising yields in this period generated 
a growing demand for middlemen to transport and market 
agricultural goods at the nearest railhead. Keegan (1981: 90) 
notes that the inability of farmers to perform these functions 
led a growing number of black transport riders to assume these 
tasks. Although Witsieshoek lacked the potential for producing a 
large agricultural surplus, the presence of white traders acting 
as brokers for the black peasantry ensured that a highly 
lucrative market developed around the transfer of agricultural 
goods to and from the nearest railway station at Harri smith. Both 
oral and missionary sources suggest that from 1895 both chiefs 
and commoners in Witsieshoek were purchasing wagons for the 
purpose of entering the transport business. This practice 
continued until the early 1930's when motorised transport first 
arrived in the area [9]. 
The effect of motorised transport in Witsiehoek was abrupt and 
decisive. In the space of a few years the truck and the tractor 
replaced the entire black wagon trade (cf. Badenhorst 1944). From 
the 1930s onwards local white traders were able to journey to and 
from the station without the assistance of black intermediaries. 
Indeed, by 1934 the Gray family not only catered for all its own 
transport needs, but also ran a local bus service for migrants 
from Qwaqwa village to Afrikaskop station. A few years later a 
competing service was set up by the SAR. 
During the 1940s increasing labour migration, together with the 
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liberalisation of transport licensing under Natal local 
authorities [10], rejuvenated black transport interests in 
Witsieshoek. In the late 1940s two local peasant farmers led the 
way by setting up buses on the Harrismith/Rydal Mount road. 
Shortly afterwards they were joined by other operators from 
Harrismith, Monontsha and Tseseng. The leading figure in the new 
black transport business was a Makong stock farmer, Kama Twala, 
who at one stage ran three buses between Witsieshoek, Harrismith 
and Bethlehem. But by the 1960s his dominance over the market 
began to wane, providing space for new entrepreneurs to break 
into the business. By 1965 there was no single controlling 
interest. The market had entered a competitive phase with the 
four major operators Mohamane, Twala, Modingoana and Motaung 
struggling for control. But these conditions were short-lived 
with the arrival of the BIC in the homeland. 
From the point of view of the BIC, the existence of a free market 
in transport was not compatible with the state's decentralisation 
initiatives and the anticipated growth of frontier commuting. The 
Corporation was well aware that the success of these policies 
depended in large measure on keeping worker subsistence costs 
down by subsidising and controlling housing and transport 
(Swilling & Maccarthy 1985). But neither of these objectives 
could be realised without state monopoly. Consequently, in 1967 
the BIC attempted:to set up negotiations with local bus owners 
for the establishment of a single company supported by the state. 
This initiative was rejected outright by Twala and Mohamane who 
saw the move as a guise for introducing a white monopoly. The 
lesser owners, Motaung and Modingoana, on the other hand, felt 
they had nothing · to lose by going into partnership with the 
state. The BIC, undeterred by this lack of consensus, set up the 
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Setsokotsane Bus Service as a local monopoly in 1969 with 
Modingoana and Motaung as the leading shareholders. Both Twala 
and Mohamane were left out of the agreement. This exclusion was 
seen as unprecedented by local traders. In 1974 a member of the 
new Qwaqwa Legislative Assembly reflected on the manner in which 
the BIC conducted the Setsokotsane agreement: 
The BIC was brought to this homeland when local bus owners asked 
it for assistance, but I can assure you that it drowned these 
owners. Orginally, when Setsokotsane was established there were 
four chickens [Twala, Mohamane, Modingwana and Motaung]. But now 
only two remain. I cannot give you the assurance that they will 
live very long (QLA 1974). 
The BIC tried to justify its actions by arguing in its 1974 
report that it had been forced to intervene in homeland 
transport, because local bus owners were "not professionally 
equipped to deal with rising demands" (BIC Annual Report 1974:8). 
rYet there is no evidence to suggest that there were any 
improvements in public transport in Qwaqwa between 1969 and 1975.J 
In fact, with the advent of relocation it got considerably worse 
and between 1969 and 1973 the company ran only five buses for a 
population that was rapidly approaching the 100 000 mark. 
Transport conditions in the villages were appalling. One resident 
from Tseseng attempted to explain the situation: 
Women have to stand in long queues with their babies on their 
backs. When a bus arrives it is often full, if not, they are 
packed in like sardines into a tin. Some remain standing all the 
time until they get to Harrismith. The situation is particularly 
bad in Tseseng, Makaneng and Thaba Tshewu where one can wait a 
whole day without a single bus arriving (QLA 1975: 231). 
Another speaker reflected on the effects of the poor bus service 
on e mp l oy men t: 
The Setsokotsane bus service is cruel. It has caused many people 
to lose their jobs, simply because at the time they needed 
transport these buses were not available. Some people [working in 
Harrismith] do not even come home over the weekend because they 
know they will lose their jobs as a result of these buses. You 
can see the seriousness of the situation, Mr Chairman, when you 
have a case where a person gets up at five 'o clock in the 
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paying the more expensive daily fares. 
Sources: BENBO 1978. BIC Annual Reports 
(1979780), Setsokotsane Annual Reports. 
(1976-84) SAIRR 
As predicted, the rationalisation of Setsokotsane in the late 
1970s brought with it greater white control. Managers were 
imported from other homelands to run the business. In 1978 
Motaung and Modingoana lost their majority share in the company 
and eventually, in 1982, both owners were completely bought out 
by the Corporation for Economic Development. This agreement not 
only marked the end of an era in the history of public transport 
in Qwaqwa, but also made Qwaqwa the only homeland in which the 
local bus service was entirely owned and run by the South African 
government. 
The Taxi Business in Qwaqwa (1976-84) 
r 
The decline of local bus interests in Qwaqwa corresponded with a 
rise in the homeland taxi business.J The roots of the taxi 
r 
movement in Qwaqwa can be traced back to the early 1970s when the 
Setsokotsane bus service had proven itself incapable of meeting 
local transport needs.j The shortage of public transport in this 
period produced a plethora of part-time or casual taxi operators 
using vans and bakkies. rThese owners were usually engaged in a 
range of commercial activities involving the transfer of goods 
from areas of abundance to areas of shortage. In addition to 
transporting building materials, fresh produce, alcohol and 
furniture they carried people. The demands on their time and the 
profitablity of their major activities restricted their 
involvement in taxiing to weekends~ when large numbers of people 
wished to travel to Harrismith and Bethlehem. Yet, interspersed 
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among these operators, was a small group of permanent licensed 
commuter • ' tax1men. In 1974 they comprised about half-a-dozen 
operators who travelled to and from Harri smith on a daily basis. 
Unlike their casual counterparts, they used cars rather than 
bakkies, and were legally limited to passenger loads of four 
people. This limitation restricted profits and put a premium on 
multiple licence holding. Consequently, at the end of 1974 they 
set up the Qwaqwa Taxi Association to standardise their services 
and bargain for more licences-J 
After 1976 with the expansion of Setsokotsane the taxi trade came 
under serious threat from the cheaper bus service. With the taxi 
trade on the verge of collapse, taximen started moving into new 
business 
r 
spheres to recuperate their losses. However, in 1977 
amendments to the Road Transportation Act breathed new life into 
the local trade. Licensees were now allowed to purchase kombi 
taxis which were legally entitled to carry eight passengers.J In 
1979 the commuter trade received a further boost with the tarring 
of the Harrismith road. These new conditions produced a flood of 
licence applications to the Bloemfontein Transportation Board, 
increasing commuter taxis from about 10 in 1978 to 30 in 1980. 
But these achievements were cut short by the Setsokotsane, whose 
interests the state sought to protect (cf. Chapter Four). Between 
1980 and 1985 only six additional licenses were extracted by 
commuter taximen. In these circumstances Qwaqwa experienced the 
re-emergence of an illegal commuter and local taxi business. In 
1982 a Setsokotsane survey revealed that 17% of all kombis 
travelling to Harrisrnith were unlicensed. A further group of 
Harrismith Association owners. licensed to operate only within 
the Harrismith municipal boundaries, had also made inroads into 
the commuter market by the early 1980s. Qwaqwa owners reported 
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that police patrols in Harrismith were unaware of these 
infringements because they seldom travelled outside the town. In 
spite of these interferences, there is little doubt that commuter 
taxi profits had increased dramatically since the mid-1970s. The 
high incidence of multiple ownership among commuter taxirnen - one 
Phuthaditjhaba owner held eight licences in 1984 - and the good 
quality of Qwaqwa Taxi Association vehicles was indicative of the 
boom in the commuter taxi trade. 
In contrast to developments on the commuter front, the internal 
taxi trade remained retrogressive. rsetsokotsane's tight web of 
internal routes eradicated many of the earlier transport 
opportunities inside the homeland. But gaps in supply still 
existed, especially in areas where demand was irregular and could 
not easily be accommodated by bus timetables"...)r In openings were 
filled by local truck and van owners, operating unhindered by 
local traffic police. In 1985 there about were 50 regular 
internal taximen left._, 
If the kombi taxi had made a lasting imprint on the commuter 
market, its influence was equally powerful in the sphere of long-
distance transport. By the late 1970s all migrant transport from 
Qwaqwa was controlled by three state monopolies - United 
Transport, Greyhound and the S.A. Railways. 'The SAR services were 
the most regular: a weekly bus service was established between 
Qwaqwa and Welkom, Johannesburg, Vereeniging and Secunda during 
the 1970s, while trains were available from Harrismith, Bethlehem 
and Afrikaskop.J Attempts to have the railway line extended from 
Afrikaskop to Qwaqwa were floored by the Kestel municipality in 
1980, which feared that the move would encourage loitering in the 
town (OLA 1980). But, while long-distance transport was receiving 
some attention from the authorities, migrancy patterns from 
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Qwaqwa were changing rapidly in the late 1970s. According to the 
National Manpower Commission, the total number of migrants in the 
h9meland increased from 35 000 in 1979 to 51 000 in 1981 (Mare 
1983: 81) [11]. New service contracts, incorporating a flexible 
weekend leave structure, also influenced demand patterns. Workers 
were no longer satisfied with slow SAR buses, which left the 
cities at times inconvenient to the majority of migrants. They 
wanted a transport system that ensured rapid transfer and could 
accommodate irregular travelling hours. Migrants clocking out at 
6.00 pm on Friday evening in Welkom or Johannesburg wished to 
arrive home in Qwaqwa, some 300 kms away,ron the same evening, so 
that they could maximise the amount of time with their families 
before having to return to work by Monday morning.~ In the late 
1970s, as the following SAR bus timetable demonstrates, these 
demands could not be met by the existing migrant transport 
system: 
Table 1.4: Departure and Arrival Times of SAR Buses from Three 

















Welkom/ D 7:00 7:00 
' 
Qwaqwa A 15:00 15:00 
Secunda/ D 
Qwaqwa A 












Source: Superintendent of Passenger Services, SAR, Cape Town. 
In terms of the above schedule, the time taken by a migrant to 
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travel the 320 kms from Welkom to Phuthaditjhaba on Friday 
evening totals eight and a half hours. This excludes the extra 
time wasted getting home from the Phuthaditjhaba bus stop where 
there are no buses operating at 3.35 am in the morning. 
'In the context of widening cracks in the long-distance transport 
market, local vehicle owners in Qwaqwa and in urban areas set 
themselves up in competition with the existing bus companies. 
These owners gained immediate popularity among migrants, who by 
the most conservative estimates could expect to have their 
travelling times halved by engaging the services of unlicensed 
pirate taximen.Jln the period between 1978 and 1981 the number of 
regular long distance taxi pirates operating from Qwaqwa grew 
from about 15 to well over a hundred [12]. ~he rate at which 
these owners had spun their commercial web over the migrant 
transport trade caused major internal disputes between taxi 
pirates over issues such as loading, fares and safety precautions 
(especially drunken driving) 
organisational monitoring of 
and necessitated 
the trade as a 
some form of 
{ 
whole.) The 
Majakathata (the strugglers) Taxi Association was inaugurated to 
realise this objective.) The Association represented a loose 
alliance of all long-distance owners operating within Qwaqwa and 
Lesotho and sought to standardise services through the creation 
of 'line committees'. These committees aimed at controlling entry 
into the trade, monitoring supply, hearing passenger complaints 
and supervising loading procedures. 
For the first year of its existence Majakathata operated with 
great efficiency as an umbrella body uniting all long-distance 
taxi operators in Qwaqwa. However, following the publication of 
the Welgemoed Commission's findings in 1982, which slated the 
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pirate taxi business, more localised interests began to come to 
the fore within the organisation. Police activity in the OFS 
played an important part in fragmenting the taxi pirates. {y 
Clampdowns on routes such as the Welkom 'line' by Railways and 
the OFS traffic police began to cause tensions with other 'line 
committees', who were expected to pay higher subscription fees to 
cover the legal expenses of their Welkom colleagues.) 
r,:o compound matters, the emerging schisms were deepened by the ', 
intervention of association lawyers, who sought to set up car-
hire companies to short-circuit police arrests.; They proposed 
that Majakathata be dissolved into a number of smaller companies 
operating under the facade of car rental schemes. This 
suggestion, while opposed by the Majakathata executive, was 
quickly exploited in the urban areas, ~nd by the end of 1983 a 
taxi war had broken out between the new urban entrepreneurs and 
the original founders of the pirate business in the homeland:J 
Between the middle of 1983 and February 1984 long-distance taxi 
pirating fell into a state of collapse with the involvement of 
urban street gangs as protection racketeers in taxi trade. 
Incidents of violence became widespread at the various OFS taxi 
ranks as passengers were driven away, drivers assaulted, and 
vehicles vandalised. Fearing for their safety, migrants moved 
back onto the buses and the profits within the long-distance taxi 
trade plummeted. 
By June of 1984 the situation had stablised with the signing of a 
number of agreements between competing taxi associations and car-
hire companies. An uneasy peace settled over the trade, and this 
is how it remained until I left the field in February 1985. It 
was nevertheless clear by this stage that Majakathata was slowly 
reorganising itself into car-hire companies. 
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'. ':/ 
In this context of rapid change it is difficult to isolate the 
essential features of long-distance pirate taximen and their 
scope for accumulation. I will venture to suggest, however, that 
if conditions continue to stabilise, these owners will find 
themselves in a powerful economic position as the state has made 
no attempt to remedy the dismal bus services available to 
migrants. Indeed, in spite of the tense and volatile state of the 
pirate taxi business during 1984 and 1985, there was abundant 
evidence that these operators were approaching their business 
with innovation. One impressive development which began to emerge 
in 1985 was the establishment of a weekend hire scheme where 
groups of ten or more people could hire a kombi and a driver to 
take them to a specific destination and wait for them to complete 
their business before returning. Soccer fans and church groups 
were particularly attracted to these schemes. 
The overall success of long-distance pirates was also 
demonstrated in other ways. For instance, in contrast to other 
groups of pirate taximen discussed below, long-distance operators 
were distinguished by the quality of the vehicles they used. 
Almost without exception their kombis were the latest 15-seaters 
on the market and came with a range of accessories such as tape 
decks, mag wheels, tinted windows and CB radios. In addition, 
1 multiple-vehicle ownership was common in this category. In fact, 
half of the people interviewed either owned more than one vehicle 
·individually or were members of families with multiple vehicles. 
The latter owners were also often involved in other commercial 
activities. Finally, to provide some indication of the kinds of 
profits that could be made in this business it can be noted that 
a single journey to Johannesburg with a full combi load earned a 
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ti, (gross income of R300. > Some of the wealthiest owners were making 
as many as six journeys a week during 1985. In this context it is 
little wonder that many of the licensed taximen in Qwaqwa were 
attempting to muscle their way into the illegal business. 
My research into the taxi trade was conducted in January and 
February 1985 and involved the collection of 20 life-histories of 
members from a variety of the above associations. Additional 
interviews were conducted with the bus company officials and 
members of association executives to glean additional information 
about the trade as a whole. The general mobility of taximen and 
complexities of association politics made it extremely difficult 
to interview owners from all associations. I consequently focused 
my research primarily on the long-distance trade where the 
intervals between journeys were sufficiently long to conduct 
detailed interviews. 
THE LIQUOR TRADE 
The liquor Trade in Witsieshoek 
Although it is a well-known fact that the consumption and 
distribution of homebrewed beer formed an integral part of daily 
life in rural African communities throughout South Africa durin9 
the early part of this century, little has been written on the 
rise of a commercial liquor trade in rural African communities to 
supplement the growing body of literature on liquor trade in 
urban African communities (Pinnock 1982, Kock 1983, la Hause 
1984, Coplan 1985, Scharf 1986). 
In this section, I do not claim to be able to document the rise 
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of a commercial liquor trade in Witsieshoek in any detail since 
that would have required an entirely separate oral history 
project. I merely wish to point to the historical depth of 
commercial liquor dealing in the reserve and highlight some of 
the continuities between urban and rural liquor trading. 
Charles van Onselen (1982) has recently argued that enlarged 
agricultural surpluses in the Transvaal in the 1880s were an 
important antecedent to the emergence of liquor production on the 
Witwatersrand. The use of liquor as a means of storing 
agricultural surplus, he argues, is a recurring historical theme 
in the transition from feudal to capitalist agriculture in Europe 
(1982:45). In a similar vein, commercial liquor production in the 
north-eastern OFS, manifested in the establishment of the 
Demarillac Distillery in Harrismith in 1895, appears to be 
increasingly closely related to the consolidation of an 
capitalist white farming sector in the region in the late 
nineteenth century (cf. Keegan 1981). 
The arrival of commercially produced liquor in Witsieshoek and 
northern Basotholand in general preceded the growth of a local 
liquor industry in the OFS. Keegan (1986: 202) notes that by the 
1880s: 
A number of liquor canteens has sprung up [in Basotholand], where 
Basotho illicitly exchanged grain for cheap often unadulterated 
Cape Brandy - a muid of grain was often exchanged for a bottle, 
ensuring big profits for liquor vendors. 
Walton (1958) corroborates this evidence by suggesting that white 
farmers were engaged in smuggling copious quantities of liquor 
across the eastern border of Basotholand in the 1890s. He quotes 
a Basotholand missionary: 
the strongest and vilest Cape Smoke [brandy], we call it 'kill at 
forty yards', is daily being smuggled into the country by 
unprincipled men, both Dutch and English, and a whole string of 
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illicit grog shops and canteens exist along the border (p.30). 
Despite the availability of Cape liquor in Witsieshoek by the 
late nineteenth century, there is no evidence to suggest that 
Cape liquor was used in Witsieshoek in large quantities prior to 
the 1890s. Missionary evidence suggests that Paramount chief 
Paulus Mopeli was opposed to the illegal liquor trade and only 
encouraged the brewing of traditional jwala (Badenhorst 1944: 
258). But, with the arrival of the Harrismith distillery and the 
outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War, conditions began to change in 
Witsieshoek. Several factors seem important in the transformation 
of local attitu~es. Firstly, the closure of the mines and OFS 
roadworks brought migrants home with first-hand experience of the 
liquor trade in the compounds. Secondly, the arrival of 20 000 
British troops in Harrismith heightened local awareness of the 
popularity of commercial liquor. Thirdly, the death of Paulus 
Mopeli in 1897 and his replacement by the rebellious, anti-
mission Ntsane Mopeli undermined the temperance philosophies of 
the Dutch Reformed church (Ross 1930: 60). Fourthly, the vacation 
of white farms in the Harrismith area during the war enabled 
Witsieshoek residents to travel freely to nearby towns to 
purchase liquor (Steytler 1932). 
Whatever the combination of these factors, there is little doubt 
that local brewers in Witsieshoek were selling mixtures of 
traditional beer and commercial liquor for profit during the war. 
Describing conditions in the reserve, Badenhorst (1944} maintains 
that 1 drunkeness 1 and 'anarchy' were interrupting the work of the 
mission. Rev Ross' letters reveal a similar complaint: 
There is no law and order in the reserve at all •••• Beer brewing 
and drinking, pagan dancing and all sorts of terrible things are 
occurring. Moreover, many beer canteens have been set up and sell 
beer to the public. The reserve will soon be full of canteens. I 
have already protested about this to the chiefs [translation from 
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Afrikaans] (Ross 1930: 57). 
The initial growth of commercial brewing waned with the 
restoration of law and order in the reserve after the war and the 
tighter implementation of the 1897 prohibition on liquor sales to 
Africans in white areas. But commercial brewing did not 
disappear. This is confirmed by missionary reports and the 
descriptions of reserve life found in the opening chapter of 
Mopeli-Paulus' (1952) Blanket Boy 1 s Moon. Mopeli-Paulus, writing 
of the conditions in Witsieshoek before the 1913 Land Act, 
maintains that landless widows and other women made a living from 
the sale of beer: "in order to make more money , they added 
certain liquors to their brew which quickly made men drunk and 
senseless 11 (1953: 21). 
The oral accounts of the liquor trade in the 1920s and 1930s 
provide rich descriptions of the kinds of concoctions brewed in 
the area with the arrival of new recipes from urban areas. But at 
the same time they describe a liquor trade with little vitality, 
which was relatively homogeneous and conservative. Commercial 
beer production remained linked 





consumption patterns. Rural women in Witsieshoek could only 
improvise urban traditions of which they had little or no 
personal experience. In this sense, the Witsieshoek trade lagged 
behind other reserves located closer to the city. La Hause (1983: 
9), for instance, suggests that in parts of Natal rural women 
manipulated the five-day pass system to travel into Durban over 
weekends to sell large calabashes and paraffin tins of utswala to 
migrants, thereby retaining some continuity between brewing 
traditions in town and country [13). The distance of Witsieshoek 




rural brewers from extracting large profits by penetrating into 
urban areas. Local accounts depict the reserve trade as small and 
irregular, peaking at periods when large numbers of migrants were 
home. 
The activities of liquor traders in Witsieshoek during this 
period were not comparable with those of their urban counterparts 
who fed on media images, cross-cultural contact and urban dance 
and music subcultures to establish vibrant drinking houses (cf. 
Coplan 1985). Shebeeners in Witsieshoek were neither cultural 
innovators nor aspirant capitalists [14]. They simply serviced 
the needs of migrant workers by integrating urban drinking habits 
with established rural liquor consumption patterns. In this sense 
the operations of liquor traders contrasted markedly with those 
of retailers and transport operators prior to the 1960s. 
The Rise of the Liquor Trade in Qwaqwa 
Conditions in the liquor trade improved marginally in the 1960s 
with the lifting of the prohibition on African liquor purchasing 
in white areas. In 1962 it became legal for blacks to carry up to 
nine litres of bottled liquor from white residential areas into 
r 
locations • .) 'This measure, combined with increasing population 
relocation from the mid-1960s, \ stimulated liquor sales in the 
reserve. But at the same time there were still important 
limitations. rFirstly, there were no bottlestores in Witsieshoek 
during the 1960s, forcing shebeeners to carry the expense of 
regular journeys into Kestell and Harrismith to purchase liquor.; 
( 
Secondly, this period was typified by the influx of farm families 
into Qwaqwa who had little experience of shebeening. Liquor 
' 
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consumption in the OFS countryside was generally confined to 
domestic units where women brewed beer daily for the household 
r-
head. The residential locations on most farms were also too 
small to commercialise liquor production. 
~ 
Increased urban removals to Qwaqwa in the 1970s, however, moved 
the core of the shebeen trade to Phuthaditjhaba. The urban 
relocation policy to Qwaqwa had two aspects. On the one hand, it 
concentrated on resettling entire urban communities in 'freehold' 
locations. The most striking cases of this were witnessed in the 
demolition of the Schoonplaas locations in Harrismith in 1972 and 
the Vergenoeg location in Senekal between 1972 and 1975, while 
other examples involved mass removals from Bloemfontein, Aliwal 
North, and Vereeniging. On the other hand, the state concentrated 
on weeding out 1 superfluous 1 and 1 undesirable' elements in a wide 
range of urban areas. The vast majority of these individuals, 
exposed to influx control removals, were women and pensioners. 
Initially, they were resettled in a two-roomed housing complex at 
the east end of Phuthaditjhaba known as Maqhekung, literally 
"place of the old", but when this accommodation was exhausted 
they were dispersed in among closer settlement residents. Many 
were located in a new segment of Namahadi which they called 
Mangaung, after the Bloemfontein location whence they had come. 
r 
The marginality of single women - deserted, widowed or divorced 
by their husbands - from the male-dominated migrant and commuter 
labour markets in Qwaqwa forced large numbers into the familiar 
activities of shebeening and hawking~ My interviews revealed that 
1a number of these women were already second generation 
shebeeners, brought up on concoctions such as skokiaan, skomfana, 
'shimivane and magasimani.jThis experience enabled them to emerge 
as the new homebr~w 'shebeen queens' of the early 1970s~ It is 
_/ 
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perhaps worth emphasising that, in spite of their innovative 
brewing styles, these women seldom generated large profits .by 
their efforts. 0his was particularly true in the impoverished 
closer settlements, where most household incomes could not be 
stretched to such luxuries as commercially brewed beer.) 
After the mid-1970s employment patterns in Qwaqwa became more 
stable, especially with the mines cutting down on foreign 
recruits. According to the National Manpower Commission, the 
number of migrants increased in Qwaqwa from 7 000 in 1975 to 
43 000 in 1980, while the available commuter jobs grew from about 
1 500 to 6 800 over the same period (SAIRR 1975/81). A 
considerable number of local construction jobs on roads, schools, 
clinics and township housing were created by the Oranje Vaal 
Administration Board. 
,-
These developments cultivated local demand 
for mass-produced .liquor, especially bottled beer. In closer 
1 ~ettlement areas storekeepers emerged as important brokers in the 
new trade. As owners of refrigerators, and regular commuters to 
.. Y 
Harrismith they were able to supply both the shebeen trade and 
the general public with bottled 
r: 
beer. J Another interesting 
development in the rural trade in the late 1970s was the 
development of a fortnightly shebeening cycle in Bakwena villages 
such as Botsabela and Mangaung. These areas, located close to the 
Phuthadithjaba labour bureau, were the main recruiting zones for 
SASOL migrants and as such were the destination of the 
fortnightly pay packets of these workers.~This distinctive cycle, 
however, declined in 1983 when the SASOL plant at Secunda was 
completed. 
rln Phuthaditjhaba new employment opportunities, as well as the 
arrival of increasing numbers of teachers and bureaucrats with 
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westernised drinking habits, rrapidly transformed shebeening. New 
demands for spirits and bottled beer introduced specialised 
liquor runners into the trade. These individuals negotiated bulk 
purchasing agreements with Harrismith bottlestore owners and 
resold their liquor in Phuthaditjhaba at inflated prices~~ The 
ready availability of bottled liquor from these runners produced 
a local price war in the town between 1977 and 1979, the average 
price of 750 ml of beer in shebeens dropped from 90 to 70 cents. 
This competition was compounded in 1979 with the establishment of 
the first black-owned bottlestores in the town. Under these 
circumstances it became imperative tor shebeeners to specialise 
in order to avoid being ousted from the liquor market by owners 
of large drinking and retailing depots. Although it is difficult 
to document the full variety of operations in the town by 1980, 
r 
three types stand out, which I shall term 'neighbourhood 
outlets', 'general drinking houses' and 'club shebeens' {cf. 
Chapter Four)._.) 
Neighbourhood shebeens were the most common in Phuthadithaja in 
·· tthe early 1980s when there were at least three on every block. 
I; 
They were run predominantly from the homes of single women who 
exploited a common residential identity to sell a combination of 
bottled beer, mass-produced sorghum beer ('Big S') and homebrews, 
especially the fast brewing magasimane made from sugar,j bread 
yeast, malt and flavoured with fruit. The profits of these 
r 
operations were small and their markets competitive. Club 
shebeens, on the other hand, catered specifically for the needs 
of the aspirant middle class and were structured around comma~ 
occupational and recreational interests. In contrast to the 
smaller neighbourhood outlets, they sold mainly bottled liquor, 
. especially beer, and were often run by husband and wife, 
.J 
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combinations. 'Teacher' shebeens were probably the most common in 
this category, although high-class outlets operating from self-
built homes were making their mark by the mid-1980s. The final 
category of shebeen, the general drinking house, was the least 
( <' common r: of the three types. These outlets were defined by their 
size and their mixed clientele. In a sense, they were simply 
larger versions of the neighbourhood outlets with a more upmarket 
orientation. They operated from houses with several drinking 
zones, usually a courtyard for migrants and two or three plushly 
decorated rooms inside for wealthier clients~, At these shebeens 
liquor was not cheap, as clients paid for privacy, service and 
comfort. In terms of the variety of liquor sold these outlets 
were the closest thing in Qwaqwa to the white suburban pubs. 
Market changes in the villages came more slowly. Part of the 
reason for this was that bottlestores were only set up in these 
areas after 1982. But more important was the fact that class 
differentiation had not gained momentum outside of 
Phuthaditjhaba. Closer settlement shebeeners continued to be 
constrained by the structures of labour migration and the 
irregular flow of remittances. In these areas neighbourhood 
s hebe e n s , s o me de a l i n g o n l y i n h o me b r ew e d l i q u o r , c o n t i nu e d to 
dominate the trade. Peak trading hours for these operators were 
over weekends, but it was noted that most of them stayed open all 
week to allow unemployed men to gather together and chat. 
However, by 1984 a few larger drinking houses were beginning to 
appear in some of the older villages such as Namahadi, the seat 
of the Bakwena tribal authority. These outlets, nevertheless, 
r 
remained rare. The contrast in variety and scale between 
Phuthaditjhaba shebeens and those in the villages was the most 
notable characteristic of the liquor market in Qwaqwa in 1984. _) 
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This division should not, however, be assumed to be static. The 
consolidation of commercial liquor interests with the formation 
of the Qwaqwa Bottlestore Association in 1984 threatened to 
change the rural market by offering shebeeners cut prices to 
stimulate demand. This point was emphasised by Bakwena 
chieftainess and businesswdman, Mampoi Mopeli, when she urged the 
Qwaqwa government to promote local bottlestore owners by setting 
up a 11 Buy Qwaqwa" campaign (QLA 1984: 598). The prospect of the 
legalisation of shebeens also held important implications for the 
trade as a whole. In 1984 the Qwaqwa government, keen to extract 
revenue from the trade, v,as seriously considering implementing 
the Soweto 'tavern' system in the homeland. Local shebeeners were 
less enthusiastic, especially in the rural areas where women 
realised that licensing would probably transfer the trade into 
male hands. 
During my fieldwork I conducted 20 interviews with shebeeners in 
Phuthaditjhaba, Manaung and Namahadi. Although these interviews 
attempted to capture a wide range of operations in both town and 
country, sustained police harassment of rural shebeeners at the 
end of 1984 interrupted my research in the closer settlement 
areas. The data collected therefore shows a bias towards 
Phuthaditjhaba traders. 
Conclusion 
Although the above analysis is primarily concerned with local-
level change in three commercial sectors in Qwaqwa, the 
discussion throws critical light on two widely held assumptions 
about black class formation in the homelands. In concluding this 
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chapter I wish briefly to draw attention to these two issues. 
The first revolves around the central role ascribed to the BIC in 
inaugurating class formation in the homelands. Molteno (1977) in 
his influential overview of the bantustan strategy identifies the 
BIC as a major force in forging the shift in homeland policy away 
from the 'class level ling'' tendencies of the reserve period to 
the 'class forming' tendencies of the contemporary phase. This 
analysis is based entirely on the experience of the Transkei 
where the BIC bought up 423 white trading stations during the 
1960s and had already transferred 217 of these stores into black 
hands by 1972 (Southall 1983: 163). This initiative was coupled 
with a business loan scheme which assisted more than 100 black 
traders in the Transkei over this period (Hart 1972: 105). In 
contrast to this situation, there is little evidence that the BIC 
played an equivalent role in Qwaqwa. In fact, it seems clear 
that, in spite of growing proletarianisation, class formation 
occurred less rapidly in the 1960 1 s than it did in the 1950s when 
state involvement in commerce was minimal. Indeed, when one 
critically investigates the role of the BIC in Witsieshoek, it is 
not at all clear that the major objective of the Corporation was 
to stimulate the interests of local black entrepreneurs. During 
the period 1960 to 1974 the Corporation not only failed to crush 
white retailing interests in the reserve effectively, but also 
undermined those of local bus owners, dairy farmers and brick 
merchants by establishing state monopolies (cf. Mapena 1970, Bank 
1985). Its involvement in the construction of the Mount-Aux-
Sources holiday resort, 
further evidence of 
designed for and run by whites, provides 
the orientation of BIC activities in 
Witsieshoek. It seems clear that black commercial advancement in 
Qwaqwa in the 1960s did not occur because of BIC initiatives, but 
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rather in spite of them! This finding brings into question the 
validity of generalising from the very specific experience of the 
Transkei to other homeland areas, but it also focuses attention 
more generally on the transition period of the 1950s and 1960s, 
between the reserve and the bantustan strategies [16). In 
analysing the significance of this transition it is crucially 
important to counterpose the rhetoric of the state with its 
actions in the rural periphery. Hirsch's (1984) suggestion that 
there is an urgent need to consider the composition of various 
government corporations and state departments to fully grasp 
subtle shifts and regional differences in state policy in rural 
areas is an important one, but one that should be coupled with 
analysis of actual rural situations during the transitionary 
phase [15]. 
The second issue relates to my earlier warning that black petty 
bourgeois development should not be seen only in legalistic 
terms. There are two underlying assumptions that inform this 
position: (1) unlicensed informal sector operations are by 
definition small-scale undertakings, (2) legal reform is the only 
way in which black entrepreneurs can effectively enter the South 
African economy. Neither of these notions is unequivocally 
supported by the analysis presented in this chapter. Indeed, it 
is clear that certain categories of shebeeners and taximen in 
Qwaqwa were making considerably larger profits in 1984 than their 
licensed counterpaftS in the retail trade, burdened with lengthy 
bureaucratic procedures and over-trading. I am not suggesting 
that legal reform is not an important aspect of black class 
formation, but rather that illegal operators will continue to 
prosper where market conditions are good and state intervention 




[l] Arthur Gray (Jr.), personal communication, January 1985; for 
a more general discussion of the skin and hide trade in the 
Harrismith district during the 1870s and 1880s see Steytler 
(1932: 82ff) 
[2] Morris Thibella, an retired teacher from Monontsha village, 
claimed that when his father bought a wagon from a white 
Harrismith farmer in the early 1890s he was the first commoner to 
own a wagon in the district. 
[3] Informants claimed that women undertook these 
between July and September, after the winter peaches 
and before the summer rains made the wagon trails in 
the reserve unusable. 
expeditions 
had ripened 
and out of 
[4] Keegan (1986: 212-14} provides a more detailed description of 
the involvement of the Stevens family in the Basotholand trade. 
He focuses particularly on the competitive relationship that 
developed between the Stevens and the Fraser family businesses. 
[5] In 1932 the Native Economic Commission reported that: "it is 
unreasonable to prevent natives from obtaining trading licences 
inside the Native reserves" (UG 22-32: par. 954}. In 1934, 
following this recommendation, provisions were made to assist 
black traders in obtaining licences in the Transkei, 62i of the 
business licences granted in the reserves between 1934 and 1936 
were issued to blacks (Hart 1972: 95). These measures were, 
however, not extended to the OFS as a result of strong resistence 
from white municipal authorities (Ibid: 97-100, Rheinault Jones 
1939). 
[6] This figure is commuted by subtracting the official 1970 de 
facto population figure and the estimate 1980 figure of 300 000 
and dividing them by 120, the number of months. 
[7] This information was obtained during my 1983 fieldwork in the 
town. The high density of informal sector activities in 
Phuthaditjhaba during the early 1970s is corroborated by Robins 
.evidence (1982). 
[8] The Tripartite Agreement System was introduced in 1975 as 
part of a package of economic decentralisation intiatives. The. 
aim of the system is to allow white-owned companies to gain 
direct access to homeland areas, but on condition that local 
shareholders will eventually own half of their assets. Local 
Development Corporations were entitled to hold shares in trust 
until such time as it became feasible for them to be sold off to 
local residents (cf. Zille 1981, Uatson, Dewar & lodes 1981). 
[9] Information derived from intervies with the Gray and Brand 
families. Gertie Gray owned the first private sedan, a Tin Lizzy. 
[10] During the 1940's transport licences in Witsieshoek were 
issued from Dundee in Natal (Kama Twala, personal communication). 
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[11] These National Manpower figures appear to include migrants 
recruited in Onverwacht near Thaba 'Nchu. This figure remains the 
only available estimate. 
[12] This figure is based on oral reports from Majakathata 
owners. 
(13] Bradford (1987) has demonstrated this clearly in .her 
analysis of female shebeeners in small Natal midland towns. She 
argues that the connection Qetween urban and rural brewing can be 
seen in the active particpation of rural brewers in the 1929 
Natal Beer Riots. 
[14] Bradford (1987) has argued that the profits generated by 
rural female shebeeners were also restricted by the control men 
sought to exercise over their earnings. She maintains (1987: 303) 
that in terms of the Natal code, the entire earnings of an 
African woman belong to her guardian, a privilege which was 
passed down on marriage from fathers to husbands. She suggests 
that these rights were protected by the legal system: "white 
magistrates betrayed few qualms in supporting rapacious guardians 
who pounced on female assets and incomes" (Ibid) 
[15] Recent literature on the reserves has concentrated in great 
detail on the decline of peasant agriculture, the incorporation 
of rural people into the wider capitalist economy and the 
responses of rural people to this processes between 1880 and 1930 
(cf. Bundy 1979, Marks & Atmore 1980, Beinart 1983, Shillington 
1985, Bienart and Bundy 1987). There has also been a considerable 
amount written about the contemporary period ~Rotberg & Bulter 
1977, Shultz 1980, Sreek & Wicksteed 1981, Southall 1983). 
Studies of the intermediate period, especially the 1950 1 s and 
l960's, have been far more limited and mainly confined to 
investigating resistance to the implementation of agricultural 
'betterment'(Marony 1976, Mason 1983, Lodge 1983). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE POLITICS .OF CENTRALISATION 
TRADERS, DIKWANKWETLA, AND THE QDC, 1974 - 1984 
In this chapter I will concentrate on the changing relationship 
between small traders, the ruling Dikwankwetla party and the 
Qwaqwa Development Corporation between 1974 and 1984. I will 
attempt to demonstrate through this analysis that class formation 
in Qwaqwa cannot be understood as the mechanical unfolding of 
neatly integrated collective interests, but must be seen as a 
process of both economic and political struggle [1]. 
The chapter is divided into three sections based on a 
periodisation of the central shifts in the relationship between 
traders and the Qwaqwa government. The first section, which deals 
with the period 1974 to 1980, attempts to document traders' 
initial support for and subsequent opposition to the economic 
policy of the Dikwankwetla party, which increasingly surfaced at 
the party political level towards the end of this period. The 
second section, wtiich deals with the period 1980-1982, 
concentrates on the re-election of Dikwankwetla in Qwaqwa in 1980 
and its move away from confrontation politics towards co-option 
and repression as key political strategies. In the final section 
I will deal with the evolution of this policy after 1982 and its· 
economic and political implications for traders in Qwaqwa. 
Traders, Dikwankwetla and the Politics of Opposition 
The evolution of homeland self-government in Qwaqwa after 1971, 
while of little significance for the vast majority of Sotho-
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speakers in South Africa. was a process that was watched with 
considerable interest by Basotho entreprenuers both inside Qwaqwa 
and beyond its borders. For those traders living in Witsieshoek a 
shift in political control away from Pretoria promised to release 
them from the 'tyranny' of the BIC and the Harrismith 
Municipality. whose collective control over business licensing 
existed as a formidable obstacle to their commerical ambitions. 
Local traders were also disillusioned with the tribal 
authorities, whose persistent petitioning against racist 
licensing policies had earned them few concessions, and looked 
with some optimism to days when business licensing was controlled 
by the local Qwaqwa government. Basotho traders in urban areas 
had a similar interest in the devolution of political control in 
Qwaqwa. Since the mid-1960s their businesses had come under 
increased pressure from urban authorities and they realised that 
unless new opportunities arose in the homeland they might be 
forced to relinquish their businesses altogether (Southall 1980). 
In this context, it is not suprising that in 1974, 
announced that Qwaqwa was poised to enter the second 
when it was 
phase of 
self-government, large numbers of traders joined forces, some as 
candidates, with the opposition Dikwankwetla party under T.K . 
. Mopeli to dislodge the ruling Basotho Unity party led by Batlokwa 
Paramount Wessels Mota. The Dikwankwetla party was aware of this 
constituency and in preparation for the 1975 election made 
strongly worded promises of economic reform, threatening to 
institute principles of free enterprise for Basotho traders in 
Qwaqwa and to expel the BIC (van der Merwe etal 1978: 536). 
Consequently. in 1975 when Dikwankwetla swept into power 
capturing 19 of the 20 elected seats in the new Legislative 
Assembly it received a strong mandate to meet the demands of 
64 
traders, organised by 1975 in the Qwaqwa Chamber of Commerce 
(also known as the Qwaqwa Traders Association). 
Dikwankwetla responded swiftly to this pressure: By December 1975 
the new Chief Minister, T.K. Mopeli, announced the termination 
of BIC activities in Qwaqwa and the formation of a new 
corporation structured arbund the interests of the Basotho 
trader, the Qwaqwa Development Corporation. Shortly afterwards, 
in June 1976 new legislation was approved by the Qwaqwa 
Legislative Assembly to reorganise business licensing at the 
local level. Kroonstad businessman and Minister of the Interior, 
M.C. Koekoe, who moved the Basotho Business and Trading 
Undertakings Bill, explained that the main aim of the legislation 
was to exclude the Harrismith n,unicipality from business 
licensing 
henceforth 
in Qwaqwa and to ensure that this process was 
controlled directly by the tribal authorities and the 
Qwaqwa government (QLA 1976: 684). He expressed the hope that 
this measure would rapidly advance black business development in 
Qwaqwa and would bring back to the homeland much of the money 
spent by local consumers in white South Africa (Ibid: 86). 
The wave of enthusiasm that filtered through the Basotho business 
community following these two announcements was shortlived. By 
March 1977, almost a year after the passage of the Trading Bill, 
it became clear that considerable confusion still surrounded the 
new legislation. Heated discussions in the Legislative Assembly 
revealed that the District Magistrate in Phuthaditjhaba, who had 
not yet received confirmation of Pretoria's approval of the bill, 
was continuing to apply the 'old' legislation in his assessment 
of new license applications. Incensed traders complained that the 
white magistrate was doing all in his power to stifle the 
business licensing process. They argued that he was harsh and 
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'technical' in his assessment of new applicants and favoured 
applicants who employed the services of white lawyers. As one 
speaker explained: "It appears that people who stand under the 
protection of a white goat skin are issued licences without any 
problem" (Ibid: 360). The continuation of restrictive practices, 
one speaker claimed 'mocked the Basotho' who had to queue at 
shops for 'about an hour to buy a box of matches' (Ibid). 
At a political level the dissatisfaction of traders over the 
retention of outmoded licensing practices was expressed in a 
growing disillusionment with Dikwankwetla's ability to enforce 
economic reform. Some speakers argued that Dikwankwetla's 
tardiness on tbe licensing issue was deliberate, they had become 
'complacent' and 'indifferent' to the needs of ordinary people 
after their convincing election victory (Ibid: 364). But Koekoe 
a~sured the Assembly that the fault lay not with the Qwaqwa 
government but with Pretoria, which was slow to react to their 
demands. He informed traders that their problems would be 
addressed immediately and that the cabinet would ensure that 
malpractices were eradicated until such time as a fully-fledged 
Licensing Board could be set up in the homeland (Ibid: 366). 
But Dikwankwetla's efforts to placate local traders did not last 
for long. In 1977 with the announcement by the QDC that it sought 
to attract white commercial capital to Qwaqwa under the 
Tripartite Agreement System simmering discontent re-emerged 
within the Qwaqwa Traders Association. Since November 1976 the 
QTA had aligned itself strongly with NAFCOC's rejection of the TA 
system and regular meeting were held between the two 
organisations, res~lting in negotiations between NAFCOC and the 
Qwaqwa government in 1977 (Keeble 1980: 37). These negotiations, 
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however, came to an abrupt halt in 1978 when the QDC publicly 
announced that it had invited Frasers, one of South Africa's 
largest white-owned chain-stores, to participate in a multi-
million rand shopping centre scheme in Phuthaditjhaba. 
were now sceptical of NAFCOC's ability to solve their 
and sought private assisten~e from a group of Pretoria 
who were asked to draw up a memorandum stating 






shopping centre scheme. The document, which claimed to represent 
the interests of 350 local traders, was presented to the QDC in 
September 1979 (Chamber Memo 10/9/1979}. 
The growth of opposition to the Dikwankwetla party among traders 
in Qwaqwa was not an isolated event. Developments in other areas 
demonstrated deepening sctiisms within the emerging homeland petty 
bourgeoisie. Local teachers, organised in the Qwaqwa Teachers 
Association had, for instance, become increasingly critical of 
Dikwankwetla education policy. They were particularly concerned 
about the 1976 Qwaqwa Education Act which endorsed the central 
principles of Bantu Education at a time when this system was at 
the forefront of national political opposition (QLA 1977). They 
also complained that the Dikwankwetla party had lost sight of its 
initial manifesto by failing to equalise salaries between black 
and white teachers. Another pocket of strong opposition to the 
ruling party came from the Batlokwa chiefs who had -been ousted 
from power in 1975. They argued that the Dikwankwetla party with 
its political core in the Bakwena Tribal Authority was 
increasingly discriminating against them in its allocation of 
local resources and funds (cf. Quinlan 1987: 42-44). 
Of the latter two groups, traders found they had most in common 
with teachers, who shared their opposition to the tribal 
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political paradigm of the Batlokwa chiefs, and in 1978 formed 
themselves into a new opposition party called Mokga wa Setjhaba 
party. Although the basic groundwork for the establishment of 
this party had been done during 1977, Mokga wa Setjhaba only 
officially emerged after the 'No Confidence' debate of 1978 when 
Dikwankwetla chief whip, M:J. Mohlahli, crossed the floor with 
four other Dikwankwetla members, M.J. Maqabe, E.T. Chele, P.N. 
Bohloko and T.J. Sefale, to set up a new official opposition in 
the house. In the course of the 'No Confidence' debate the new 
opposition left little doubt as to the source of its support. Its 
criticisms of Dikwankwetla were confined to four major areas. 
Firstly, it questi-0ned the tribal basis of homeland politics 
suggesting that the existence of non-elected tribal 
r~presentatives in the Assembly ran 
principles of constitutional democracy. 
contrary to established 
Secondly, they accused 
Dikwankwetla of failing to institute effective 'Africanisation' 
within the local bureaucracy. They pointed to the leading role 
played by seconded white officials in all government departments 
and criticised Dikwankwetla for continuing disparities between 
white and black salaries. Thirdly, and more specifically, they 
slated the Qwaqwa Education Act for its ethnic focus and general 
adherence to the South African government's notions of black 
education. Finally, and also on a note of sectional interest, 
they lashed out at the failure of Dikwankwetla to institute 
meaningful reform for black traders (cf.QLA 1978: 13-95). Indeed, 
in view of these concerns it is significant that the leader of 
the new opposition was both headmaster of a local high school, 
and at the same time chairman of the QTA. 
The response to the new opposition from within Dikwankwetla 
identified even more clearly the kernel of opposition support. 
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M.C Koekoe, responding to accusations by Mokga wa Setjhaba 
against his Department, claimed that: 
Initially the Qwaqwa Chamber of Commerce insisted that they have 
authority concerning the licensing of businesses. However, today 
they deviate from this and want to form their own government ••• ! 
want to make it known that the Chamber of Commerce in Qwaqwa 
intends taking over our government regardless of the progress 
being made in the homeland (QLA 1978: 107). 
The Chief Minister endorsed these comments later in the debate 
when he suggested: 
I want to explain and emphasise that Mokga wa Setjhaba should be 
regarded as a front for the local Chamber of·Commerce. But we 
must further explain that they have disobeyed the policy and 
instruction of the President of NAFCOC, who stated that 
businessmen or business organisations should not interfere in 
politics as it is a dirty practice ..•• It would be a sad day if 
our businessmen did not do what was expected of them and decided 
to take somebody else's place instead of helping the nation 
(Ibid:147} 
While these conspiratorial explanations for the rise of Mogka wa 
Setjhaba gives some indication as to where the leadership of the 
new party lay, it would be incorrect to regard the 1978 split as 
a purely in-house affair. Evidence collected in the field 
suggests that the formation of Mokga wa Setjhaba enjoyed at least 
nominal support from urban voters on whom the Dikwankwetla had 
initially relied for support. In the 1975 election campaign 
Dikwankwetla had promised to address some of the day-to-day 
problems of urban dwellers, especially in the sphere of housing. 
However, after 1975 these promises were left unattended as the 
the ruling party turned its attention to growing numbers of 
refugees settled in the Bakwena tribal area. This shift in 
interest to a rural constituency was demonstrated, on the one 
hand, by the concerted effort made by T.K. Mopeli to integrate 
central governmental power with the Bakwena Tribal Authority 
(Quinlan 1987) and, on the other, by his emphasis on land 
incorporation and rural relocation as a central political issue 
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(Sharp & Martiny 1984). The exclusion of urban residents from the 
Dikwankwetla political programme caused further tension within 
the Legislative Assembly in 1979, leading to the dismissal of 
Ministers Koekoe and N.gake from the cabinet (SAIRR 1979: 317-18). 
Both these members were influential urban representatives who 
disagreed fundamentally with the Chief Minister on the 
Dikwankwetla approach to urban blacks. Koekoe in particular 
challenged T.K. Mopeli on numerous occasions for directing most 
of his attention to Basotho refugees in the Transkei and Thaba 
1 Nchu, while ignoring the plight of urban families being evicted 
daily under influx control legislation. 
Although there was now considerable scope for an alliance between 
the ex-Ministers Koekoe and Ngake and Mohlahli, this never 
materialised because of the strong personal conflicts that had 
emerged between members of Mokga wa Setjhaba and the incumbent 
Ministers of Interior and Education, who had been called on to 
defend the status quo during the 1978 split. Koekoe and Ngake 
instead formed their own opposition party Matla-a-Setjhaba and 
thereby thwarted the possibility of a united front to fight 
Dikwankwetla in the 1980 election [2]. 
Dikwankwetla and the 1980 Elections 
The mounting political opposition to the Dikwankwetla party by 
the end of 1979 was compounded when a general election was called 
for 1980. T.K. Mopeli was aware that his power base had been 
eroded by the schism within his party and was particularly 
fearful of the urban support that potentially lay behind the 
Matla-a-Setjhaba party (QLA 1980: 40). Mopeli and his allies, 
consequently, approached the 1980 election with the aim of 
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supressing political opposition. 
This campaign was called on a number of fronts. At the local 
level Dikwankwetla used its control over schools and other 
potential venues for political meetings to prevent the opposition 
parties from canvassing support. Reports from opposition 
spokesmen claimed that it was customary for the Qwaqwa government 
to cancel meetings at the last minute and send Dikwankwetla's own 
speakers to address local villagers instead. A more serious 
accusation made against the ruling party concerned the use of 
village chiefs and headmen to influence voters. It was, for 
instance, noted that pitso gatherings were widely used as a 
public platform for Dikwankwetla spokesmen. In the 1980 pre-
election Legislative Assembly debates senior Bakwena chiefs 
openly acknowledged their allegiance to Dikwankwetla and pointed 
to the role they would play in influencing voters. As Chief Haig 
Mopeli explained: 
No-one will be forced or compelled to do anything. We, the 
chiefs, will only indicate the direction and say that in our 
opinion this is the government which is acceptable to us and 
which will render service to the nation (QLA 1980: 114). 
This assurance notwithstanding, evidence was collected that 
pointed to the use of coercion by Bakwena tribal officials. Some 
traders, for instance, reported that villagers were commonly 
threatened with eviction from Qwaqwa if they did not cast their 
vote with the ruling party. These allegations have, however, been 
consistently denied by the ruling party. In Phuthaditjhaba there 
was also evidence that local resources were manipulated to elicit 
political support. In 1979 it was, for instance, recorded that 
Phuthaditjhaba town councillors were preventing non-Dikwankwetla 
members from obtaining municipal housing. This was documented by 
an official enquiry into the housing issue which revealed that 
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Dikwankwetla membership cards were being used as a pre-requisite 
for obtaining urban housing (QLA 1979: 593-622). 
The activities of Dikwankwetla outside Qwaqwa were more diffuse, 
although considerable effort was made to canvass support from 
Sotho-speakers living in other homelands. From as early as 1976 
when T.K. Mopeli first bffered political asylum to Basotho 
refugees from the Herschel and Maluti districts, Sotho speakers 
in other homelands had become a focus of Dikwankwetla activities 
(cf.Streek & Wicksteed 1981). In fact, in 1978 when the leader of 
Mogka wa Setjhaba attempted to enter negotiations with the 
Maluti/Herschel South Sotho Central Committee he was strongly 
reprimanded by the Chief Minister (OLA 1978: 149). In 1978 the 
Chief Minister's concern for 
demonstrated when Dikwankwetla 
rural refugees 
launched a major 
was again 
campaign to 
assist Sotho residents in Thaba 'Nchu, a small enclave of 
Boputhatswana in the OFS. Regular delegations from the Qwaqwa 
government were sent to the area to investigate the plight of 
residents in squatter camps there, especially in the newly 
created Onverwacht slum, and to negotiate with the Boputhatswana 
government. In 1979 to confirm Dikwankwetla's hold over Thaba 
'Nchu refugees, a blanket ban was placed by the Qwaqwa government 
on political meetings by any of the opposition parties in 
Onverwacht (known officially as Botsabelo). It was also alleged 
by the leader of the opposition that T. K. Mopeli was using Radio 
Sotho to encourage people to go to Onverwacht and on arrival 
there forcing them to become members of Dikwankwetla (QLA 1980: 
54). 
The ability of Dikwankwetla to mobilise support in urban areas 
was, however, more constrained because of their lack of direct 
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influence in these areas. Yet, in spite of this, it was noted 
that white officials were prepared to lend support to their 
campaign. For instance, in March 1980 a group of opposition 
politicians were conveniently arrested by the police for 
attempting to attend a Dikwankwetla rally in the town. They were 
released without charge sho\tly after the rally. The co-operation 
between Dikwankwetla and the SAP was endorsed in April 1980 when 
Mr Koekoe laid a complaint that an SAP orchestra had been used to 
lead a Dikwankwetla procession through the streets of 
Phuthaditjhaba in the build-up to the election (Friend 
14/4/1980). Another technique used by the ruling party was to 
carry bus loads of rural supporters to urban meetings using 
transport. This misuse of 







argued that Dikwankwetla was using devious methods to create 




Finally, and having taken all the above precautions, it is 
believed that government officials tampered with the election 
result itself, in which the ruling party captured all 20 seats. 
This belief resulted in the opposition parties combining after 
the election to file a case against Dikwankwetla at the Rand 
Supreme Court for tampering with the election results. These 
legal proceedings were drawn out over a period of four years 
before the election was officially endorsed in September 1984. 
The opposition felt that the court ruling had been politically 
motivated. 
The New Regime and the Politics of Patronage 
The 1980 elections. although shrouded in controversy, marked the 
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beginning of a new phase in the relationship between traders and 
the Qwaqwa government. The realignment of political forces behind 
the Chief Minister served to consolidate the allaince between the 
Bakwena Tribal Authority and the ruling party, opening the way 
for greater repression and tighter internal control. 
When T.K. Mopeli returned to office in 1980 his first major 
objective was to take full control of the institutional framework 
of homelands politics: the Legislative Assembly and the Tribal 
Authorities. This had been partially achieved through the 1980 
election, but the potential for political opposition within the 
Tribal Authorities remained an important consideration. Since 
1974 when Batlokwa Paramount Wessels Mota had been ousted from 
power, T.K. Mope]i had attempted to reorganise tribal power in 
Qwaqwa by forging close links with members of the Mopeli clan at 
the expense of Batlokwa chiefs and powerful non-Mopeli chiefs in 
the Bakwena area. The appointment of Chief Haig Mopeli and 
Paramount Matabang Mopeli to ministerial positions after th~ 
expulsion of Ngake and Koekoe from the cabinet in 1979 is 
illustrative of this tendency. Quinlan (1987: 44) provides 
further evidence when he suggests that by the early 1980s Mopeli 
agnates occupied 14 of the 15 top positions in the Bakwena Tribal 
Authority. This attempt at creating a coherent and loyal 
political following from within the Tribal Authorities was 
consolidated after 1980 with the passage of the 1983 Qwaqwa 
Administration of Authorities Act, which gave the Chief Minister 
discretionary powers to appoint and dismiss chiefs. The new 
system also reduced the number of senior chiefs in the homeland 
to ensure greater centralisation and control of tribal affairs 
(cf. Quinlan 1987). 
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were also used to win over support from the techniques 
opposition. The following case study of a Phuthaditjhaba 
businessman illustrates how the control of local resources, 
especially business licences, could be used to win recruits: 
Case 2.1: Reaching a politi~al compromise 
Marumo was resettled from Welkom to Qwaqwa in 1970 for running an 
illegal watchmaking business on the mines. After arrival in 
Qwaqwa, he struggled for a number of years to set up a small 
retail business, but was prohibited from getting a licence by the 
Harrismith municipality. 
By 1977 Marumo was tired and frustrated, and in desperation 
decided to join the QTA where he could share his grievances with 
other traders. This association proved to be a fruitful one for 
Marumo and with the assistance of the association he was managed 
to obtain a license to operate a kiosk in the Phuthaditjhaba 
stadium. 
Marumo 1 s involvement with the QTA after 1977 also introduced him 
to members of the new Mogka wa Setjhaba party, who provided him 
with advice and assisted in his business. By 1980 he was fully 
integrated into the new party and participated actively in the 
party's election campaign. Even after the election Marumo 
remained a loyal supporter of Mogka wa Setjhaba and offered to 
make a statement to the Supreme Court about the irregularities he 
had noted at the Phuthaditjhaba stadium on the day of the 
election. 
But with his increased political involvement. Marumo began to 
experience problems with the Qwaqwa government who wished to 
restrict his business hours on the grounds that the 
Phuthaditjhaba stadium was only fully used over weekends. Marumo 
complained about this 'injustice', but was told that members of 
the opposition should expect this kind of treatment. 
In June 1981, a{ter considering his position carefully, Marumo 
decided to withdraw from the opposition and joined Dikwankwetla. 
He withdrew his affidavit implicating a Dikwankwetla politician 
with election irregularities. For this decision Marumo was 
rewarded with a permanent cafe licence by the Minister of 
Interior. By 1984 Marumo was politically active within 
Dikwankwetla as a regional organiser. 
In conjunction with attempts such as this to undermine the 
opposition's court case, business licensing was also used more 
generally as a means of party recruitment. To be sure, this 
tendency had existed prior to 1980. From 1978 when the Minister 
of Interior was able to issue licences at his personal discretion 
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the system was open to abuse. Yet, there is little evidence to 
suggest that political factors played a significant role in the 
issuing of licences until 1979 when Minister Koekoe was dismissed 
for refusing an application recommended by the Chief Minister 
(SAIRR 1979: 318). After this incident the licensing procedure 
a·gain came under official s~rutiny with the new Mogka wa Setjhaba 
party claiming that a Licensing Board should immediately be 
established with representation from the QTA. Dikwankwetla, 
however, rejected this idea and it was decided that until a 
proper Licensing Board could be constituted the cabinet would 
take responsiblity in this field. Abuse of the licensing process 
for directly political ends now became more widespread, 
especially since the core of the opposition lay in the QTA. 
In 1981, following Dikwankwetla's decisive victory in the 1980 
election, steps were eventually taken to establish a Licensing 
Board in terms of the Qwaqwa Business and Trading Undertakings 
Amendment Act. In the discussion surrounding the Bill, an 
appointed representative of the Batlokwa Tribal Authority, M.J. 
Letsela, suggested that it was imperative for the Phuthaditjhaba 
Town Council, the QDC and the 'Chamber of Commerce' to be 
represented on the Board. He suggested an appropriate amendment 
which was seconded by fellow Batlokwa member, H.A Mohale. The 
Legislative Assembly then adjourned before the final reading of 
the Bill. However, when the Bill was read for the final time the 
Batlokwa members mysteriously withdrew their amendment and 
replaced it with the original clause which gave the Minister of 
Interior, a Dikwankwetla stalwart, Motabang Mopeli, complete 
control over the appointment of representative to the Licensing 
Board. The Act was then passed with no further objections (QLA 
1981:44-67;93-100). 
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The political implications of the 1981 Act were that, although 
the ruling party had eventually relented on the issue of a 
Licensing Board, it had done so without relinquishing its overall 
control over the licensing system. The establishment of political 
patronage as a premise for commerical involvement in Qwaqwa after 
1980 is clearly illustrated in the following two case studies: 
Case 2.2: Serving the Nation 
William came to Qwaqwa in 19~8 after being dismissed from the 
African Methodist Church 1n Senekal for selling Qwaqwa 
citizenship to farm families in the district. 
On arrival in Qwaqwa William was immediately rewarded for his 
political work by being allocated a job as housemaster at a local 
teachers training college. He continued to work closely with 
Dikwankwetla during the 1980 election, organising Dikwankwetla 
supporters in Senekal and Vereeniging where his brother was 
standing as a candtdate for the party. In 1981 William, although 
theoretically unable to obtain a business licence because of his· 
work in the civil service, was granted the special concession of· 
being able to open a trading store in Setsing centre, while 
retaining his job as housemaster at Bonamelo training college in 
Phuthaditjhaba. · 
Case 2.3: Reading the Political Tide 
James was educated and brought up in the Evaton location in 
Vereeniging, where after completing school in the late 1960s he 
obtained a clerical job with the Oranje Vaal Administration 
Board. He maintains that from the outset he regarded the job only 
as a means of saving enough money to one day enter business. 
By 1977 James had saved about R4 000 and made an application to 
the Evaton township superintendent for a licence to open a coal 
yard. This application was, however, turned down on the grounds 
. that there were already too many wood and coal dealers in the 
area. James now adopted a new course of action by applying for a 
general dealer's licence, but this was also denied him on similar 
grounds. · 
Eventually in 1979 James relinquished his urban rights ~o take up 
residence with his brother, a local storekeeper, 1n Makong 
·village, Qwaqwa. Initially, he did not apply for his own business 
licence, but simply helped his brother in his store. James 
explained: "Before I decided to apply for my own business, I felt 
it was necessary to familiarise myself with all the opportunties 
in Qwaqwa. I wanted to know what cards were on the table before I. 
played my hand". The kind of 'cards' James was referring to were 
Jincreasingly exposed after 1980 when he noticed. the progress his 
brother had made in business after joining· the Dikwankwetla 
party. Following this strategy, James joined Dikwankwetla, before 
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making a successful application for a coal yard licence. 
After 1982 James increased his involvement with the ruling party 
by standing as a candidate for the newly established "village 
committes", designed to assist Dikwankwetla with the 
administration of these areas. By 1984 he felt that he had 
accumulated sufficient political credibility to make a second 
business application. James was aware that it was unconventional 
for the Licensing Board to issue individuals more than one 
licence. He consequently decided to soften the blow by 
approaching the QDC for support. In March 1984, with all his 
credentials in order, James was granted a licence to open a 
supermarket in Phuthaditjhaba. 
Although the above two cases clearly illustrate the growing 
importance of political patronage in the practice of political 
domination after the 1980 elections, they also point to the 
extent to which traders themselves were able to manipulate party 
allegiance for personal gain. In the latter case it is, for 
instance, clear that James' support for the ruling party had far 
less to do with his personal commitment to Dikwankwetla's 
political vision than it had to do with his undefstanding of how 
local resources could be manipulated for personal gain. The 
tightening control of Dikwankwetla over Qwaqwa as a whole was 
becoming painfully clear to other traders as well, especially 
those in the opposition QTA. The options seemed relatively clear, 
either they followed William and joined the ruling party or they 
left the homeland. These pressures, combined with the constant 
demands placed on the QTA members by opposition parties for 
assistance to cover the expen~es relating to their court 
hearings, put exceptional strain on the QTA after 1980. 
The Final Coup: Constructing a New Chamber of Commerce 
The decline of the QTA after 1980 was closely linked with the 
dissolution of Mogka wa Setjhaba as an important political force 
in Qwaqwa. Mike Mofokeng, one of the 16 businessmen who stood for 
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Mokga wa Setjhaba in the 1980 election, explained that: 
At first we were confident that we would be able to declare the 
election null and void by taking the matter to the Supreme Court. 
But many of our followers were sceptical of this strategy. They 
argued that homeland leaders like Sebe had already been taken to 
court for the same reasons without the opposition making any 
headway. Businessmen in Qwaqwa were especially worried that if 
they continued to oppose Dikwankwetla they would lose their 
licences and as a result many of them now made amends with 
Dikwankwetla and renewed thdir membership cards. This has serious 
implications for the party as a whole because we relied on these 
people for finances and support. 
Another local businessman and Mogka wa Setjhaba member referred 
specifically to loss of local leadership as a reason for the 
decline of the party after 1980: 
Our problem after the election was that most of the local party 
leadership moved to urban areas. Some of them.moved by choice, 
others were hounded out by Dikwankwetla •.•• This trend caused the 
party to become weak and vunerable. 
The withdrawal of the opposition political elite from Qwaqwa 
after 1980, while closely related to Mopeli's clampdown on 
political dissidents, was also influenced by the prospect of a 
refurbished community council system in urban areas. In 1980 
Minister of Co-operation and Development, Piet Koornhof, 
announced that he would introduce legislation in 1981 that would 
provide for the transformation of community councils into fully-
fledged local authorities. Township elections scheduled for 1980 
were, consequently, temporarily postponed to allow the 'new deal' 
to become law (Bloch 1982: 64). The wide powers promised to the 
new councils, including control over township finances and 
business licensing, proved highly attractive to opposition 
politicians, who had done much of their political campaigning in 
urban areas during the 1980 Qwaqwa elections. Businessmen with 
urban connections were particularly favourably disposed to the 
new system that offered a way out of the increasingly politically 
loaded business licensing system in Qwaqwa. The switch of focus 
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away from Qwaqwa by leading opposition politicians was clearly 
demonstrated with the election of M.C.Koekoe and J.Ngake as the 
majors of Kroonstad and Welkom respectively in 1982. [Recent 
evidence collected by Haysom (1986: 22). interestingly, connects 
former Matla-a-Setjhaba members, Ngake and Tlali, with vigilante 
murders in Welkom during 198~]. 
The loss of prominent Qwaqwa businessmen and politicians to the 
Community Council system in urban areas after 1980 had important 
implications for the QTA, which was rapidly losing its coherence 
as a local political force. This was clearly demonstrated by the 
inability of the QTA to respond to the the QDC's renewed 
commitment to the Tripartite A~reement system after 1980 and the 
concurrent plans for extending the shopping centre concept into 
the closer settlement areas. In 1981 four additional centres were 
planned for Namahadi, Tseki, Makwane and Tseseng. As one ex-
member of the QTA explained: 
I would say that after the election there was a feeling of 
complete disillusionment in the QTA. We had struggled hard with 
Dikwankwetla and there was nothing to show for it - not even one 
representative in the Legislative Assembly! Many traders now felt 
that the fight against the QDC was lost and withdrew from the 
QTA. Some even argued that it would be better to negotiate with 
the QDC than to fight them. 
The decline and eventual dissolution of the QTA after 1980 left a 
vacuum for the emergence of the new Chamber of Commerce, prepared 
to seek reconciliation with the QDC and the Qwaqwa government. In 
1982 this Chamber was brought into existence under a group of 
loyal Dikwankwetla supporters led by the Molefe brothers from 
Harrismith. Within a matter of months of the formation of the new 
Chamber negotiations were set up with the QDC. In September 1982 
the first of a series of meetings were held between the two 
organisations to discuss the shopping centre issue, and by 
January 1983 the Director of the QDC was able to report that: 
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The relationship between the Chamber of Commerce and the 
Development C~rporation is excellent •••• Whenever there is a 
difference of opinion the matter is discussed thoroughly until. a 
consensus is reached [translation from Afrikaans] (QDC memo 
31/1/1983). 
He also encouraged the new Chamber to refrain from attempting to 
operate as a politi·cal party and to realise that "its objectives 
can be more easily achieved if it operated in harmony with the 
Government and if it has the active support of the Government" 
(Ibid). 
Yet while the new Chamber of Commerce had clearly opted for a 
policy of conciliation, it also realised that explicit links with 
the government undermined its potential to generate local 
support. In February 1983 it demonstrated this by rejoining 
NAFCOC and by refusing the Chief Minister's offer to become 
'Honourary President' of the Chamber. These attempts at 
projecting an image of autonomy were, however, seriously 
undermined because leading executives of the new Chamber were co-
opted onto the QDC's board of directors by 1983. 
The growing trend towards political and commercial centralisation 
was not without its contradictions and tensions. During the 
course of my fieldwork, I was aware of strong conflicts of 
interest between the QDC and leading Chamber officials. One of 
the areas where this was increasingly coming to the fore was in 
the sphere of urban real estate. In 1982 the QDC had pre-empted 
the expansion of freehold rights to Phuthaditjhaba by investing 
large amounts of capital in luxury housing schemes. These houses 
when complete were offered to the Qwaqwa public at exorbitant 
prices. Initially the schemes attracted little local attention, 
but after the granting of housing subsidies to black civil 
servants there was a sudden rush for the new accommodation. 
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Leading businessmen, realising the escalation of demand in this 
area, also sought to participate in the real estate market by 
purchasing· and developing property. In 1984, in spite of 
opposition from the QDC, these owners managed to extract sites 
from the Qwaqwa Tenure Board and set themselves up in competition 
to the QDC. This development caused considerable tension, 
especially since independent businessmen using local cheap labour 
were able to offer their homes at considerably cheaper prices 
than the QDC. 
The other issue on which members of the new Chamber and the QDC 
still clashed was the question of the absence of freehold rights 
in QDC shopping centres. Leading Chamber members argued that the 
QDC was being directly obstructionist in this field by demanding 
excessive rents from traders who could afford to purchase their 
business premises. As one owner explained: 
When we started negotiating with the QDC we accepted that the 
shopping centres were here to stay. This was a non-negotiable 
issue as far as the QDC was concerned. All they were prepared to 
concede was that Basotho traders would in future be given 
preference over white firms in occupying these premises. We were 
prepared to accept this, but what we will not tolerate is the 
QDC 1 s attempts prohibit us from owning our own premises. The QDC 
cannot always expect us to swallow the food they provide! 
The conflicting interests illustrated in the above two examples 
suggest that, while close links between Qwaqwa leading 
businessmen, Dikwankwetla and the QDC have facilitated a degree 
of consensus on the question of economic development, there 
exists considerable scope for tension between these groups for 
the spoils of these investments. Leading Qwaqwa businessmen 
objected to the corporate control exercised by the QDC in 
critical spheres of local investment. They were concerned aboui 
the financial costs of political involvement. In September 1984, 
for instance, politically aligned businessmen were requested by 
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handful of pensioners and school children awaited the dignitaries 
arrival. The whole episode, one QDC official explained. was "a 
terrible embarrassment for the Chamber - it's probably the 
smallest audience Dr. Motsuenyane has ever addressed!". 
Footnotes 
[1] This chapter might be read in association with Tim Quinlan's 
(1987) 0 The Tribal Paradigm and Ethnic Nationalism: A Case Study 
of Political Structures in Qwaqwa' (Transformations, 2). Both 
pieces cover the same period, although from two different angles. 
His paper focuses specifically on the refurbishing of chieftaincy 
and the construction of ethnic nationalism during the 
contemporary period. 
[2] The failure of Mokga wa Setjhaba to recruit Koekoe and Ngake 
did not detract from their efforts to campaign for urban support. 
This was clearly reflected in the 1980 pre-election meeting of 
the Legislative As~embly (1979: 52-70). In this debate the leader 
of the opposition lashed out strongly against the Community 
Council system 
[3] Accusations agains~ Dikwankwetla for using government 
vehicles for party political purposes were brought to the 
attention of the Legislative assembly by E.T. Chele prior to the 
election (QLA 1979: 63). 
[4] Mopeli 1 s ~ovement away from Black Alliance politics occurred 
~hortly after the 1980 election when he came out in support of 
Republic Day. Buthelezi, incensed by Mopeli's statements, accused 
him of "political delinquency" (Friend 11/6/1981). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ROUTES INTO BUSINESS: 
EXPERIENCES FROM TOWN AND COUNTRY 
Sociological studies of entrepreneurship have been primarily 
concerned with the motivational aspects of economic innovation. 
They have placed great stress on the importance of the social 
backgrounds of entrepreneurs in determining their differential 
responses to economic opportunities. Two related perspectives 
have dominated these studies. Firstly, following Weber's The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit £f. Capitalism, there has been an 
emphasis on the relationship between ideological commitment, 
socialisation and entrepreneurship. Studies that draw on this 
tradition tend to regard the values and experiences encountered 
during socialisatton as instrumental in structuring the 
entrepreneurial re~onse (McClelland 1966; Kunkel 1970). The 
second perspective, which is clearly linked to the first, focuses 
specifically on the relationship between marginality and 
entrepreneurship. It is argued that individuals socially or 
culturally excluded from the mainstream of society attempt to 
compensate for their disabilities by applying themselves 
conscientiously to economic matters (Hagen 1962; Geertz 1963; le 
Vine 1966). 
However, while a considerable amount of literature has been 
devoted to both perspectives, these broad motivational theories 
of entrepreneurship have remained unable to cover adequately the 
full range of responses encountered in reality. Part of the 
reason for this is that these analyses have concentrated on 
intangible social :resources without properly considering the 
miterial prerequisites for entrepreneurial activity. Marris and 
I 
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Qwaqwa to the changing commercial opportunities that were made 
available to them on arrival in the area. I will look separately 
at the different routes into business pursued by ex-farm workers, 
urban immigrants and original inhabitants in Qwaqwa. In 
attempting to demonstrates the different trends and relationships 
referred to in the chapter I will introduce a number of case 
studies, which serve both the immediate aims of this chapter as 
well as providing a base for further discussion in later 
chapters. 
ORIGINS, RELOCATION AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
Ex-farm Workers 
rBy 1984 more than 90% of Qwaqwa's adult population had lived in 
the homeland for less than 15 years. The vast majority of these 
; 
people arrived in Qwaqwa as refugees from white-owned farms~ in 
the north-eastern OFS, Transvaal and Natal and were resettled on 
urban-sized residential plots in congested closer settlement 
villages. Although the specific circumstances surrounding farm 
removals varied widely, few rural families ~ame to Qwaqwa 
completely of their own accord. Research conducted by Sharp 
(1982), Krause (1Q82), Niehaus (1984) and Salo (1984) has 
revealed that relocations from white-owned farms occurred within 
the context of the growing mechanisation of agriculture in the 
western Transvaal and the north-eastern OFS during the 1960s and 
1970s. This process, which was to a large extent sponsored by 
state subsidies, transformed the nature of agricultural labour. 
De Klerk (1983) has argued that the impact of mechanisation on 
the western Transvaal maize belt was to reduce employment, 
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inctease underemployment and broaden the division of labour on 
farms. Workers formerly engaged in diverse activities such as 
milking, weeding, threshing and reaping were either forced to 
specialise by learning new labour skills or were gradually 
excluded from full-time farm labour. Sharp (1982} extends these 
observations to the mixed farming (maize and cattle) belt of the 
north-eastern OFS, but suggests that mechanisation occurred more 
slowly and unevenly in this region. 
In this context the chief problem facing farmers 
themselves of the responsibility of reproducing an 
labour force (Ibid). Initially, they responded, 
was to rid 
unproductive 
as Sharp has 
shown. by allowing idle workers to seek wage employment in nearby 
towns and at rural labour bureaus. But this process gained little 
momentum for two reasons: firstly, farmers feared that by 
allowing all workers access to urban jobs they would lose their 
more skilled employees; secondly, at a structural level, changes 
in labour legislation increasingly directed labour recruitment to 
the homelands, the preferred destination for unemployed black 
workers. The latter shift in emphasis in state policy enabled 
farmers to justify forcible eviction of surplus workers (Niehaus 
1984). But it also provided redundant workers with the option of 
moving to the homelands of their own accord to find better jobs. 
The insistence by many farm workers that they moved to Qwaqwa 
'voluntarily' to secure migrant employment and to educate their 
chil'dren must, nevertheless, be seen against the backdrop of 
growing inactivity among certain sectors of the rural workforce, 
declining real wages and the general reluctance of white farmers 
to support 'superfluous blacks'. 
Mass relocation in Qwaqwa during the 1970s saw tens of thousands 
of ex-farm workers herded into closer settlement villages and 
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transit camps every year. Conditions in these areas were 
appalling: large families of ten or more people were crammed onto 
small urban-sized residential sites, terraced against the rocky 
mountain slopes of the Drakensberg foothills. They were forced to 
construct their own tin and mud shacks, and were provided with 
only the most basic amenities such as pit latrines and communal 
water points. Essential facilities such as public transport, 
retail stores and labour recruitment points remained absent from 
these areas until the late 1970s. Moreover, as a result of the 
circumstances surrounding relocation most farm workers were 
unemployed on arrival in Qwaqwa and were usually forced to wait 
long periods before they managed to obtain manual migrant jobs to 
support their families. These jobs were also often insecure as 
they were based on non-renewable contracts that sent migrants 
back to the Qwaqwa labour bureaus at the beginning of each year 
(Spiegel & Sharp 1986). 
1Despite the poverty and insecurity that faced ex-farm workers in 
Qwaqwa, some of them - a very small proportion - did manage to 
open businesses after arrival.~ rThese individuals, representing 
approximately one-third of the sample (25 out of 80 owners), were 
comprised mainly of rural retailers who entered commerce 
concurrently with engagement in migrant and commuter employment~ 
~n most cases these individuals had arrived in Qwaqwa in the 
early 1970s and had been able to obtain semi-skilled work as 
drivers, bricklayers, carpenters and indunas (supervisors).J~hey 
were also commonly members of households with multiple wage 
earners, which ena~led them to reinvest part of their earnings in 
small-scale commercial activities in Qwaqwa which could be run by 
kin in their absence.J This strategy of reinvesting wage earnings 
in informal sector activities was seen to be particularly 
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successful in the early 1970s and mid-1970s when business 
licensing was still controlled by the Harrismith municipality and 
shortages in basic needs items were acute in virtually all closer 
settlement villages. To illustrate the way in which some rural 
households were able to manipulate their relatively large 
earnings to meet local consumer demands, it is instructive to 
consider the case of Tlali, a small general dealer store owner in 
Tseki. 
Case 3.1: Earning two incomes from one job 
Tlali arrived in Qwaqwa from a farm in the Zastron district in 
1972. After spending six months at the Namahadi labour bureaus, 
he was recruited by an electrical company in Welkom as an 
apprentice electrician. At first Tlali was paid badly, receiving 
only R25 a week, but his salary increased as he became more 
skilled at his job. In fact, by 1974 Tlali was earning R90 a week 
and was able to use his reputation in the firm to obtain 
employment for his younger brother, Moses, who had stayed at home 
with his wife. Between 1974 and 1976 the combined earnings of 
Tlali and Moses were more than adequate to meet the household's 
demands in .Qwaqwa. This gave Tlali the opportunity to invest his 
earnings in clothes that could be sent home for his wife to 
resell in the villages. This strategy proved to be highly 
successful and by 1976 Tlali had managed to establish a system 
whereby merchandise and profits flowed to and rrom Welkom and 
Qwaqwa through a n,etwork of reliable workmates. Indeed, the 
success of Tlalf'~ part-time business was such that in October 
1976 he was able to afford a good second-hand pick-up truck, 
which allowed him to travel home more regularly with larger 
quantities of goods. Tlali claimed that he now wished to withdraw 
from wage employment and open a small retail business in Qwaqwa. 
In 1977, with starting capital of R7 000, he acquired a licence 
to run a general dealer store in Tseki. 
The combination, in the above case, of kin co-operation, 
relatively large household earnings and local scarcities in basic 
needs items emerged as a common pattern of access to the rural 
retail trade. The key to the successful transfer of goods between 
town and country was based crucially on the location of co-
earning kin and the reliability of support networks in the 
countryside. The fact that Tlali and Moses worked for the same 
firm in Welkom enabled them to co-ordinate their remittances and 
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collectively plan commercial strategies. Yet, it must also be 
emphasised that the scope for expanding small-scale commercial 
activities into large ones was restricted specifically to the 
period between 1972 and 1975 when the demand for consumer goods 
far outstretched supply. After 1976, with the issuing of a large 
number of general dealer licences, the scope for successful petty 
trading declined rapidly as these larger stores concentrated in 
the hands of a few individuals a whole range of commodities that 
had previously been traded by specialised hawkers. 1 By 1980, with 
the establishment of large white-owned supermarkets, the 
opportunity for petty traders to fill a niche in the village 
consumer market had diminished markedly. The data collected by 
Sharp (1962) and Niehaus (1984) in Tseki village in the early 
1980s characterises hawking as a highly involuted activity, 
employed only as a survival strategy._) 
Besides those individuals in this segment of the sample that 
entered licensed retailing in or shortly after 1976 by means of 
petty trading, there were a small number of owners in rural areas 
who set up businesses during the late 1970s, but used different 
points of access. 
,-
The first of these routes involved (, 
participation in the local building trade, which had sprung up in 
the wake of government drives to construct schools in the closer 
settlement areas and residential accommodation in Phuthaditjhaba".J 
Ex-farm workers, who either arrived in Qwaqwa with bricklaying 
skills or acquired them subsequently on the urban labour market, 
were able to contract their services to the Qwaqwa government 
from the mid-1970s onwards in return for considerable financial 
rewards. Some local builders earned between R200 and R300 a week 
in 1978 • .J The availability of this secure and lucrative form of 
local employment provided a firm basis for entry into licensed 
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V 
of a commercial liquor trade in Witsieshoek in any detail since 
that would have required an entirely separate oral history 
project. I merely wish to point to the historical depth of 
commercial liquor dealing in the reserve and highlight some of 
the continuities between urban and rural liquor trading. 
Charles van Onselen {1982) has recently argued that enlarged 
agricultural surpluses in the Transvaal in the 1880s were an 
important antecedent to the emergence of liquor production on the 
Witwatersrand. The use of liquor as a means of storing 
agricultural surplus, he argues, is a recurring historical theme 
in the transition from feudal to capitalist agriculture in Europe 
(1982:45). In a similar vein, commercial liquor production in the 
north-eastern OFS, manifested in the establishment of the 
Demarillac Distillery in Harrismith in 1895, appears to be 
increasingly closely related to the consolidation of an 
capitalist white farming sector in the region in the late 
nineteenth century (cf. Keegan 1981). 
The arrival of commercially produced liquor in Witsieshoek and 
northern Basotholand in general preceded the growth of a local 
liquor industry in the OFS. Keegan (1986: 202) notes that by the
1880s: 
A number of liquor canteens has sprung up [in Basotholand], where 
Basotho illicitly exchanged grain for cheap often unadulterated 
Cape Brandy - a muid of grain was often exchanged for a bottle, 
ensuring big profits for liquor vendors. 
Walton {1958) corroborates this evidence by suggesting that white 
farmers were engaged in smuggling copious quantities of liquor 
across the eastern border of Basotholand in the 1890s. He quotes 
a Basotholand missionary: 
the strongest and vilest Cape Smoke [brandy], we call it 'kill at 
forty yards', is daily being smuggled into the country by 
unprincipled men, both Dutch and English, and a whole string of 
50 
illicit grog shops and canteens exist along the border {p.30). 
Despite the availability of Cape liquor in Witsieshoek by the 
late nineteenth century, there is no evidence to suggest that 
Cape liquor was used in Witsieshoek in large quantities prior to 
the 1890s. Missionary evidence suggests that Paramount chief 
Paulus Mopeli was opposed to the illegal liquor trade and only 
encouraged the brewing of traditional jwala (Badenhorst 1944: 
258). But, with the arrival of the Harrismith distillery and the 
outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War, conditions began to change in 
Witsieshoek. Several factors seem important in the transformation 
of local attitu~es. Firstly, the closure of the mines and OFS 
roadworks brought migrants home with first-hand experience of the 
liquor trade in the compounds. Secondly, the arrival of 20 000 
British troops in Harrismith heightened local awareness of the 
popularity of commercial liquor. Thirdly, the death of Paulus 
Mopeli in 1897 and his replacement by the rebellious, anti-
mission Ntsane Mopeli undermined the temperance philosophies of 
the Dutch Reformed church (Ross 1930: 60). Fourthly, the vacation 
of white farms in the Harrismith area during the war enabled 
Witsieshoek residents to travel freely to nearby towns to 
purchase liquor (Steytler 1932). 
Whatever the combination of these factors, there is little doubt 
that local brewers in Witsieshoek were selling mixtures of 
traditional beer and commercial liquor for profit during the war. 
Describing conditions in the reserve, Badenhorst (1944) maintains 
that 1 drunkeness 1 and 'anarchy' were interrupting the work of the 
mission. Rev Ross' letters reveal a similar complaint: 
There is no law and order in the reserve at all •••• Beer brewing 
and drinking, pagan dancing and all sorts of terrible things are 
occurring. Moreover, many beer canteens have been set up and sell 
beer to the public. The reserve will soon be full of canteens. I 
have already protested about this to the chiefs [translation from 
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Afrikaans] (Ross 1930: 57). 
The initial growth of commercial brewing waned with the 
restoration of law and order in the reserve after the war and the 
tighter implementation of the 1897 prohibition on liquor sales to 
Africans in white areas. But commercial brewing did not 
disappear. This is confirmed by missionary reports and the 
descriptions of reserve life found in the opening chapter of 
Mopeli-Paulus' (1952) Blanket Boy's Moon. Mopeli-Paulus, writing 
of the conditions in Witsieshoek before the 1913 Land Act, 
maintains that landless widows and other women made a living from 
the sale of beer: "in order to make more money they added 
certain liquors to their brew which quickly made men drunk and 
senseless" {1953: 21). 
The oral accounts of the liquor trade in the 1920s and 1930s 
provide rich descriptions of the kinds of concoctions brewed in 
the area with the arrival of new recipes from urban areas. But at 
the same time they describe a liquor trade with little vitality, 
which was relatively homogeneous and conservative. Commercial 
beer production remained linked 





consumption patterns. Rural women in Witsieshoek could only 
improvise urban traditions of which they had little or no 
personal experience. In this sense, the Witsieshoek trade lagged 
behind other reserves located closer to the City. La Hause (1983: 
9). for instance, suggests that in parts of Natal ru ra 1 women 
manipulated the five-day pass sys tern to travel into Durban over 
weekends to sell large calabashes and paraffin tins of utswala to 
migrants, thereby retaining some continuity between brewing 
traditions in town and country [13]. The distance of Witsieshoek 
from the major cities excluded these possibilities and prevented 
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r 
rural brewers from extracting large profits by penetrating into 
urban areas. Local accounts depict the reserve trade as small and 
irregular, peaking at periods when large numbers of migrants were 
home. 
The activities of liquor traders in Witsieshoek during this 
period were not comparable with those of their urban counterparts 
who fed on media images, cross-cultural contact and urban dance 
and music subcultures to establish vibrant drinking houses (cf. 
Coplan 1985). Shebeeners in Witsieshoek were neither cultural 
innovators nor aspirant capitalists [14]. They simply serviced 
the needs of migrant workers by integrating urban drinking habits 
with established rural liquor consumption patterns. In this sense 
the operations of liquor traders contrasted markedly with those 
of retailers and transport operators prior to the 1960s. 
The Rise of the Liquor Trade in Qwaqwa 
Conditions in the liquor trade improved marginally in the 1960s 
with the lifting of the prohibition on African liquor purchasing 
in white areas. In 1962 it became legal for blacks to carry up to 
nine litres of bottled liquor from white residential areas into 
r 
1 o ca ti on s • -> 'T h i s me a s u re , comb i n e d w i th i n c re as i n g pop u l at i on 
relocation from the mid-1960s,, stimulated 1 iquor sales in the 
reserve. But at the same time there were still important 
limitations. rFirstly, there were no bottlestores in Witsieshoek 
during the 1960s, forcing shebeeners to carry the expense of 
regular journeys into Kestell and Harrismith to purchase liquor., 
r 
Secondly, this period was typified by the influx of farm families 
into Qwaqwa who had little experience of shebeening. Liquor 
I 
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consumption in the OFS countryside was generally confined to 
domestic units where women brewed beer daily for the household 
r-
head. The residential locations on most farms were also too 
small to commercialise liquor production . 
..J 
Increased urban removals to Qwaqwa in the 1970s, however, moved 
the core of the shebeen trade to Phuthaditjhaba. The urban 
relocation policy to Qwaqwa had two aspects. On the one hand, it 
concentrated on resettling entire urban communities in 'freehold' 
locations. The most striking cases of this were witnessed in the 
demolition of the Schoonplaas locations in Harrismith in 1972 and 
the Vergenoeg location in Senekal between 1972 and 1975, while 
other examples involved mass removals from Bloemfontein, Aliwal 
North, and Vereeniging. On the other hand, the state concentrated 
on weeding out 'superfluous' and 'undesirable' elements in a wide 
range of urban areas. The vast majority of these individuals, 
exposed to influx control removals, were women and pensioners. 
Initially, they were resettled in a two-roomed housing complex at 
the east end of Phuthaditjhaba known as Maghekung, literally 
"place of the old", but when this accommodation was exhausted 
they were dispersed in among closer settlement residents. Many 
were located in a new segment of Namahadi which they called 
Mangaung, after the Bloemfontein location whence they had come. 
rT he · · marg1nal1ty of single women - deserted, widowed or divorced 
by their husbands - from the male-dominated migrant and commuter 
labour markets in Qwaqwa forced large numbers into the familiar 
activities of shebeening and hawkingJ My interviews revealed that 
1a number of these women were already second 9eneration 
shebeeners, brought up on concoctions such as skokiaan, skomfana, 
'shimiyane and magasimani. 1This experience enabled them to emerge 
..) 
as the new homebrew 'shebeen queens' of the early 1970s.\ It is j 
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perhaps worth emphasising that, in spite of their innovative 
brewing styles, these women seldom generated large profits by 
their efforts. {This was particularly true in the impoverished 
closer settlements, where most household incomes could not be 
stretched to such luxuries as commercially brewed beer-) 
After the mid-1970s employment patterns in Qwaqwa became more 
stable, especially with the mines cutting down on foreign 
recruits. According to the National Manpower Commission, the 
number of migrants increased in Qwaqwa from 7 000 in 1975 to 
43 000 in 1980, while the available commuter jobs grew from about 
1 500 to 6 800 over the same period {SAIRR 1975/81). A 
considerable number of local construction jobs on roads, schools, 
clinics and township housing were created by the Oranje Vaal 
Administration Board. C These developments cultivated local demand 
for mass-produced . liquor, especially bottled beer. In closer 
settlement areas storekeepers emerged as important brokers in the 
~ew trade.J As owners of refrigerators, and regular commuters to 
Harrismith they were able to supply both the shebeen trade and 
the general public with bottled 
r: beer • .J Another interesting 
development in the rural trade in the late 1970s was the 
development of a fortnightly shebeening cycle in Bakwena villages 
such as Botsabela and Mangaung. These areas, located close to the 
Phuthadithjaba labour bureau, were the main recruiting zones for 
SASOL migrants and as such were the destination of the 
fortnightly pay packets of these workers.~This distinctive cycle, 
however, declined in 1983 when the SASOL plant at Secunda was 
completed. 
1 In Phuthaditjhaba new employment opportunities, as well as the 
arrival of increasing numbers of teachers and bureaucrats with 
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westernised drinking habits, r-rapidly transformed shebeening. New 
demands for spirits and bottled beer introduced specialised 
liquor runners into the trade. These individuals negotiated bulk 
purchasing agreen1ents with Harrismith bottlestore owners and 
resold their liquor in Phuthaditjhaba at inflated prices._) The 
ready availability of bottled liquor from these runners produced 
a local price war in the town between 1977 and 1979, the average 
price of 750 ml of beer in shebeens dropped from 90 to 70 cents. 
This competition was compounded in 1979 with the establishment of 
the first black-owned bottlestores in the town. Under these 
circumstances it became imperative tor shebeeners to specialise 
in order to avoid being ousted from the liquor market by owners 
of large drinking and retailing depots. Although it is difficult 
to document the full variety of operations in the town by 1980, 
r-
three types stand out, which I shall term 'neighbourhood 
outlets', 'general drinking houses' and 'club shebeens' (cf. 
Chapter Four)._) 
Neighbourhood shebeens were the most common in Phuthadithaja in 
~ {he early 1980s when there were at least three on every block. 
G 
They were run predominantly from the homes of single women who 
exploited a common residential identity to sell a combination of 
bottled beer, mass-produced sorghum beer ( 'Big S 1 ) and homebrews, 
especially the fast brewing magasimane made from sugar,j bread 
yeast, malt and flavoured with fruit. The profits of these 
r 
operations were small and their markets competitive. Club 
shebeens, on the other hand, catered specifically for the needs 
of the aspirant middle class and were structured around commo~ 
occupational and recreational interests. In contrast to the 
smaller neighbourhood outlets, they sold mainly bottled liquor, 
. especially beer, and were often run by husband and wife~ 
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combinations. 'Teacher' shebeens were probably the most common in 
this category, although high-class outlets operating from self-
built homes were making their mark by the mid-1980s. The final 
category of shebeen, the general drinking house, was the least 
;'c. common ,::; of the three types. These outlets were defined by their 
size and their mixed clientele. In a sense, they were simply 
larger versions of the neighbourhood outlets with a more upmarket 
orientation. They operated from houses with several drinking 
zones, usually a courtyard for migrants and two or three plushly 
decorated rooms inside for wealthier clients., At these shebeens 
..._, / 
liquor was not cheap, as clients paid for privacy, service and 
comfort. In terms of the variety of liquor sold these outlets 
were the closest thing in Qwaqwa to the white suburban pubs. 
Market changes in the villages came more slowly. Part of the 
reason for this was that bottlestores were only set up in these 
areas after 1982. But more important was the fact that class 
differentiation had not gained momentum outside of 
Phuthaditjhaba. Closer settlement shebeeners continued to be 
constrained by the structures of labour migration and the 
irregular flow of remittances. In these areas neighbourhood 
shebeens, some dealing only in homebrewed liquor, continued to 
dominate the trade. Peak trading hours for these operators were 
over weekends, but it was noted that most of them stayed open all 
week to allow unemployed men to gather together and chat. 
However, by 1984 a few larger drinking houses were beginning to 
appear in some of the older villages such as Namahadi, the seat 
of the Bakwena tribal authority. These outlets, nevertheless, 
r 
remained rare. The contrast in variety and scale between 
Phuthaditjhaba shebeens and those in the villages was the most 
notable characteristic of the liquor market in Qwaqwa in 1984 • .) 
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This division should not, however, be assumed to be static. The 
consolidation of commercial liquor interests with the formation 
of the Qwaqwa Sottlestore Association in 1984 threatened to 
change the rural market by offering shebeeners cut prices to 
stimulate demand. This point was emphasised by Bakwena 
chieftainess and businesswdman, Nampoi Mopeli, when she urged the 
Qwaqwa government to promote local bottlestore owners by setting 
up a "Buy Qwaqwa" campaign (QLA 1984: 598). The prospect of the 
legalisation of shebeens also held important implications for the 
trade as a whole. In 1984 the Qwaqwa government, keen to extract 
revenue from the trade, was seriously considering implementing 
the Soweto 'tavern' system in the homeland. Local shebeeners were 
less enthusiastic, especially in the rural areas where women 
realised that licensing would probably transfer the trade into 
male hands. 
During my fieldwork I conducted 20 interviews with shebeeners in 
Phuthaditjhaba, Manaung and Namahadi. Although these interviews 
attempted to capture a wide range of operations in both town and 
country, sustained police harassment of rural shebeeners at the 
end of 1984 interrupted my research in the closer settlement 
areas. The data collected therefore shows a bias towards 
Phuthaditjhaba traders. 
Conclusion 
Although the above analysis is primarily concerned with local-
level change in three commercial sectors in Qwaqwa, the 
discussion throws critical light on two widely held assumptions 
about black class formation in the homelands. In concluding this 
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chapter I wish briefly to draw attention to these two issues. 
The first revolves around the central role ascribed to the BIC in 
inaugurating class formation in the homelands. Molteno (1977} in 
his influential overview of the bantustan strategy identifies the 
BIC as a major force in forging the shift in homeland policy away 
from the 'class levelling'' tendencies of the reserve period to 
the 'class forming' tendencies of the contemporary phase. This 
analysis is based entirely on the experience of the Transkei 
where the BIC bought up 423 white trading stations during the 
1960s and had already transferred 217 of these stores into black 
hands by 1972 (Southall 1983: 163}. This initiative was coupled 
with a business loan scheme which assisted more than 100 black 
traders in the Transkei over this period (Hart 1972: 105}. In 
contrast to this situation, there is little evidence that the BIC 
played an equivalent role in Qwaqwa. In fact, it seems clear 
that, in spite of growing proletarianisation, class formation 
occurred less rapidly in the 1960's than it did in the 1950s when 
state involvement in commerce was minimal. Indeed, when one 
critically investigates the role of the BIC in Witsieshoek, it is 
not at all clear that the major objective of the Corporation was 
to stimulate the interests of local black entrepreneurs. During 
the period 1960 to 1974 the Corporation not only failed to crush 
white retailing interests in the reserve effectively, but also 
undermined those of local bus owners, dairy farmers and brick 
merchants by establishing state monopolies (cf. Mapena 1970, Bank 
1985). Its involvement in the construction of the Mount-Aux-
Sources holiday resort, 
further evidence of 
designed for and run by whites, provides 
the orientation of BIC activities in 
Witsieshoek. It seems clear that black commercial advancement in 
Qwaqwa in the 1960s did not occur because of BIC initiatives, but 
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rather in spite of them! This finding brings into question the 
validity of generalising from the very specific experience of the 
Transkei to other homeland areas, but it also focuses attention 
more generally on the transition period of the 1950s and 1960s, 
between the reserve and the bantustan strategies [16). In 
analysing the significance of this transition it is crucially 
important to counterpose the rhetoric of the state with its 
actions in the rural periphery. Hirsch's (1984) suggestion that 
there is an urgent need to consider the composition of various 
government corporations and state departments to fully grasp 
subtle shifts and regional differences in state policy in rural 
areas is an important one, but one that should be coupled with 
analysis of actual rural situations during the transitionary 
phase [15). 
The second issue relates to my earlier warning that black petty 
bourgeois development should not be seen only in legalistic 
terms. There are two underlying assumptions that inform this 
position: (1) unlicensed informal sector operations are by 
definition small-scale undertakings, (2) legal reform is the only 
way in which black entrepreneurs can effectively enter the South 
African economy. Neither of these notions is unequivocally 
supported by the analysis presented in this chapter. Indeed, it 
is clear that certain categories of shebeeners and taximen in 
Qwaqwa were making considerably larger profits in 1984 than their 
licensed counterpa~ts in the retail trade, burdened with lengthy 
bureaucratic procedures and over-trading. I am not suggesting 
that legal reform is not an important aspect of black class 
formation, but rather that illegal operators will continue to 
prosper where market conditions are good and state intervention 




[l] Arthur Gray (Jr.), personal communication, January 1985; for 
a more general discussion of the skin and hide trade in the 
Harrismith district during the 1870s and 1880s see Steytler 
(1932: 82ff) 
[2] Morris Thibella, an retired teacher from Monontsha village, 
claimed that when his father bought a wagon from a white 
Harrismith farmer in the early 1890s he was the first commoner to 
own a wagon in the district. 
[3] Informants claimed that women undertook these expeditions 
between July and September, after the winter peaches had ripened 
and before the summer rains made the wagon trails in and out of 
the reserve unusable. 
[4] Keegan (1986: 212-14) provides a more detailed description of 
the involvement of the Stevens family in the Basotholand trade. 
He focuses particularly on the competitive relationship that 
developed between the Stevens and the Fraser family businesses. 
[5] In 1932 the Native Economic Commission reported that: "it is 
unreasonable to prevent natives from obtaining trading licences 
inside the Native reserves" (UG 22-32: par. 954). In 1934, 
following this recommendation, provisions were made to assist 
black traders in obtaining licences in the Transkei, 62% of the 
·business licences granted in the reserves between 1934 and 1936 
were issued to blacks (Hart 1972: 95). These measures were, 
however, not extended to the OFS as a result of strong resistence 
from white municipal authorities (Ibid: 97-100, Rheinault Jones 
1939). 
[6] This figure is commuted by subtracting the official 1970 de 
facto population figure and the estimate 1980 figure of 300 000 
and dividing them by 120, the number of months. 
[7] This information was obtained during my 1983 fieldwork in the 
town. The high density of informal sector activities in 
Phuthaditjhaba during the early 1970s is corroborated by Robins 
evidence (1982). 
[8] The Tripartite Agreement System was introduced in 1975 as 
part of a package of economic decentralisation intiatives. The. 
aim of the system is to allow white-owned companies to gain 
direct access to homeland areas, but on condition that local 
shareholders will eventually own half of their assets. Local 
Development Corporations were entitled to hold shares in trust 
until such time as it became feasible for them to be sold off to 
l o ca l res i dents ( cf • Z i 1 1 e 1 9 81 , Hats on , 0 ew a r & Tod es 1 9 81 ) • 
[9] Information derived from intervies with the Gray and Brand 
families. Gertie Gray owned the first private sedan, a Tin Lizzy. 
[10] During the 1940's transport licences in Witsieshoek were 
issued from Dundee in Natal (Kama Twala, personal communication). 
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[11] These National Manpower figures appear to include migrants 
recruited in Onverwacht near Thaba 1 Nchu. This figure remains the 
only available estimate. 
(12] This figure is based on oral reports from Majakathata 
owners. 
(13] Bradford (1987) has demonstrated this clearly in ,her 
analysis of female shebeeners in small Natal midland towns. She 
argues that the connection ~etween urban and rural brewing can be 
seen in the active particpation of rural brewers in the 1929 
Natal Beer Riots. 
(14] Bradford (1987) has argued that the profits generated by 
rural female shebeeners were also restricted by the control men 
sought to exercise over their earnings. She maintains (1987: 303) 
that in terms of the Natal code, the entire earnings of an 
African woman bel~ng to her guardian, a pri~ilege which was 
passed down on marriage from fathers to husbands. She suggests 
that these rights were protected by the legal system: "white 
magistrates betrayed few qualms 1n supporting rapacious guardians 
who pounced on female assets and incomes 11 (Ibid) 
(15] Recent literature on the reserves has concentrated in great 
detail on the decline of peasant agriculture, the incorporation 
of rural people into the wider capitalist economy and the 
responses of rural people to this processes between 1880 and 1930 
(cf. Bundy 1979, Marks & Atmore 1980, Beinart 1983, Shillington 
1985, Bienart and Bundy 1987). There has also b~en a considerable 
amount written about the contemporary period (Rotberg & Bulter 
1977, Shultz 1980, Sreek & Wicksteed 1981, Southall 1983). 
Studies of the intermediate period, especially the 1950's and 
1960's, have been far more limited and mainly confined to 
investigating resistance to the implementation of agricultural 
1 betterment'(Marony 1976, Mason 1983, Lodge 1983). 
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CHAPTER nw 
THE POLITICS .OF CENTRALISATION 
TRADERS, DIKWANKWETLA, AND THE QDC, 1974 - 1984 
In this chapter I will concentrate on the changing relationship 
between small traders, tne ruling Dikwankwetla party and the 
Qwaqwa Development Corporation between 1974 and 1984. I will 
attempt to demonstrate through this analysis that class formation 
in Qwaqwa cannot be understood as the mechanical unfolding of 
neatly integrated collective interests, but must be seen as a 
process of both economic and political struggle [l]. 
The chapter is divided into three sections based on a 
periodisation of the central shifts in the relationship between 
traders and the Qwaqwa government. The first section, which deals 
with the period 1974 to 1980, attempts to document traders' 
initial support for and subsequent opposition to the economic 
policy of the Dikwankwetla party, which increasingly surfaced at 
the party political level towards the end of this period. The 
second section, which deals with the period 1980-1982, 
concentrates on the re-election of Dikwankwetla in Qwaqwa in 1980 
and its move away from confrontation politics towards co-option 
and repression as key political strategies. In the final section 
I will deal with the evolution of this policy after 1982 and its· 
economic and political implications for traders in Qwaqwa. 
Traders, Dikwankwetla and the Politics of Opposition 
The evolution of homeland self-government in Qwaqwa after 1971, 
while of little significance for the vast majority of Sotho-
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speakers in South Africa, was a process that was watched with 
considerable interest by Basotho entreprenuers both inside Qwaqwa 
and beyond its borders. For those traders living in Witsieshoek a 
shift in political control away from Pretoria promised to release 
them from the 'tyranny' of the BIC and the Harrismith 
Municipality, whose collective control over business licensing 
existed as a formidable obstacle to their commerical ambitions. 
Local traders were also disillusioned with the tribal 
authorities, whose persistent petitioning against racist 
licensing policies had earned them few concessions, and looked 
with some optimism to days when business licensing was controlled 
by the local Qwaqwa government. Basotho traders in urban areas 
had a similar interest in the devolution of political control in 
Qwaqwa. Since the mid-1960s their businesses had come under 
increased pressure from urban authorities and they realised that 
unless new opportunities arose in the homeland they might be 
forced to relinquish their businesses altogether (Southall 1980). 
In this context, it is not suprising that in 1974, 
announced that Qwaqwa was poised to enter the second 
when it was 
phase of 
self-government, large numbers of traders joined forces, some as 
candidates, with the opposition Dikwankwetla party under T.K • 
. Mopeli to dislodge the ruling Basotho Unity party led by Batlokwa 
Paramount Wessels Mota. The Dikwankwetla party was aware of this 
constituency and in preparation for the 1975 election made 
strongly worded promises of economic reform, threatening to 
institute principles of free enterprise for Basotho traders in 
Qwaqwa and to expel the BIC (van der Merwe etal 1978: 536). 
Consequently, in 1975 when Dikwankwetla swept into power 
capturing 19 of the 20 elected seats in the new Legislative 
Assembly it received a strong mandate to meet the demands of 
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traders, organised by 1975 in the Qwaqwa Chamber of Commerce 
(also known as the Qwaqwa Traders Association). 
Dikwankwetla responded swiftly to this pressure: By December 1975 
the new Chief Minister, T.K. Mopeli, announced the termination 
of BIC activities in Qwaqwa and the formation of a new 
corporation structured ar6und the interests of the Basotho 
trader, the Qwaqwa Development Corporation. Shortly afterwards, 
in June 1976 new legislation was approved by the Qwaqwa 
Legislative Assembly to reorganise business licensing at the 
local level. Kroonstad businessman and Minister of the Interior, 
M.C. Koekoe, who moved the Basotho Business and Trading 
Undertakings Bill, explained that the main aim of the legislation 
was to exclude the Harrismith municipality from business 
licensing in Qwaqwa and to ensure that this process was 
henceforth controlled directly by the tribal authorities and the 
Qwaqwa government (QLA 1976: 684). He expressed the hope that 
this measure would rapidly advance black business development in 
Qwaqwa and would bring back to the homeland much of the money 
spent by local consumers in white South Africa (Ibid: 86). 
The wave of enthusiasm that filtered through the Basotho business 
community following these two announcements was shortlived. By 
March 1977, almost a year after the passage of the Trading Bill, 
it became clear that considerable confusion still surrounded the 
new legislation. Heated discussions in the Legislative Assembly 
revealed that the District Magistrate in Phuthaditjhaba, who had 
not yet received confirmation of Pretoria's approval of the bill, 
was continuing to apply the 1 old 1 legislation in his assessment 
of new license applications. Incensed traders complained that the 
white magistrate was doing all in his power to stifle the 
business licensing process. They argued that he was harsh and 
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'technical' in his assessment of new applicants and favoured 
applicants who employed the services of white lawyers. As one 
speaker explained: 111 t appears that people who stand under the 
protection of a white goat skin are issued licences without any 
problem
11 
(Ibid: 360). The continuation of restrictive practices, 
one speaker claimed 'mocked the Basotho' who had to queue at 
shops for 'about an hour to buy a box of matches' (Ibid). 
At a political level the dissatisfaction of traders over the 
retention of outmoded licensing practices was expressed in a 
growing disillusionment with Dikwankwetla's ability to enforce 
economic reform. Some speakers argued that Dikwankwetla's 
tardiness on the licensing issue was deliberate, they had become 
'complacent' and 'indifferent' to the needs of ordinary people 
after their convincing election victory (Ibid: 364). But Koekoe 
a·ssured the Assemply that the fault lay not with the Qwaqwa 
government but with Pretoria, which was slow to react to their 
demands. He informed traders that their problems would be 
addressed immediately and that the cabinet would ensure that 
malpractices were eradicated until such time as a fully-fledged 
Licensing Board could be set up in the homeland (Ibid: 366). 
But Dikwankwetla's efforts to placate local traders did not last 
for long. In 1977 with the announcement by the QDC that it sought 
to attract white commercial capital to Qwaqwa under the 
Tripartite Agreement System simmering discontent re-emerged 
within the Qwaqwa Traders Association. Since November 1976 the 
QTA had aligned itself strongly with NAFCOC's rejection of the TA 
system and regular meeting were held between the two 
organisations, res~lting in negotiations between NAFCOC and the 




retailing; not least because qualified builders were able to 
construct their own stores at minimal additional expense. In 
fact, one owner reported that he had managed to use government 
building material earmarked for school development to construct 
his store. To demonstrate this trend it is useful to consider the 
case of I 1 one, one of s i x ex-bu i 1 de rs i n the s a mp 1 e: 
Case 3.2: From building to storekeeping 
!lone, an ex-farm worker from Reitz, arrived in Qwaqwa in 1973. 
In January 1974 he secured a migrant contract with Prima Milling 
Company in Johannesburg where he took a part-time course in 
bricklaying. In June 1975 Iloni qualified as a bricklayer and 
returned to Qwaqwa to hire out his services to the Qwaqwa 
government. He was consigned to work on municipal houses in 
Phuthadi tjhaba. He claimed that the agreement wi'th the government 
was that contractors worked independently until they had finished 
the job allocated to them. Thereafter, building inspectors would 
be called in to check the work and to organise payment. Between 
1975 and 1977 Ilone worked in Phuthaditjhaba, but also did a few 
private jobs for shopkeepers and village chiefs to increase his 
earnings. He claims that it was through these jobs that he became 
interested in the rural retail market: "I could see that these 
people were making a killing. Their shops were always crowded, 
especially at mo~th-end when people would even queue outside". 
After considering his finances, !lone decided that he would 
withdraw from the building trade to set up a shQp in Tseseng. He 
applied for a licence in November 1977 and by February 1978 had 
finished building his store at a total cost of R3 000 - he had 
not only built the store by himself, but had also baked the 
bricks himself. 
1The second route into business followed by ex-farm workers in the 
1 ate 1970s revolved around the organisation of migrant lift 
clubs0 Individuals, who held supervisory roles at industrial 
plants which employed large numbers of Qwaqwa migrants, were seen 
to invest their earnings in second-hand vans to provide a 
commercial transport service for migrants. This activity was 
particularly common at the Secunda SASOL plant, where migrants 
r-
were given fortnightly weekend passes to return home. In this 
context shift supervisors, or indunas, could organise lift 
~chemes within their work teams or at hostels,~ which increase 
their fortnightly wages. As time passed some of these workers 
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were seen to accumulate sufficient capital to either enter the 
taxi trade on a full-time basis or make their way into the rural 
retail trade in Qwaqwa. The case study of Themba, an ex-SASOL 
migrant from Namahadi, illustrates how this transition could be 
achieved: 
Case 3.3: From Secunda to Majakathata 
Themba arrived in Qwaqwa from the Senekal district in 1974. In 
1975 he obtained his first industrial job as a manual worker for 
Murray & Roberts Construction with whom he fulfilled two 
consecutive nine month contracts. In 1977 the job for which he 
had been recruited was completed and the contract workers were 
sent home. Between March 1977 and January 1978 Themba remained 
unemployed, and only obtained occasional piece-work in QwaqwaA 
This period of unemployment, however, ended when. he was recruited 
along with hundreds of other workers to the SASOL plant in 
Secunda where he was given a job as an induna. Throughout 1978 
Themba saved his overtime pay and at the beginning of 1979 
purchased a pick-up truck to set up a lift club in his hostel. He 
~xplained: · 
From Secunda there were no trains travelling to Qwaqwa and 
the railway buses only came once a week. The workers in the 
hostels were suffering because the buses were always 
full ••• I decided to help these people by setting up a lift 
club in my hostel. Every second weekend I would take eight 
workers home, charging them Rl6 for the journey to Qwaqwa 
and back. In this way I managed to earn an extra R250 ~ 
month. 
In 1980, with increasing numbers of Qwaqwa migrants arriving in 
Secunda, Themba decided to resign from his job and enter the 
migrant taxi business on a full-time basis. 
Although the part-time taxi transport provided a means of 
expanding formal sector earnings, the opportunities in this 
,-
sphere, like those in petty trading, were short-lived. The rise 
of a fully-fledged long-distance pirate taxi business in Qwaqwa 
after 1980 saw the eclipse of lift club schemes, which were being 
made redundant by the cheaper and more efficient service~ It was 
at this time that Themba resigned. He realised that in order to 
stay in the taxi business he would have to join the new 
Majakathata association. 
After 1980 there was little evidence that ex-farm workers were 
94 
able to assemble the resources necessary to enter business on a 
full-time basis. Increasing unemployment, reduced government 
spending on local development projects and intense competition in 
small-scale retailing made it extremely difficult for wage 
employees to multiply their earnings in the informal sector. This 
decreasing involvement of rural households in lucrative forms of 
commerce was demonstrated by the fact that only two ex-farm 
workers in the sample managed to open or hire rural retail stores 
after 1980. rlndeed, it was only in exceptional cases, where more 
than three male household members were able to hold well-paid 
jobs concurrently, that access to licensed commerce could be 
considered.~ The case of Thapelo, who purchased a retail store in 
Namahadi in 1982, illustrates this point: 
Case 3.4: Assembling household resources 
Thapelo moved to Namahadi in 1977 at the age of 50. He had spent 
his adult life as a worker on white-owned farms in the Senekal 
district in the north-eastern OFS. Thapelo claims that his 
decision to bring his family to Qwaqwa resulted from the demands 
placed on him by his children, who wished to seek industrial 
employment. 
In comparison with many other farm households, Thapelo and his 
family were highly successful in their work-seeking strategies. A 
summary of the employment experiences of male household members 
after arrival is presented below: 
0 




[1] Household head. September 1977 obtains job as manual labourer 
on dam construction site in Venterburg. July 1978 accepts 
contract to Sasol plant in Secunda again as a construction 
worker, forced to give up this job in 1981 after contracting TB. 
[2] Migrates illegally to Pretoria in 1978, finds a jobs as a 
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carpenter with an interior decorating company. Married in 1983, 
but retains his job in Pretoria. 
[3] Unemployed in 1978, but with the assistance of elder brother 
obtains a carpentry job in Alberton, where he remained employed 
in 1984. Married 1983. 
[4] Takes contract to Sasol in December 1978, promoted to shift 
supervisor and, later, receives on the job training as a fitter 
and turner. Unmarried. 
[5] In 1979 obtains permanent job with with SAR in Isando. 
Unmarried. 
ln view of the growing financial resources at Thapelo's disposal 
as household head, he decided, after recovering from his illness 
in 1982, to lease a small retail store. Since arrival in Qwaqwa, 
Thapelo had actively been saving for his old ·age and he had 
purchased (with the assistance of his sons) seven head of cattle 
which he left in the care of a relative in Tseseng village, as 
well as a second-hand pick-up truck purchased with the cash 
payments accrued after the marriage of his two daughters. Thapelo 
felt that if he combined these resources, he would have 
sufficient capital to set himself up in business. 
For several months in 1982 Thapelo searched for an acceptable 
lease agreement, b~t was only able to come up with offers outside 
of Namahadi village. The offer available in Namahadi at the time 
was a purchase agreement. Thapelo, consequently, discussed the 
matter with his sons and in October 1982 bought the Namahadi 
store for R4 800. 
,Experiences from Urban Areas 
r , 2, In addition to mass relocations from white-owned farms, a ) 
significant proportion of Qwaqwa's population, probably between 
10% and 15%,. arrived in the area from urban areas in common South 
Africa.J Most of these individuals were forcibly removed from 
towns and cities in common South Africa under the influx control 









locations had been demolished.~ Most of these removals had been 
pending since the mid-1960s, but were only effected once 
municipal accommodation became available in Phuthaditjhaba after 
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1970 (Bank 1984, Niehaus 1987). During this period influx control 
offenders were also resettled in Phuthaditjhaba, but after 1974 
were increasingly sent to the villages to ensure that they did 
not use up all the available accommodation in the town. This move 
was later endorsed by Qwaqwa Legislative Assembly which 
stipulated that urban residence in Qwaqwa would be restricted to 
Section 10.1 (a) and (b) holders (QLA 1975). 
After the mid-1970s township development escalated. Between 1978 
and 1980 an average of two new municipal houses were being 
constructed on a daily basis (QDC 1982). This resulted in a 
relaxation of earlier restrictions on urban residence - influx 
control refugees arriving in Qwaqwa during the late 1970s were, 
for the first time, being offered accommodation in the town. Yet, 
the town was simultaneously absorbing growing numbers of families 
arriving in Qwaqwa voluntarily to participate in the growth 
r 
industry of homeland development. Building contractors, 
~ricklayers and carpenters came from all over South Africa to 
hire out their services to the Qwaqwa government 0 Bureaucrats and 
teachers, frustrated by the constant boycotts at city schools, 
also started arriving in large numbers to fill vacancies in the 
expanding 
settled 
r . local bureaucracy. Approximately 1 500 new teachers 
in Qwaqwa between 1978 and 1982 (QDC personal 
ctmmunication). Traders were another group of urban dwellers 
attracted by QDC advertisements on Radio Sesotho, offering them 
leans and business licences (Bank 1984):, 
In view of the changing settlement patterns in Phuthaditjhaba, it 
was evident that the town housed a more diverse population than 
the closer settlement villages. Significantly fewer 




u n e m_p 1 o y e d o n a r r i v a 1 i n Q w a q w a , s i n c e t h o s e w o r k i n g i n u r b a n 
areas at the time of removal were often able to transfer their 
labour contracts to the Phuthaditjhaba labour bureau. Yet, even 
in cases where individuals were unemployed on arrival, their 
contacts with urban areas and their previous experiences on the 
urban labour market could be of considerable assistance in work-
seeking strategies (Bank 1984). Furthermore, urban families in 
Phuthaditjhaba had access to an efficient district labour bureau 
at the magistrate's courts in the town, as well as a TEBA 
(Chamber of Mines) recruitment office which recruited a quota of 
5 000.workers from the homeland annually (Sharp & Martiny 1984). 
f~he establishment of approximately 4 000 low-paid factory jobs in 
industrial parks on the outskirts of the town and 1 500 commuter 
job opportunities provides further evidence of the advantages 
town residents enjoyed over closer settlement inhabitants in the 
sphere of employment~ 
In this context it comes as little surprise that urban immigrants 
in Qwaqwa fared considerably better than ex-farm workers in their 
attempts to enter commerce. 'r-1ore than half of the traders and 
taximen in the sample (45 out of 80) came to Qwaqwa from urban 
areas. In contrast to the ex-farm workers in the sample who 
tended to be concentrated in rural storekeeping, the operations 
of urban immigrants were more evenly distributed across all three 
sectors (16 storekeepers, 15 shebeeners and 14 taximen) and were 
as a result more stratified0In attempting to identify the routes 
urban individuals followed into commerce in Qwaqwa it is 
necessary to differentiate between those owners who moved 
directly into business from urban areas and those that spent some 
time in Phuthaditjhaba before entering business. Most of the 
operators in the former category tended to arrive in Qwaqwa 
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between 1978 and 1982 with the specific aim of exploiting the 
commercial opportunities within the homeland. A number of these 
individuals moved directly into commerce from service sector 
employment in urban areas. This tendency is demonstrated in the 
case of Tom, one of the most successful pirate taximen in the 
sample: 
Case 3.5: From teaching to taxi driving 
Tom was born in Johannesburg in 1952, but grew up in Soweto. In 
1974, after finishing matric, he took up a job as a teacher at 
Matseka High in Orlando West. In 1976, with the outbreak of the 
Soweto riots, Tom became frustrated with teaching: "When the kids 
started telling me what to do I decided it was time to move on". 
For three months he searched for a suitable job and eventually 
took a job as a bookkeeper for a furniture firm in Johannesburg. 
By 1978 he was earning R600 a month. But Tom was still not 
content : 11 I w a s not s a ti sf i e d w i th my s a l a r y , es p e c i a l 1 y when I 
knew that my brother with only a Standard 8, was earning twice 
that amount running taxis from Alexandra to Parktown station". 
In 1979, during his leave from work, he bought a kombi and 
temporarily assisted his brother in Alexandra. He claimed that it 
was during this month that he heard of the new opportunities open 
to long-distance taximen: 11 I spoke to many of my brother's 
friends and they said that there was much money to be made in 
Qwaqwa. I hardly knew where Qwaqwa was, but within two months I 
was coming here almost every weekend with my kombi". By 1981 Tom 
had purchased a ho~se in Phuthaditjhaba. 
lt\lthough Tom had set up a business in Qwaqwa and purchased a 
house in the Phuthaditjhaba he still retained his urban rights in 
Germiston. He explained that he did not want to be tied down in 
the homeland in case his business faltered.J In the long-distance 
taxi trade there were numerous other owners in Tom's position, 
many of them qualified heavy-duty drivers who had left their 
urban jobs, but retained their homes in common South Africa. For 
urban immigrants in licensed commerce residence outside the 
homeland was not easily maintained, since the Qwaqwa licensing 
authorities insisted that business licence holders become Qwaqwa 
citizens and reside in the area. This measure dissatified urban 
immigrants who correctly argued that the Qwaqwa authorities were 
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contravening the central government's 1978 policy measures that 
entitled permanent urban residents with section 10 l(a) or (b) 
rights to trade in African areas other than those prescribed in 
their residence qualifications (Hudson & Sarakinsky 1986: 178). 
But the Qwaqwa administration remained impervious to these 
complaints, stating that it would not be receptive to strangers 
from urban areas whose only interest in Qwaqwa was to exploit its 
resources. In this context, urban businessmen such as Thumelo 
were forced to strategise accordingly: 
1Case 3.5: Marriages of convenience~ 
Thumelo started his working life as a shop assistant in a small 
ca f e i n V e n t e r s bu r g • H e 1 e f t t h i s j ob i n 1 9 7 1 ':to haw k ' so f t 
goods', mainly clothing, in the town's location. By 1973 he had 
proved his success in this sphere and decided to use his savings 
to apply for a general dealer's licence. By 1975 Thumelo owned 
the only African-run supermarket in Ventersburg. 
This success inspired him to apply for further business licences, 
but these were all refused by the township superintendent. 
Eventually in 1978 Thumelo struck on the idea of using marriage 
tq expand his business interests. He moved temporarily to 
Vereeniging where he persuaded a woman to apply for a business 
licence on his behalf: when the licence was granted he married 
her, made her manager of his new store and returned to 
Ventersburg. Thumelo contracted a similar marrtage in Sebokeng 
two years later. In 1983 he moved to Qwaqwa and took on a third 
wife, to whom he entrusted a supermarket which he opened in one 
of the newly-established village shopping centres. Although 
Thumelo took out Qwaqwa citizenship he retained his urban rights 
as a resident of Ventersburg. 
The above cases notwithstanding, there were a number of owners in 
the sample who had moved to Qwaqwa from urban areas to take up 
jobs in the civil service, and only subsequently moved into 
commerce as storekeepers and general drinking-house owners. These 
individuals, while retaining their urban rights, were de facto 
residents of the homeland. Like Thumelo, they too experienced 
problems with the local licensing bureaucracy, which 
theoretically prohibited civil servants from opening businesses. 
But it was noted that this clause could be comfortably by-passed 
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if civil servants registered their business assets in their 
wives' names. In a few other cases it was noted that individuals 
with experience of skilled employment in urban areas were 
prepared to relinquish both their jobs and their urban rights to 
come to Qwaqwa. A good example of this is seen in Case 2.3 where 
James, after failing to obtain a coal yard licence in 
VerPEniging, decided to join his brother in the rural retail 
trade in Qwaqwa. Relinquishing urban rights was not taken lightly 
by these owners and in all cases they attempted to secure their 
interests in the homeland before leaving the urban area. This 
usually meant establishing firm contact with the QDC. 
1Although many of the urban immigrants arrived in Qwaqwa with the 
resources to set up businesses, approximately a third of the 
owners in this segment of the sample were forcibly resettled in 
Qwaqwa~ Like their counterpart in the rural areas, these 
operators usualy entered business by combining relatively small 
formal sector wages with various kinds of informal sector 
activities. The case (2.1) of Marumo in the previous chapter 
shows the kinds of strategies these operators were forced to 
employ. rMarumo arrived in Phuthaditjhaba in 1970 after being 
evicted from Welkom. He was destitute at the time of resettlement 
and struggled for several years among the poor, oscillating 
between piece-work jobs, commission-based selling for established 
traders and small-scale independent activities. During this 
pPriod he had litile success and only through a quirk of fate was 
he able to secure a kiosk licence in the town:~ he explained that 
he had to borrow the money to pay the licensing fee. Marumo's 
r-
eventual success in business was fortuitous, and is therefore not 
characteristic of operators in the urban informal sector. Most of 
the individuals in the sample forcibly relocated to Qwaqwa from 
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urban areas, remained in the informal sector as small-time 
shebeeners and hawkers. These individuals were almost all women, 
many of them single, who were unable to support their dependents 
on meager local industrial wages:_JThese women found themselves in 
the precarious position of being locked into low profit markets 
that offered little scope for expansion.J Although the timing of 
market entry for these operators did make a difference in 
Phuthaditjhaba - the largest shebeeners in the town were 
popularly believed to be the first - the chronology of entry was 
not nearly as significant as in the closer settlements. There are 
two important reasons for this. (Firstly, by comparison to rural 
households urban families displayed greater access to wage 
employment throughout the 1970s. This meant that a greater 
proportion of the household in the town had access to disposable 
income that could be reinvested in the informal sector, hence the 
emergence of a more competitive sector in the town~rsecondly, as 
a result of Phuthaditjhaba's location on the fringe of Qwaqwa, 
town re~idents were exposed to a constant stream of itinerant 
traders (including white farmers and Harrismith retailers) who 
periodically flooded the consumer market with goods.j In this 
context operators in the informal sector lost their 
competitiveness, having to constantly adjust their prices to 
accommodate outside interference. 
tho t~por1enees of Original Residents 
In addition to the people relocated to Qwaqwa from urban and 
rural areas after 1970, there were a number of families in Qwaqwa 
who had lived there prior to the advent of mass relocation. These 
people comprised about 101 of Qwaqwa's population in 1984 and 
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resided mainly in the historic Witsieshoek villages such as 
Monontsha, Qwaqwa, 
retained relatively 
While village life 
visible signs of 
Namahadi, Thaba Bosiu and Tseseng where they 
large garden plots throughout the 1970s. 
for these inhabitants lacked many of the 
congestion and poverty common in the closer 
settlements, the process of relocation had an important impact on 
their lifestyles. Large-scale land clearances for the purpose of 
resettlement rapidly reduced the available agricultural and 
grazing land set aside for communal use outside of village 
boundaries. Initially, tribal authorities did their utmost to 
placate original residents by forcing relocated families to 
settle on infertile rocky inclines, but this process could only 
be sustained for a limited period (QLA 1973: 25-40). The alarming 
pace of relocation throughout the 1970s eventually forced tribal 
chiefs to subdivide even the most fertile land for residential 
purposes. Research conducted in Qwaqwa village in 1983 revealed 
that during the mid-1960s, village residents, who had lost land 
as a result of the establishment of Phuthaditjhaba, were given 
the choice of financial compensation or equivalent sized plots on 
newly incorporated white-owned farms near Makwane. These 
guarantees, however, disappeared from tribal authority policy 
after 1970, and in 1977 Qwaqwa village residents who accepted 
compensation in land found their new fields expropriated without 
explanation. 
But while mass relocation marked the final demise of household-
based agriculture in Qwaqwa, it did bring in its wake a number of 
new employment opportunities in an increasingly multi-tiered 
tribal administrative structure. Mushrooming closer settlement 
had to be controlled and scarce resources carefully allocated. 
for this purpose the tribal authorities appointed a hierarchy of 
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chief, sub-chief and headmen, all of whom appointed their own 
henchmen. These bureaucratic jobs, although not particularly well 
paid, gave individuals wide-ranging administrative and coercive 
powers. Chiefs and headmen, for instance, were entitled to impose 
fines on closer settlement villages for whatever they considered 
to be contraventions of tribal practice. Theoretically, closer 
settlement residents had recourse to tribal courts, but in 
practice these structures virtually disappeared during the 1970s. 
In this context political power was open to abuse and some 
villagers were fined for such imaginary offences as hanging up 
washing at the wrong time of day! (also see Niehaus 1984) 
But the distribution of bureaucratic responsibilities occurred 
within a small kinship circle focused around the Mopeli clan. For 
the majority of original inhabitants relocation simply exposed 
them to growing competition for jobs and diminished access to 
basic resources. Indeed by the early 1980s, villages like 
Namahadi, Bolata and Qwaqwa, abutting directly onto sprawling 
settlements, were virtually indistinguishable from the villages 
that surrounded them. 
In view of this general decline in living standards it is not 
surprising that original inhabitants were poorly represented 
within the sample, comprising only 12 of the 80 traders and 
taximen. Most of these owners were licensed storekeepers, who had 
worked their way into business on the basis of formal and 
informal earnings generated in the local bureaucracy. The example 
of. Mpho, a local headman in Namahadi, illustrates the role that 
bureaucratic privilege played in many of these cases: 
Case 3.7: Manipulating bureaucratic connections 
Mph o was born i n Na mah ad i i n 194 O. Me was the son of a 1 o ca 1 
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headman and wealthy stock-owner, maternally related to the 
dominant Mopeli line. In 1958, after completing Standard Six Mpho 
left Qwaqwa to take a job as a messenger at the Perm Building 
Society in Johannesburg. Later, after improving his education at 
night school, he joined the SAP and was stationed in Harrismith. 
In 1975, however, on the death of his father Mpho was recalled to 
Qwaqwa to fill his position as a village headman. 
For two years Mpho worked diligently at his new job, but 
increasingly felt that the rewards were not equivalent to the 
responsibility. Consequently, in 1977 he approached an old friend 
of his father's to apply for a business licence on his behalf. By 
December of that year the licence was secured: Mpho called 
together a work party (letsema) to help him with the construction 
of the store and sold a number of his father's ~attle to boost 
his finances in order to open the business. 
Individuals 
commercial 
in Mpho's position were optimally placed for 
participation. In addition to their political 
influence, they had access to secure earnings, which could be 
temporarily enhanced by the misuse of bureaucratic positions. 
Moreover, they often owned small herds of cattle, usually between 
eight and ten animals, which provided a valuable back-up resource 
in case of emergencies. 
In the above discussion I have attempted to explain the various 
routes into business taken by taximen and traders in Qwaqwa. I 
have not, as is conventional in studies of entrepreneurs, focused 
on the motivational aspects of commercial participation. I 
believe that this issue is of limited importance to the present 
study, which seeks to understand class formation in Qwaqwa within 
the appropriate local historical context. The. findings of this 
chapter suggest the following periodisation of commercial 
participation in Qwaqwa. During the period 1976 to 1978 it has 
been argued that commerce in the homeland was dominated by the 
rise of the rural retail trade, which created opportunities 
primarily for ex-farm workers and village chiefs and headmen. 
Both groups of individuals possessed relatively low-level 
occupational skills, but had been able to generate the resources 
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needed to enter licensed commerce through their participation in 
informal earning activities. The serious shortage of basic needs 
commodities in closer settlements during the early and mid-1970s 
provided the context in which these groups were able to utilise 
their disposable income to maximum benefit. The phase of 
commercial development stretching from 1979 to 1984 appears, on 
the other hand, to have been dominated by infiltration of urban 
immigrants into commerce. The majority of these individuals 
arrived in Qwaqwa with the specific aim of exploiting the 
business opportunities they had either heard existed in Qwaqwa or 
seen advertised in the press. They were individuals employed in 
well-paid semi-skilled or skilled jobs, who had often failed in 
earlier attempts to enter licensed commerce in the urban areas, 
but had the financial resources or credit facilities to open 
businesses. Furthermore, unlike farm workers who predominated in 
the rural retail sector, these operators were more evenly spread 
between licensed and unlicensed activities - there were, for 
instance, a significant number of urban immigrants in the pirate 
taxi trade. One important reason for this, as suggested, was that 
the Qwaqwa authorities remained reluctant to issue licences to 
tndividuals who wished to retain their rights in urban areas. One 
Legislative Assembly member expressed this objection: "I do not 
approve of those people who come here when the table has been 
laid and only stay to eat" (QLA 1981: 165). Alongside these two 
waves of commercial energy, there existed a small residual 
category of urban informal sector operators inhabited 
predominantly by women running small shebeens. These people were 
constrained by low earnings, confined to competitive markets, and 
had little impact on the general commercial development of Qwaqwa 
throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ECONOMIC CENTRALISATION AND CLASS FORMATION: 
PROCESSES OF AND BARRIERS TO ACCUMULATION 
Our people should attempt to establish large companies ••• It is 
customary for blacks to be very proud of owning a small cafe. He 
will say, "Yes, I am proud of this cafe because it belongs to me, 
I am the owner", but will not expand this business ••. ! feel that 
with the passage of time our people will realise the necessity of 
large businesses and that they should not simply be involved in 
small cafes - Chief Minister, T.K. Mopeli (OLA 1980: 247). 
Having dealt in the previous chapter with the kinds of resources 
and experiences that traders and taximen in Qwaqwa bring with 
them into commerce, I will concentrate in this chapter on the 
conditions that faced traders and taximen once they were 
established in commerce. I wi 11 consider both the structural 
pressures that came to bear on their enterprises and the 
strategies they devised in response to these. The chapter 
concludes with an attempt to locate within a class framework the 
growing economic differentiation described. 
Economic Centralisation and the Informal Sector 
Since the mid-1970s there has been considerable debate 
surrounding the potential for expansion in the small-scale 
business sector in Third World cities. Much of this debate has 
its roots in the well-known International Labour Offices' report 
on unemployment and poverty in Kenya. According to the ILO, one 
of the main reasons for the failure of the Kenyan economy to 
expand significantly after independence derives from the failure-
of the post-colonial state to recognise and support small-scale 




In elaborating its programme for economic reform in 
the ILO suggested that the ability of the Kenran 
government to deal with the escalating problems of poverty and 
unemployment was critically dependent on its ability to release 
the 'informal sector' from the constraints of discriminatory 
legislation, low levels of capital investment and intense market 
competition (ILO 1972:5-45) 
While the responses to the ILO's findings varied widely, neo-
marxist commentators slated the report's findings for assuming 
that the informal sector was an unarticulated segment of the 
Kenyan economy, which could be independently stimulated without 
considering its economic links with the formal sector and the 
state. Some authors, following the work of Quinajo (1974) on 
Latin America have suggested that, while the informal sector 
enjoys a degree of autonomy from the formal sector, it becomes 
increasingly subordinated and involuted with the spread of 
monopolistic conditions in the capitalist sector. Sandbrook 
(1982) in a recent exposition of this position argues that in 
African cities: 
into larger, more productive enterprises nor even displacement by 
larger capitalist firms. It is instead a situation where more and 
more people share stagnant markets among themselves (p. 63). 
Other authors following Leys (1975) have argued that small-scale 
urban traders and artisans generally lack autonomy from large-
scale organised capital which exploits them as sources of cheap 
labour. This approach concentrates exclusively on the role of the 
informal sector as a supplier of goods and services to the formal 
sector. In contrast to the former approach which emphasises the 
increasing marginalisation of informal sector operators, the 
latter view stresses the existence of intense intersectorial 
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exploitation. Both views, however, in asserting the functionality 
of the informal sector to large scale capital accumulation refute 
the notion that this sector is at all susceptible to economic 
growth. 
Not all neo-marxists present such a bleak picture of 
for opportunities in the informal sector. Tokman {1979}, 
instance, suggests that under certain conditions, especially 
during periods of economic growth, intersectorial linkages may 
become mutually advantageous and stimulate growth among informal 
entrepreneurs. He refers specifically to the way in which small 
traders might expand markets for larger concerns and, therefore, 
temporarily exist in a 'benign' relationship with the formal 
sector. Long and Roberts (1982), on the other hand, emphasise the 
i~portance of location in the success of informal sector 
operators. In their. study of Peruvian migrants and entrepreneurs 
they suggest that: 
the emphasis on the functionality of the informal sector for 
capital accumulation requires an important rider when applied to 
provincial centres .•• The small-scale sector is less likely to be 
controlled directly by its linkages with the large-scale sector 
because such centres are not significant locations for productive 
investment and accumulations [and therefore] exhibit greater 
diversity with considerable movement between different types of 
economic activities {Long & Roberts 1982: 144}. 
Long and Roberts, consequently, explicitly deny that small 
traders and artisans will necessarily be engaged in processes of 
economic involution. Nattrass {1984: 8), in a more market-
orientated approach to the informal sector, takes these arguments 
further by suggesting that the opposition of the benign and 
subordinate positions on the informal sector is unenlightening. 
She contends that: 
It is clear that the informal sector is far from homogeneous, 
incorporating many activities performed under different 
conditions. Consequently it would be trite to state that the 
informal sector either can or cannot experience evolutionary 
growth, as the degre~ to which it can be exploited depends on the 
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market conditions facing them (Ibid). 
Although the commercial undertakings within my sample are not 
necessarily definable under the rubric of the informal sector, 
the above arguments are of direct relevance to the present study 
since the prevailing debate about class formation in the 
bantustans focuses on different understandings of the role of the 
South African state and white capital in the homelands. Authors 
such as Southall (1983) and Hirsch (1984) argue that in line with 
the state's general commitment to political decentralisation and 
middle-class formation in the reserves, it has consciously 
restricted the participation of white commercial capital in these 
areas and has i~stead promoted industrial decentralisation to 
create employment opportunities for the rural poor. Nolutshungu 
(1983), on the other hand, suggested that the South African state 
has remained committed to the general principles of capitalist 
growth and centralisation in the white sector. Middle-class 
formation or "black embourgeoisement 11 , outside of the new 
salaried bureaucratic sector in the homelands, he argues, has 
been more a 'coincidence of the social structure' than a priority 
of the South African government (see Introduction). Although t'he 
two positions are too stark to capture diverse state initiative 
in different homelands, Nolutshungu's argument seems particularly 
relevant to an understanding of commercial developments in Qwaqwa 
where the white state and capitalist interests were still 
conspicuously present in 1985. 
Economic Subordination and Local Retailers 
If the penetration of whites in every field of human activity is 
permitted in the homeland ••• ,then the emerging entrepreneurial 
class of Qwaqwa will in the end become frustrated, humiliated, 
eclipsed and ultimately eliminated (QTA memo, Sept 1979). 
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In 1984 the single most important influence on processes of 
accumulation in the licensed retail trade in Qwaqwa was the 
growing market presence of large white-owned capitalist firms. 
Most of these firms arrived in Qwaqwa in the late 1970s at the 
invitation of the QDC to set up Tripartite companies (Tripcos). 
These companies, while opposed by traders in principle, were 
initially exclusively engaged in wholesale activities. Frasers, 
SASKO and Clover all provided valuable wholesale services to 
traders who would otherwise have had to travel to Harrismith and 
Bethlehem to purchase stock. This relationship, however, changed 
dramatically in 1978 when the QDC announced that Tripcos and 
other white firms prepared to establish franchise agreements with 
black traders would be entitled to compete directly with local 
traders in a series of newly planned shopping centres in 
. Phuthaditjhaba and in a number of rural villages. This move, 
which came as a direct defiance of the QTA protests against the 
Tripartite system, was rationalised by the incumbent Minister of 
the Interior on the grounds that they served the interests of the. 
Qwaqwa consumer: 
It is, of course, the duty of the Qwaqwa government to protect 
the rights of black traders, but on the other hand the government 
has a duty to protect the defenceless consumer, who is in the 
majority (QLA 1979: 237). 
The Minister also assured traders that the new scheme was not 
intended as an assault against them, but was primarily aimed at 
encouraging Qwaqwa consumers to spend their money inside the 
homeland rather than outside its borders. He suggested that the 
new consumer spending patterns would eventually benefit small 
black traders (Ibid: 244). 
This ideal notwithstanding, it soon became abundantly clear, 
after the establishment of a Frasers supermarket in the new 
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Setsing shopping centre in Phuthaditjhaba, that the brunt of the 
new policy was to be borne by local traders. In the first year of 
operation the QDC estimated that approximately Rl.5 million in 
turnover had been lost by local retailers to Frasers (QOC memo 
1980). These losses were accentuated after 1982 with the 
establishment of Setsing II, housing a Fairways hypermarket 
(owned by Frasers) and a large branch of Pep stores, as well as 
the opening of a number of Spar supermarkets in villages. 
The effects of these developments were felt most acutely by 
general storekeepers in rural areas who, as a result of changes 
in business licensing policy after 1976 (cf. Table 1.2), had 
begun to experience intense but uneven intra-market competition. 
The central role played by local chiefs in the licensing process 
ensured that in some villages or neighbourhoods where chiefs had 
personal business interests, competition was kept to a minimum, 
while in other areas licensees were clustered together. The 
latter situation was particularly evident in certain parts of 
Tseki and Bolata village. In one segment of Bolata (ext.) it was, 
for instance, noted that there were as many as eight general 
dealer stores and cafes set up between 1980 and 1984 to service a 
population of fewer than 10 000 people. The situation here was 
compounded by the fact that this residential area was situated 
only a few kilometres from the Setsing complexes in 
Phuthaditjhaba. In other areas such as Tseseng where local chiefs 
and headmen had less interest in protecting sectional business 
interests, retail traders were more evenly distributed and 
enjoyed a better chance of success. 
In spite of these dynamics, it was also clear that the impact of 
the shopping centre schemes was generalised in rural areas. The 
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small size of Qwaqwa relative to other bantustans greatly 
enhanced the ability of consumers from all areas to make 
extensive use of the new shopping facilities. Storekeepers from 
villages as dispersed as Namahadi, Tseki and Tseseng were 
unanimous in their assertion that the white firms, particularly 
Fairways in Phuthaditjhaba, were making significant inroads into 
their profits. As one storekeeper from Tseseng village, where the 
local QDC shopping centre was still not fully operational in 
1984, pointed out: 
People in my neighbourhood are no longer spending their money at 
my store. They complain that the prices are too high in the 
villages and that they prefer to do their weekly and monthly 
shopping in Phuthaditjhaba where things are cheaper. Nowadays 
most of the people that come to my store only want to buy day-to-
day items such as candles, paraffin, sugar and bread. The days 
when people came here to buy blankets, clothes, school books and 
even mealie meal are now over, because of the QOC. 
In areas such as Tseki and Namahadi where shopping centres had 
already been set up by 1984, traders maintained that they were 
beginning to lose profits even on small day-to-day items. One 
Namahadi owner explained: 
Since the Spar supermarket opened at the Charles Mopeli complex 
in 1983 [situated about 500m from his store], I have found that 
virtually all my customers are now going there to do their 
shopping. They only come here as a last resort when they have run 
out of money and are on the look-out for credit. I have found 
that it is impossible to run a general dealer store under these 
conditions and have decided to concentrate on selling liquor to 
keep my business going. 
The depressing reality of shrinking markets for general retailers 
was exacerbated by the fact that, at the same time as having to 
complete with Tripcos, many storekeepers remained dependent on 
these companies for their supplies. Between 1978 and 1982 Frasers 
was the only general wholesalers in Qwaqwa and almost totally 
monopolised trade within the retail sector. This situation 
improved marginally after 1982 when the QDC managed to find a 
competitor to Frasers in Metro wholesalers. But traders 
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complained that this provided little relief because there was no 
significant price difference between the two suppliers. As a 
local bookkeeper in Phuthaditjhaba explained: 
Although the storekeepers I deal with prefer to buy from Metro 
rather than from Frasers, their motivations for this are mainly 
political and relate to their long struggle to get Frasers kicked 
out of Setsing. But in reality there is no real difference 
between Frasers and Metro. This is why traders have approached 
the Chamber of Commerce to set up its own wholesaler, like NAFCOC 
has done in Soweto [l]. 
This bookkeeper also explained that the only local retailers who 
were able to by-pass the limitations of the local wholesaling 
structure in 1984 were those who had secured franchise agreements 
with South African firms that delivered stock to their stores 
from outside the homeland. 
In the context of these developments it is not surprising that 20 
of the 29 general storekeepers in the sample maintained that 
their business profits had dropped significantly since 1980. 
Although it is difficult to provide an accurate breakdown of 
business profits ,in a situation where the vast majority of 
traders did not keep reliable books, most traders reported that 
their daily takings had been halved at least since 1980. In 1984 
as many as 16 traders claimed that their daily takings ranged 
between only R50 and R80. Tlali (Case 3.1), an experienced Tseki 
storekeeper who fell into the latter category, pointed to the 
general decline of his business since 1977: 
In 1977 business here in Tseki was hectic. People would form 
queues at my store every day. They would even disturb me at my 
home on Sunday with requests to open the store for an hour or 
two ••• ,In those days I was a wealthy businessman, I owned two 
pick-up trucks a tractor and a large house in Phomolong. I also 
employed four assistants and a nightwatchman at the store. 
But as you can see my situation has changed. The people have 
deserted me ••• There is little stock on my shelves. I have sold my 
tractor, my house is badly in need of repair and I have not had 
enough money to replace my pick-up since 1981. If this situation 
does not change I fear that I will have to lease out my store. 
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Thapelo (Case 3.3), who purchased a general dealer store in 
Namahadi in 1982, found himself in a similar position to Tlali in 
1984. Since establishing his business, he had not managed to 
raise enough capital to purchase a bakkie and in 1984 still used 
a local taxi to transport stock from Phuthaditjhaba to Namahadi. 
Thapelo also maintained that after his wife had fallen sick in 
September 1983 he had been running the store on his own because 
he could not afford to employ an assistant. 
While owners such as Thapelo, entering the general retail trade 
after 1980 with limited financial resources, found it extremely 
difficult to build up their businesses, it was apparent from the 
case material that a number of the owners were attempting to 
soften the blow of growing market competition by spreading risks 
within the retail sector. This strategy was increasingly used 
after 1982, with growing numbers of bankruptcies in the retail 
trade - in 1984 it was estimated that approximately 20% of all 
rural stores in Qwaqwa were under hire. The main advantages of 
store-hiring over other forms of diversification, in the context 
of declining profits, was that this could be carried out with 
minimal additional costs. Traders could simply transfer existing· 
stock from one location to another. In 1984 the most successful. 
multiple store-owner in my sample ran two general dealer stores 
and four cafes in Qwaqwa. This owner earned significant monthly 
profits, estimated to amount to approximately R2 000. 
Another strategy which enjoyed some popularity among struggling 
general storekeepers in 1984 was the tendency towards 
specialisation. The effective use of this strategy was 
demonstrated by !lone (Case 3.2), who after setting himself up as 
.a general retailer in Tseseng transformed his business into a 
hardware store in 1982 in response to the demarcation of a series 
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of new closer settlement villages in the Batlokwa tribal areas. 
By 1984 Ilene's profits had trebled as increasing numbers of new 
immigrants into the area turned to him to provide building 
mater i a l s • ( I l one , . we w i l l rec a 11 , had been a bu i l d i n g c on tractor 
prior to entering the retail trade and was therefore able to 
offer clients valuable advice}. Although many other rural traders 
realised the need to seek out new niches in the consumer market, 
their responses were generally less sucessful. Incomes in the 
closer settlement were too small and business too widely spread 
to support effective specialisation. 
The appropriate location for specialised stores in Qwaqwa was not 
in rural areas, but alongside large supermarkets in the QDC 
shopping centres where small traders could co-exist with larger 
concerns, in what Tokman (1979) would call a · 1 benign 1 
relationship with large capital. Access to these centres had, 
however, become increasingly expensive by 1984, with some owners 
paying in excess of RBOO rent a month to the QDC - an amount 
which most rural retailers could not afford [2]. For those who 
did managed to enter agreements with the QDC, the rewards from 
specialised retailing were high. This form of trading was seen to 
be particularly attractive to established urban entrepreneurs who 
moved to Qwaqwa in greater numbers after 1980. Amos, owner of a 
photographic studio and record bar in Setsing, recounted his 
experience: 
When I arrived in Qwaqwa from Nigel in 1980 I immediately 
approached the QDC for a kiosk in their new centre in order to 
set up a photo studio. At that time they were short of tenants 
and the rents at Setsing were low because many of the traders 
here in Qwaqwa refused to participate in this scheme •••• This 





my business had begun to do well and I decided to move to 
II so that I could have my own developing facilities. I 
to sell records, tapes and hi-fi equipment as well, 
these items were not sold at Frasers or Fairways. This 
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venture has been a great success and I am now looking for larger 
premises. 
Another owner, James, a jeweller and qualified watchmaker from 
Welkom, explained how he established his business in Setsing: 
When I came to Qwaqwa in 1974 I could not make a living out of 
watchmaking and in 1975 I returned to Welkom to do business 
there working together with a Portuguese man in a bicycle shop. 
After 1980, when the QDC set up shopping centres here, I realised 
that these places would attract people from all over Qwaqwa and 
there would be scope for my business. 
In 1981 I made an application to the QDC for a small store in 
their new centre and was given a store in Setsing II in 1983. 
Within one year I have made enough money to build a house in 
~huthaditjhaba. 
Although both these owners realised the advantages of being· 
situated close to larger concerns, they were also aware of the 
potential threat posed by these businesses. Amos explained that 
he had noticed a tendency in the new Fairways store to move away 
from basic consumption items to more specialised goods and was 
especially concerned about the wide range of records and tapes 
now sold at the supermarket. James expressed a similar fear when 
he suggested that the opening of a key-cutting kiosk inside 
Fairways, a service which he had monopolised until 1984, was 
beginning to interfere with his monthly profits. In addition to 
these anxieties, specialised traders were also strongly opposed 
to the high rental charged by the QDC. In 1984 black traders in 
the Setsing centre were paying between R200 and R800 a month on 
store rental alone. This amount was regarded as excessive and 
traders were demanding that the QDC allow them to purchase their 
stores [3]. 
But in spite of these pressures, there was little doubt that 
specialised retailers were benefiting considerably, at least 
temporarily, from processes of commercial centralisation in 
Qwaqwa. As opposed to rural retailers who were attempting to 
spread risks in order to prop up their struggling businesses, 
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specialised traders ·were generally engaged in processes of 
consolidation and capital deepening by expanding services and 
increasing their fixed assets. 
State Control and the Taxi Business 
The construction of monopolies in the black transport market can 
be traced back to the 1930s and 1940s when the South African 
state increasingly intervened to crush independent black taxi and 
bus operators in white urban areas (cf. Stadler 1983, Lodge 
1983). In 1957 the emerging state transport policy was 
articulated in the Black Transport Services 
Act, which transferred the responsibility for African transport 
subsidies from the Department of Native Affairs to the Department 
of Transport (Perlman 1982: 30). This measure confirmed the 
state's commitment to intervention and control through subsidies 
as a means to safeguard the spatial configuration of apartheid 
cities. 'In the 1960s, with the growth of frontier commuting in 
rural areas, this system was extended into the bantustans to 
assist the SAR with the transfer of black workers:Jln Qwaqwa this 
initiative resulted in the establishment of Setsokotsane in the 
late 1960s to meet anticipated commuter demands, while SAR trains 
and buses were allowed to retain their dominance in the migrant 
sector. 
Swilling and McCarthy (1984), in reviewing post-1970 developments 
in state transport policy, suggest that, in spite of the 
tightening of monopolistic control in various regions, the state 
has been unable to respond effectively to the Driessen (1974) and 
the Welgemoed (1983) Commissions' recommendations for co-
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ordinated inter-regional planning in the black transport market. 
They argue that this failure has led to growing disparities 
between migrant and commuter transport (1984: 31}. This 
observation is borne out by developments in Qwaqwa. In the field 
of commuter transport it has been noted that, after a period of 
initial capital shortage, Setsokotsane rapidly took control of 
the local transport market; between 1976 and 1984 their annual 
passenger loads increased from 1.5 to 9.6 million. In contrast, 
the SAR service stagnated as migrant train and bus timetables 
underwent little revision from the mid-1970s (cf. Chapter One). 
These discrepancies in state monopoly structure had an important 
influence on developments in the taxi transport business in 
Qwaqwa. In the local transport market the effects of the highly 
organised Setsokotsane service were most acutely felt. Joshua, 
chairman of the Itsokolela Taxi Association, explained the 
situation: 
When we established ltsokolela in 1981 the local taxi trade was a 
thriving business because there were many villages that did not 
receive Setsokotsane buses and we enjoyed strong local support. 
Today there is a different situation. Setsokotsane is strong and 
the people of Qwaqwa do not experience the same difficulties with 
transport they did a few years ago. This has affected our 
business badly. Many Itsokolela people are saying that there is 
no longer money in this business. They are asking the Association 
to buy their vehicles so that they can feed their families. 
Bosco, another Itsokolela member present during this interview, 
attempted to contextualise Joshua's remarks: 
I have been in this business since I completed my contract at 
Secunda in 1982. At first when Itsokolela was a new association 
with few members, there was enough business for all of us to make 
at least four full loads a day (about R30 minus petrol). Nowadays 
we are lucky if we get two loads a day. For those people, like 
myself, who have only one car this is barely enough to stay 
a 1 i ve. 
Bosco explained that like himself, many of Itsokolela's members 
were now seriously considering entering the wage labour market 
because of the diminishing profits in the local taxi business. 
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Conditions in the commuter business were more favourable. The 
main reason for this was that access to taxi licences were 
extremely difficult to extract from the OFS transport 
authorities. In 1985, in comparison with the 90-odd local pirate 
taxis in Qwaqwa, there were only 35 licensed commuter taximen 
competing with Setsokotsane for business on the Harrismith and 
Bethlehem routes. This reduced the impact of monopoly competition 
on commuter profits, but did not allay fears about Setsokotsane's 
growth in recent years. 
Association explained: 
The Chairman of the Qwaqwa Taxi 
Setsokotsane is a big thorn in our sides because their weekly 
worker fares are heavily subsidised by Pretoria. We cannot 
compete with them in this area, although in the past we were 
often able to help out workers when buses were full ••.• The only 
workers we transport now are those that are late for work and 
c~nnot afford to wait for the bus. 
At the moment we are only able to compete with Setsokotsane in 
the area of casual commuting. I mean on daily fares where they do 
not receive a subsidy. Here Setsokotsane charges Rl.80 for a 
single to Harrismith, while we offer it for R2.00. Most people 
use taxis for these journeys because our service is faster and 
more comfortable than that of the buses. In this area we still do 
a lot of business, especially over weekends when people visit the 
urban areas to do shopping. 
The chairman also noted that because most Qwaqwa Association 
members owned more than one vehicle - an average of more than two 
vehicles per member - the effect of Setsokotsane's aggressive 
market strategy was only very gradually being felt in the 
commuter trade. 
State-sponsored competition in the migrant transport market, on 
the other hand, was not a major area of concern for long-distance 
pirate taximen in Qwaqwa. Tom (Case 3.4) explained: 
The SAR and bus companies like United and Greyhound do not pose 
a big problem for us because buses and trains cannot compete 
with taxis for speed on long journeys. When migrants leave the 
mines they are tired and want to get home as fast as possible. 
They will not squabble over a small additional fee, but will 
sfmply call at the nearest taxi rank. The real problem in our 
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business is not outside competition, but internal squabbling and 
police harassment. These are the factors that are pushing profits 
down. • 
Norman, another Majakathata owner, elaborated on this remark: 
A few years ago pirate taximen travelling from Qwaqwa to 
Johannesburg were carrying three loads a week. Our earnings were 
between R300 and R400 a week. This was because there was one 
association, Majakathata, with a strong leadership that prevented 
strangers from starting up their own taxi associations. But then 
our leadership got weak and greedy, they wanted to make more 
money for the association by letting new people in. This was 
their mistake, because now there are three associations operating 
the Johannesburg line. The result is that we carry one, maybe two 
loads a week. 
Norman also explained that the competition between associations 
had caused in-fighting in the long-distance trade, which promoted 
police prosecution of unlicensed owners. 
These problems notwithstanding, the long-distance taxi trade was 
still regarded as a lucrative area for investment. In 1985 
growing numbers of commuter operators were attempting to break 
into the migrant market by participating in the new car-hire 
movement. In 1984 the Qwaqwa Taxi Association chairman led the 
field by setting up his own company, S & S Transport. One recent 
recruit explained why he and others had decided to enter the 
pirate trade: 
The commuter business is being strangled by this monster, 
Setsokotsane. This company is of the opinion that they are the 
only transport service here in Qwaqwa and have conveyed this 
message very strongly to the Bloemfontein Transport Board, who 
now refuse to grant more licences to taxis in Qwaqwa. As far as I 
am concerned there is no future for commuter taxi owners, they 
will eventually be swallowed by Setsokotsane. This is why we are 
now registering combis with car-hire companies. 
Yet, as Jacob explained, the car-hire business itself was under 
threat of absorption by white capital. The largest car-hire 
company in Qwaqwa, Mohahlaula, was, for instance, owned by a 
white attorney from Odendalsrus, who set blacks up in business on 
condition that they paid him a percentage .of their monthly 
profits (see Chapter Six). 
121 
in the context of the shifting opportunities and growing 
pressures in the taxi trade as a whole, the most successful 
owners in the business were those who had entered it during the 
r-
boom period of the late 1970s.JMoreover, it was noted that owners 
who had sufficient capital to diversify their assets outside of 
the taxi trade were also able to expand their business interests._) 
In attempting to understand the significance of early access and 
diversification, it is instructive to consider the case of George 
Molaleka, Chairman of the Qwaqwa Taxi Association: 
Case 4.1: Spreading risks outside the taxi trade 
George was in his early thirties when he arrived in Qwaqwa from 
Virginia in 1962. He had worked on a number of OFS farms and 
also had experience as a mechanic in the Virginia taxi business. 
On arrival in Qwaqwa he set his mind on establishing his own taxi 
business and, using his connections in the Virginia taxi trade, 
managed to secure a taxi licence from the OFS Transportation 
Board in 1973. 
Between 1973 and 1978 George operated with minimal success. His 
vehicle was constantly plagued by mechanical problems, which were 
compounded by the poor roads in and around Qwaqwa. However, in 
1979 he made an important breakthrough when his existing taxi 
licence was upgraded by the Transportation Board to allow him to 
carry eight rather than four passengers. George, taking a loan 
from the bank, purchased a new V~ kombi and started plying the 
newly-tarred Harrismith route with considerable success. In 1980, 
realising that there was a growing demand for commuter transport, 
George applied successfully for a second taxi licence. 
Riding on the wave of his new found commercial success, George 
now decided to diversify his interests by setting up a general 
retail store in Thaba Tsooana, for which he acquired a licence in 
September 1980. But this venture into the rural retail trade was 
shortlived and by 1982 George had sold off his Thaba Tsooana 
store to open a dairy products depot in Phuthaditjhaba. He 
explained that the QDC's decision to proceed with its village 
shopping centre project had been the major moti~ation behind his 
decision to focus on more specialised forms of ~etailing. 
In 1983, following a period of sustained capital accumulation 
since 1980, George decided to branch out into the long-distance 
pirate business. This decision was motivated both by his failure 
to obtain new commuter licences and by the realisation that quick 
profits could be made in this sector. He explained that he had 
anticipated additional risks in the illicit sector, but 
nevertheless felt this to be a productive investment. Shortly 
after making this investment George realised that his multiple 
business interests had become too diverse to manage alone. 
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Consequently, he decided to sell his dairy business and enter a 
partnership with a local contractor in the building trade, which 
had received a massive boost following the issuing of government 
housing subsidies to Qwaqwa civil servants in 1984. George 
maintains that although he had no experience in this sector, he 
now had sufficient capital to enter business partnerships with 
other established traders. In 1984 when I interviewed George, he 
owned four commuter taxis. was in the process of setting up his 
own car-hire company and was successfully engaged in the local 
building trade. 
The above case illustrates the shrewd use of market manoeuvering 
and diversification as a strategy for accumulation. But these 
manoeuvres cannot be explained purely in terms of individual 
entrepreneurial flare. George's entry into the taxi business in 
the early 1970s and his ability to take full advantage of the 
1977 amendments to the Road Transportation Act are the very basis 
of his present success. Indeed, had George entered the taxi 
business after 1980 when Setsokotsane had begun to tighten its 
grip on the commuter market, it is unlikely that he would have 
been able to raise sufficient capital to support cognate business 
ventures. In short, the argument here is that success in the taxi 
trade depended less on associational affiliations, since they_ 
were all under pressure by the mid-1980s, than on the specific 
time at which individuals managed to enter this sector. In 
assessing the business profiles of different taximen there was 
little doubt that the commuter taximen, the earliest participants 
in the local transport market, were the most successful owners, 
in spite of the fact that their monthly profits in 1985 were 
probably lower than long-distance taxi pirates. 
Market Autonomy and Competition in the liquor Trade 
In contrast to both general retailers and taximen, who in 1984 
were competing directly with large capital, shebeeners in Qwaqwa 
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enjoyed a high degree of market autonomy. 'This situation, as 
Gordin (1987: 284) points out, has emerged from the state's 
refusal to allow the formal sector to provide adequate on-
consumption liquor outlets in black areas.J In this regard Qwaqwa 
has been no exception. In 1984 there were only four legal on-
consumption liquor outlets in the homeland, three hotel bars and 
one privately-owned beer hall. 
In addition to the almost exclusive control that shebeeners 
retained over the on-consumption liquor market in Qwaqwa, they 
enjoyed advantages of supply links over other traders. Unlike 
general retailers who were dependent on two wholesaling companies 
for merchandise, shebeeners were able to purchase their liquor 
from a wide range of local off-consumption outlets, including a 
number of illegal liquor runners. Between 1979 and 1984 twelve 
bottlestores were set up in Qwaqwa in competition with one 
another. This competitive supply environment allowed shebeeners 
considerable scope for leverage and manipulation in their 
negotiations with bottlestore owners. As one owner explained: 
These shebeen queens are unscrupulous. They will only deal with 
you if you offer them credit. I have tried on occasions to deny 
them credit, but this is not wise because they will simply go 
elsewhere to do business. There are some shebeeners in Qwaqwa 
that. never use cash. They go from one store to the next asking 
for credit. In the past I have warned other owners about these 
people but they will not listen. saying that I am trying to steal 
their customers. 
Yet, in spite of these potentially favourable conditions, on-
r . ~ 
consumption shebeeners, especially those operating at the 
neighbourhood level, were among the poorest traders within my 
sample~ One major reason forlthis was the easy access individuals 
had to the liquor business~ Unlike the taxi and retail trades, 
there were no organisational or financial constraints that 
controlled access to the liquor business. As one member of the 
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Qwaqwa Legislative Assembly claimed in 1982: "Nowadays it is so 
easy .to enter the shebeen trade that people are doing it with 
only one case of beer" (QLA 1982: 205). In 1984 another speaker 
specifically related the alarming growth rate in the small-scale 
shebeen trade to the prevailing economic recession: 
.L iI can understand why we have so many shebeens locally. The main 
L reason for this is the problem of unemploymen~ which we are 
presently experiencing, because if a person obtains an amount of 
Rl0,00 in one way or another, he or she uses it to buy, say, six 
bottles and then, he sells it again, and that is the start of a 
· shebeen (QLA 1984: 642). 
r 
In this situation the availablity of cheap supplies and ready 
credit from bottlestore owners narrowed rather than broadened the 
scope for profits in the small-scale sector. This is clearly 
illustrated in the following case of a neighbourhood shebeener 
from Mangaung: 
Case 4.2: Economic involution and diversification 
Tumi is a widow and mother of four children who lives in one of 
the few brick houses in Mangaung. Since her husband died in a 
motor accident in 1979 she has been constantly engaged in 
shebeening as a meins of supporting her family. Initially, Tumi 
maintained that shebeening alone provided her with sufficient 
;income for the family. She suggested that few people were 
prepared to travil to Harrismith to purchase liquor and as a 
~esult she was able to make regular monthly profits of about R250 
from the sale of liquor in 1979. By 1984, however, she complained 
that shebeening no longer provided adequate financial support for 
her family: 11 0ver the last few years it has become very difficult 
to make money from beer. There are too many shebeens in Qwaqwa ••• 
Nowadays I stand at the school in the morning with makwenya 
(vetkoek), fried fish and fruit, and sell ice lollies, snuff and 
chilli from my house in the afternoons. This is because one can 
no longer make a decent living from beer alone." Tumi attributed 
the decline in the neighbourhood shebeen trade to the increasing 
availability of cheap liquor and the growth of unemployment in 
the villages:..) 
While the vast majority of neighbourhood shebeeners were finding 
it increasingly difficult to earn a living from liquor, there 
were other areas in the illicit liquor trade where profits 
remained good in 1984. By far the most lucrative opportunities 
were located in the supply sector, where liquor runners 
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established themselves as successful competitors to local 
r 
bottlestore owners. This was clearly illustrated by the fact that 
the largest liquor runner in Phuthaditjhaba sold more than 700 
cases of beer and wine a week,--> while his counterparts in the 
villages were known to se 11 between 200 and 300 cases. The 
profits derived from these weekly sales were regarded as 
comparable with those of small Qwaqwa bottlestores. In attempting 
to explain the competitiveness of liquor runners in the supply 
.market it is necessary to refer to a variety of factors. Firstly, 
unlike bottlestore owners, liquor runners, as illegal, household-
based entrepreneurs, were not burdened with large overheads such 
as business loans and QDC rents, nor with sales tax, which 
immediately added 12% onto the selling price of liquor at 
licensed outlets. Secondly, as illegal traders, runners were also 
able to keep their businesses open after hours when on-
consumption outlets were at their busiest and shebeeners needed 
to replenish stocks. Thirdly, and of considerable importance in 
the case of Qwaqwa, most runners did not purchase their liquor 
within the homeland, but travelled outside the homeland in search 
of cheaper suppliers. This excluded them from the heavy transport 
levies charged by the SAB and others for bringing liquor into 
Qwaqwa. By 1984 bottlestore owners had brought this to the 
attention 
undesirable: 
of the Legislative Assembly and it was deemed 
There are lorries from certain places outside the border of this 
National State that come here for the sole purpose of delivering 
large quantities of liquor to shebeeners that resell this liquor 
at prices that are even lower than those charged at 
bottlestores •••• This is not desirable because these people are 
not making any contribution whatsoever in the form of tax (OLA 
1984: 642). . 
As a result of these objections police action was taken against a 
number of liquor runners during December 1984. When I left the 
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field in February 1985 their court cases were still pending. 
'Besides runners, who stood at the centre of the illicit trade, 
''1 . ; 
.~ good profits were also being made in the on-consumption sector by 
the owners of larg~ general drinking houses and classy club 
shebeens in 1984"_) These operations differed from small-scale 
neighbourhood shebeeners both in size and service. Elite club 
shebeens, the smaller of the two operations, generated most of 
(their income from teachers and bureaucrats who were renowned for 
their expensive liquor taste5 Mapiri, a leading club shebeener in 
Phuthaditjhaba, emphasised that although the quantities of liquor 
she sold were relatively small, her profits remained good because 
her mark-up on liquor was high: 
If someone comes to my place they must expect to pay more for 
their liquor because they are not only paying for the drink, but 
qlso for the comfort of my home and the service they receive. 
Except for beer, my standard mark-up on other drinks is 100%. 
In 1984 it was evident that Mapiri was making regular monthly 
earnings of between R600 and R800 a month from her shebeen. 
Another owner from Phuthaditjhaba, who after 1980 expanded his 
small neighbourhood shebeen into a general drinking house, 
attributed his success to the fact that he had large enough 
premises to accommodate about sixty drinkers at one sitting. He 
also claimed that he imposed no entrance restrictions on his 
clients: 
There are many shebeens in Qwaqwa who restrict admission. Some 
shebeens exclude women and school children because they are 
reagrded as troublesome, others even have dress regulations. The 
difference between my shebeen and many of these places is that I 
allow all kinds of people here. There is no restriction on who we 
serve as long as they behave themselves. 
The broad appeal of general drinking houses which transcend 
neighbourhood boundaries was at the basis of their success. 
Philip explained that since he had expanded his shebeen by 
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building on two large rooms to his municipal house in 1980 his 
weekly beer sales had increased from about 10 to over 50 cases. 
Other cases of neighbourhood shebeens demonstrated even larger 
weekly sales reaching up to 80 cases. 
Although it has been noted that diversification was becoming 
increasingly necessary as a strategy for survival at the lower 
reaches of the shebeen trade, there was little evidence to 
suggest that successful shebeeners and liquor runners were 
attempting to hasten processes of accumulation by spreading their 
interests into new markets. rScharf (1985) in his recent study of 
shebeeners in 1 Coloured 1 townships on the Cape Flats demonstrates 
that successful illicit liquor dealers were very often actively 
involved in other illegal activities such as the distribution of 
r 
s to 1 e n g o o d s a n d d r u g tr a f f i c k i n g ·.J E v i de n c e o f th i s k i n d o f 
diversification into what Nattrass (1986) has called 
1 illegitimate 1 markets, was virtually absent from the Qwaqwa 
liquor trade during 1984.~ The only notable exception was a 
Lesotho divorcee from Phuthaditjhaba whose relatives smuggled 
.~iamonds and dagga into Qwaqwa from Maseru. This woman, unlike 
many of her urban counterparts, was not involved in reselling her 
merchandise locally, but operated as a broker for urban dealers. 
She explained that this reduced the risk of police arrest. 
Outside of the 'illegitimate' sector, there was only one other 
example of ~iversification in the upper ranks of the shebeen 
trade. This case also involved a single woman, who owned two· 
retail stores in the villages._) The main reasons for the lack of 
effective diversification and capital deepening in the shebeen 
'trade,rl would argue, is related closely to the fact that most of 
the shebeeners in Qwaqwa are women and are therefore marginalised 
from participation in most other commercial spheres~ This 
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argument will be developed in the following chapter. 
Finally, in the context of the above discussion it seems clear 
that while the dominant tendency in the liquor trade was towards 
declining profits and heightened competition in 1984, a number of 
enclaves still existed that offered scope for capital 
accumulation. Yet, even in these areas long-term profitability 
was uncertain. Liquor runners in particular were facing mounting 
pressures from the authorities in 1984, while better-class female 
shebeeners were concerned that legalisation, as discussed in the 
Legislative Assembly in 1984 (QLA 1984: 240-251), would result in 
men moving into the local liquor business on a greater scale. 
Economic Differentiation and Class Formation 
I have assessed the economic forces operating within the three 
commercial sectors under discussion and have considered the 
economic responses of traders to these conditions. It is 
abundantly clear that the traders and taximen within the sample, 
and more generally in Qwaqwa, form neither a homogeneous nor 
stable socio-economic group. Their activities are widely 
differentiated and are not easy characterised. One of the main 
reasons for this is that prevailing economic pressures within the 
homeland are in a constant state of flux. Levels of market 
competition change regularly in relation to demographic growth, 
employment opportunities, new licensing polici~s, and shifting 
state and white capitalist interests within the area. Yet, in 
spite 
below 
of wide variation in the operations noted, I will 
that it is nevertheless possible to identify three 




The first stratum or category of operators identifiable in the 
sample corresponds, I suggest, to what House (1984) calls the 
'community of the poor' - "a very stagnant group engaged in 
menial labour with subsistence returns to their efforts" (1984: 
291). These are individuals whose participation in small-scale 
commerce is largely premised on their inability to find or hold 
jobs within the formal sector, and whose activities are primarily 
structured to meet the immediate needs of household subsistence 
and reproduction. In these terms it is clear that neighbourhood 
shebeeners, and to some extent local pirate taximen, fell within 
this group. Both groups generated extremely small profits in 
highly competitive markets, and displayed an interest in wage 
employment as an .alternative to their current employment. 
Neighbourhood shebeeners were often single women who ran liquor 
outlets concurrently with holding poorly paid local industrial 
jobs or entered the shebeen trade because they were unable to 
find formal sector jobs. Local pirate taxiing, on the other hand, 
was an exclusively male occupation which was initially preferred 
to unskilled migr~nt and commuter labour, but was losing its 
appeal by the 1980s as a result of declining profits. The highly 
precarious nature of both occupations provided these owners with 
little hope of separating themselves socially or economically 
from the mass of urban and rural poor in Qwaqwa and, thus, in 
class terms identified them closely with the working class. 
The second category of trader within the sample might be seen to 
correspond to what House (1984) has called an 'intermediate 
sector'. This gro~p is comprised of operators who stand outside 
the 'community of the poor' insofar as they are able to meet 
their subsistence requirements and periodically reinvest their 
business earnings. But, in spite of their immediate security, 
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House regards people in this category as precariously placed vis-
a-vis long-term success and expansion of their business interests 
(1984: 297}. The individuals that fall most readily into this 
category within the sample are rural storekeepers, larger 
shebeeners and long-distance taxi pirates. All three of these 
categories of traders, as the above discussion demonstrates, were 
earning incomes from commerce that exceeded their immediate 
subsistence needs and diverted their attention away from manual 
and even semi-skilled work within the formal sector. But at the 
same time they were also increasingly exposed to growing market 
competition that undermined the relative success of their 
operations. Rural storekeepers were in the process of having to 
cope with the mounting threat of large white retailing firms in 
the homeland, while larger shebeeners and pirate taximen were 
attempting to deal with the pressures of increased police 
harassment and escalating internal competition. 
The separation of these 'intermediate sector' operators from the 
urban and rural poor in Qwaqwa was never complete, since the 
temporary economic advantage enjoyed by these operators could not 
easily be expressed socially. Rural storekeepers living close to 
their stores, for instance, found themselves closely enmeshed 
with the fabric of village life. They shared the same experiences 
and many of the same discomforts that derived from poor social 
amenities and tribal political control. They also found 
themselves linked to poorer kin and clients through relations of 
credit and patronage (cf. Chapter Six}. Yet, at the same time, 
they were able to extricate themselves from the claustrophobia of 
neighbourhood life by sending their children to schools in 
Phuthaditjhaba, by taking leading roles in voluntary associations 
such as sports clubs and church groups, and by socialising with 
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bureaucrats and teachers in town shebeens. The position of larger 
shebeeners was similar, although complicated by their status as 
women. Aside from small number of club shebeeners in the sample 
which catered for teachers and bureaucrats, other larger 
shebeeners found themselves in a position similar to that of 
general storekeepers. The location of their activities within 
working-class neighbourhoods brought them into constant contact 
with poor neighbours on whom they relied for co-operation and 
protection against police harassment. As one owner pointed out: 
In this business good neighbourly relations are essential because 
if these people find that you are unfriendly and not prepared to 
help them in times of need they will go to the police and 
complain about the noise and drunkenness in the streets. 
Larger shebeeners in the urban area also differed from rural 
storekeepers in that they dealt with a wider range of clients, 
depended less heavily on credit and were able to participate 
regularly in stokvel associations and Tupperware parties with 
better-class women in the town. 
Pirate taximen differed from the above groups in that their 
commercial activities were not neighbourhood based. This 
separation from the rural poor in Qwaqwa allowed them greater 
freedom of association and scope for conspicuous consumption~ 
reflected in the more upmarket styles of dress and patronage of 
better class shebeens in Qwaqwa. But the ability of this group to 
effectively link up with local elites in Qwaqwa was complicated 
both by their mobility - they were constantly moving between the 
homeland and the common area - and by their participation in 
close-knit, gang-like association structures, which restricted 
wider social interaction and, as we will see in Chapter Seven, 
led to extensive social links with lumpenproletarian elements in 
w.hite urban areas. Although I will return to some of the themes 
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raised above in Chapter Six and Seven, it seems clear from this 
preliminary discussion that groups associated with Hous~'s 
'intermediate sector' occupied classically petty bourgeois class 
positions. Unlike the previous category of operators, who were 
indistinguishable from the underclasses in Qwaqwa, these latter 
groups were at l~ast in part able to separate themselves from 
poorer neighbours and kin by virtue of their larger earnings and 
leadership roles in the community. Their position was, however, 
never secure since competition and police harassment constantly 
threatened to hurl them down into the proletariat. 
While the vast majority of operators in the sample fell into the 
above two categories, certain traders and taximen in the sample, 
especially specialised storekeepers and commuter taxi owners with 
their multiple business interests, can be identified as members 
of what Southall (1983) has called, in his more specific use of 
the term, a 'commercial petty-bourgeoisie'. This group, he 
argues, comprises wealthy traders in the Transkei who operate 
under the protection of local state structures and the Transkeian 
Development Corporation. The economic advantages obtained from 
this relationship are indicated by a growing polarisation between 
this group and the rest of the homeland population (1983: 176). 
Although Qwaqwa is both smaller and economically less developed 
than the Transkei, it has been shown in Chapter Two that economic 
and political linkages were being forged between larger traders, 
the QDC and the Qwaqwa government. The relatio~ship between these 
groups, although complicated by conflicting interests and 
underlying contradictions, was one of mutual benefit - the QDC 
and the Qwaqwa government depended on the Chamber of Commerce to 
endorse its economic policies - while members of the Chamber of 
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Commerce manipulated their relationships with these bodies to 
further their own interests (see Chapter Two for details). 
In addition to the growing involvement of specialised traders and 
multiple business owners in the activities of the Qwaqwa Chamber, 
it was evident that these owners were beginning to establish a 
common class identity with the homeland's bureaucratic elite. The 
main vehicle for this process was the establishment of a real 
estate market in Phuthaditjhaba after 1980. The opening up of the 
real estate market followed persistent complaints in the 
Legislative Assembly during the late 1970s about the government's 
failure to provide s~itable housing for "educated people of 
status" in Qwaqwa (QLA 1978: 304). Assembly members felt that it 
was inimical to economic growth in the area to prevent wealthy 
people from obtaining home ownership. In response to this 
initiative the QDC embarked on a major real estate project in 
Phuthaditjhaba in an attempt to encourage home ownership. Between 
1980 and 1983 two small housing estates were built by the QDC and 
individual units sold off to the public at between Rl5 000 and 
R40 000. In 1983 these residential areas were expanded by the 
issuing of freehold land rights in Phuthaditjhaba. 
These developments provided a residential base for the process of 
class formation. Wealthy traders were now able to escape the 
isolation and insecurity of crime-ridden residential areas and 
consciously distance themselves from the mass of Qwaqwa's 
population. They could socialise within the confines of their 
relatively secluded residential areas, could send their children 
to the same schools and enjoy a privileged life-style without the 
nagging demands of poorer neighbours and kin. But, although some 
of the wealthier traders in the sample, such as Amos and James, 
were in the process of purchasing their own homes in 
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Phuthaditjhaba by 1984, there was a clear indication that 
Qwaqwa's commercial elite in general in Qwaqwa was not prepar,ed 
to limit its social and business contacts to the homeland. Owners 
of specialised stores in particular had often come to the area 
with the specific aim of exploiting the newly available 
commercial opportunities (cf. Case 3.5). They had little desire 
to make Qwaqwa their permanent home and lamented government 
regulations that made homeland citizenship a prerequisite for 
business licensing. As one bottlestore owner explained: 
I can understand why the white government wants to prevent black 
businessmen from becoming wealthy, but I do not understand why 
the Qwaqwa government wishes to follow in their footsteps •••• This 
issue of having to take out Qwaqwa citizenship before opening a 
business here is madness, because it prohibits us from owning 
businesses in more than one place. The Qwaqwa government is 
always talking about the need for economic development, but this 
will not occur unless blacks can move freely between the [common] 
urban areas and the homelands. 
Businessmen such as the above owner displayed little interest in 
staying in Qwaqwa or confining their business connections to the 
area. He maintained that after establishing his business in the 
homeland he wished to return to the common urban area and build a 
house there. This tendency among wealthy traders to seek ways of 
diversifying their assets between the homelands and urban areas, 
from whence many of them originally had come, suggests that these 
individuals sought to transcend the parochial boundaries of the 
homeland system and establish a broader class identity. This 
observation is ratified by Dison (1978: 277) in his study of 
opposition politics in Venda and Gazankulu. In conclusion, it 
seems that while Southall 1 s (1983) assertion that there is a 
considerable overlap between the bureaucratic and commercial 
factions of the homeland petty bourgeoisie migpt be valid for the 
Transkei, the proposition is not necessarily true for Qwaqwa, 
where many of the commercial elite not only had business 
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interests in urban areas, but sought to identify themselves more 
closely with the urban rather than the rural petty bourgeoisie. 
To sum up, this chapter has addressed itself to two basic issues. 
Firstly, it has attempted to provide a picture of the economic 
differentiation among traders and taximen in Qwaqwa by focusing 
on the role of economic centralisation and competition. 
Concerning this issue it has been argued that, although there was 
a significant degree of differentiation within the sample, the 
reality of changing market conditions and outside intervention 
from both state and white capital increasingly limited the scope 
for accumulation in the small business sector. The only traders 
that displayed r~al growth potential in 1985 were specialised 
storekeepers who existed in a 'benign' relationship with white 
~apital and whose markets had not yet been saturated. But even 
here restrictions on business ownership and the high rentals 
charged by the QDC curtailed reinvestment. Indeed, the Chief 
Minister's statement that "With the passage of time our people 
will realise the necessity of large businesses and they should 
not simply be involved in small cafes" (1980: 247) represents a 
gross (and perhaps deliberate) misreading of conditions in the 
small business sector in Qwaqwa. 
Secondly, the chap~er has attempted to rank the operations within 
the sample in terms of economic and social criteria. From these 
locations I have extrapolated different class positions by 
suggesting that the traders and taximen interviewed belonged to 
both the rural working class and to an internally diverse petty 
bourgeoisie. My categorisation of the latter group is broader 
than that conventionally used in the literature on class 
formation in the homelands. In Chapters Six and Seven I will 
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attempt to elaborate this usage in more detail by considering 
differing aspects of class relations in Qwaqwa. 
Footnotes 
[1] The boycott of Frasers by retail traders in Qwaqwa was 
reported to have almost resulted in the bankruptcy of the 
company's wholesale branch. This caused concern in the Qwaqwa 
Legislative Assembly as it was feared that local shareholders 
would hold the government responsible if they lost their 
investments (OLA 1985: 20ff). 
[2] Small traders were reluctant to approach the QDC for 
financial assistance because they believed that the interest 
rates charged by the Corporation were excessive. As one speaker 
remarked in the Legislative Assembly in 1985: "This organisation 
is already ten years old, but we are not aware of a single person 
who has become independent as a result of financial assistance 
rendered by this organisation" (QLA 1985: 19). 
[3] This matter had been queried in the Legislative Assembly. One 
speaker complained that after building shopping facilities the 
QDC leased them to local traders at "very unreasonable and 
exorbitant rental'\ He maintained: "I am of the opinion that the 





GENDER AND ACCUMULATION: 
THE ECONOMIC STRATEGIES OF WOMEN IN COMMERCE 
In Chapter Three I discussed the role of class origins and the 
influence of formal sector employment on access to commercial 
opportunities in 'Qwaqwa. In this discussion it was noted that 
there were a limited number of women engaged in successful 
,-
business enterprises in the homeland. In this chapter I will 
attempt to explain this phenomenon by considering women's access 
to employment resources and their exposure to various form of 
male domination in Qwaqwa.~ In the light of these remarks the 
chapter will focus specifically on the different strategies 
employed by women to break out of their socially-prescribed roles 
as mothers and homemakers. In this section I will compare the 
strategies of single and married women in commerce. 
Patriarchal Attitudes and Employment 
Sharp and Spiegel {1986), in a comparative study of gender 
relations in rural households in Qwaqwa and Matatiele, have 
argued that the attempts of women to engage in certain kinds of 
income-generating activities outside of subsistence agriculture 
met with strong resistance from male household members. 1 They 
~ 
argue that in Qwaqwa the patriarchal attitudes of men in the 
r-
closer settlement villages can be traced back to experiences on 
OFS farms, where the male household heads enjoyed tight control 
over economic resources.J These practices were carried over into 
the closer settlement villages, despite growing male 
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unemployment: 
Men's grip on domestic affairs was, if anything, strengthened by 
unemployment and their continuous presence at home. Because they 
were the only ones with any realistic prospect of employment 
outside the homeland, men saw their decisions about expenditure 
as being beyond reproach; on the other hand their presence at 
home gave them oppqrtunity for hawk-like scrutiny of their wives' 
every move, and their own anxieties brought forth bitter 
condemnation of the least hint of inefficiency (1986: 12). 
The opposition of unemployed men from the villages to the 
economic advancement of women was also expressed outside of 
domestic units. rouring October 1984, for instance, a group of 
about 400 male work-seekers from the villages stormed the 
industrial parks in Phuthaditjhaba, where several thousand women 
were employedu According to eye-witnesses, the men marched 
through the streets of Phuthaditjhaba overturning female hawker 
stalls and demanding an end to male unemployment. On arrival at 
the industrial parks they stoned employers' cars and chased women 
away from their jobs shouting: "You are doing men's work. Go 
home! 11 
lother collective attempts by unemployed men to victimise women 
were noted in the escalating cases of rapes and assaults on 
employed women in the villages.J Police officials and local 
magistrates reported that physical violations of female workers 
had reached alarming levels, especially on public transport, 
which was singled out as an frequent target for the activities of 
tsotsi gangs. Indeed, by November 1984 the situation had become 
serious enough for special police patrols to be set up at bus-
'stops in a number of villages to protect local and commuter 
workers returning home in the evenings. 
rThe only rural women to enjoy some freedom from direct male 
control were those located in households where men were absent on 
migrant contracts.j In these instances women were able to control 
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household expenditure and could, if necessary, use remittances to 
support independent economic activities such as hawking, mar~et 
gardening 
,-or shebeening. But in performing these tasks they had 
to be careful not to antagonise their husbands who generally 
prohibited them from engaging in activities that would bring them 
into contact with other men.~ Sharp and Spiegel (1986) point out 
that 'shebeening was a particularly dangerous activity for these 
women. Losing male support in the closer settlement villages had 
serious social consequences because of the very limited 
opportunities for female employment in these areas.J Research 
~onducted in Tseki village in 1983, for instance, revealed that 
of the 56 adult women in a sample of 40 households only eight had 
managed to obtain wage employment. The rest of the women in the 
sample, with the exception of a few pensioners, relied heavily on 
the financial support of men (Niehaus 1987: 61)-J 
'The situation in working-class households in Phuthaditjhaba, on 
the other hand, differed significantly from that.in the villages. 
In the urban area women enjoyed greater access to employment 
opportunities. In fact, Niehaus (Ibid) notes that of the 133 jobs 
held in a sample of 80 working class households in the town, some 
60 were held by women (28 local factory workers, 27 commuters and 
5 migrants). The main impetus behind the relatively high female 
employment in Phuthaditjhaba derived from the creation of 
industrial employment opportunities in Qwaqwa and Harrismith as a 
result of the Industrial Decentralisation Programme.JBY 1984 this 
programme had generated in excess of 7 000 jobs: 4 900 of these 
were located in industrial parks in Phuthaditjhaba and were 
immediately available to residents of the town, lespecially women 
who comprised between 70% and 80% of the local workforce (Ibid)._.:) 
The majority of these jobs were extremely poorly paid, in 1984 
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some 60% of the workers in the industrial parks earned less than 
R60 a month (~ ~ 2/3/1984). 
Despite low wages and poor working conditions. the availability 
of factory jobs for town women has had important implications 
for gender relations in urban working-class households. 
Commenting on this issue, Niehaus (1987: 174) suggests that. 
although male constructions of gender relations have conformed to 
patriarchal patterns seen elsewhere in the homeland, 'the ability 
of women to earn independently in Phuthaditjhaba has undermined 
the control men are able to exercise over them.::)The allocation of 
domestic tasks, the rights of women to earn wages and control of 
domestic expenditure are all areas of intense struggle in urban 
households. The threat that employed women posed to men in the 
town ellicited a response in a local newspaper, which discussed 
the role of trade unions in the Phuthaditjhaba industrial area: 
The only remedy for ill-treatment and exploitation of deprived 
blacks by we11 · off employers is none other than trade 
unions •••• Only trade unions will be in a position to educate 
women, forming the workforce in Qwaqwa [read: Phuthaditjhaba] 
that their place •• ~is in their kitchen. It is only through trade 
unions that women wiil comprehend the supportive role they play 
(The Pinnacle 11/1/1985 in Niehaus 1987: 177). 
r 
The determination of urban women to defy male attempts to control 
their lives was reflected in their responses to the October 1984 
riot0As one Phuthaditjhaba woman from Valiant Textiles explained 
after the event: 
These men have threatened to kill us, but we will not be pushed 
~round by them. They are idle and waste money in shebeens. We 
have no sympathy for them, they are troublemakers who want to 
prevent us from feeding our children. 
Another women explained: 
These men have made us angry by threatening to assault us. They 
want to have our jobs so that they can feel strong, but we will 
not let them do this. When these jobs were first made available 
they were offered to men, but they did not want them, saying that 
the pay was too low. They cannot expect to take these jobs now 
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because they are finding difficultly getting work in the cities. 
Although in the wake of the October riot women were becomjng 
conscious of their powerful position vis-a-vis rural men who were 
feeling the brunt of the economic recession, they were not always 
able to control their earnings in their homes. Christine Obbo 
(1980) notes in Uganda that: 
If a man cannot control a woman's money directly, he can at least 
devise all sorts of ways of spending the money that women earn, 
pretending t9 be short of money all the time or making his wife 
feel that any money earned was indirectly due to her husband, who 
brought her to town and allowed her to work in the first place. 
r 
Niehaus (1987} notes that attempts by Phuthaditjhaba men to use 
female earnings for their own pursuits were a central source of 
domestic conflict. He maintains that the unusually high levels of 
female employment in Phuthaditjhaba were resulting in increased 
marital instability in the town by 1984 (1987: 182).!.l 
Not all men in Qwaqwa, however, felt threatened by the economic 
activities of treir wives. rAmong the small petty bourgeoisie 
located in the ·state sector, it was noted that women were 
actively encouraged to pursue independent careers. Women in these 
households, freed from their domestic responsibilities by 
servants and local creches, were allowed to further their 
education and enter 'respectable occupations' such as teaching 
C and nursing~ These husbands also encouraged their wives to 
participate in Tupperware parties and sewing groups that brought 
them into contact with women of a similar social status. But, at 
the same time, men with well-paid jobs were prescriptive in the 
kinds of economic and social activities they allowed their wives 
to engage in.JThey sought to restrict them to economic activities 
that neither threatened their own positions as 'breadwinners' nor 
brought their wives into extensive contact with other men. The 
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prevalence of these attitudes was demonstrated in the virtual 
absence of 'better-class' women from shebeens in Phuthaditjhaba. 
Most teachers I spoke to claimed that they would either beat ·or 
divorce their wives if they heard that they had been patronising 
r shebeens. Upper-class drinking houses in Qwaqwa were the domain 
of men, prostitutes and single women: there was little room for 
interfering wives • ..)·· 
~he large amounts of leisure time bureaucrats and teachers spent 
at these outlets was a major source of marital tension. Women 
objected to being left alone at home in the evening to prepare 
the supper and look after the children. They also feared that 
their husbands were seeing other women: "There are so many loose 
women here in Phuthaditjhaba that I can never be sure that my 
husband will not be tempted to sleep with them".j In 1984 the 
moral standards of male teachers were even discussed in the 
Legislative Assembly, where it was noted that "since schools have 
been put under the Qwaqwa government teachers have turned into 
hobos who drink as they please" (1984: 201). 
On the basis of the above discussion it can be seen that 
patriarchal attitudes were deeply engrained in the fabric of 
social life in Qwaqwa: to use Schuster's phrase "the leitmotif of 
a man ' s at ti tu de i s control 11 (19 7 9 : 7 8 ) • But· i t has al so been 
shown that the ability of men to assert their control over women 
varied considerably, depending on the economic status of the 
former. Indeed, it seems evident that male attempts to control 
women were most fierce in households where the positions of men 
as breadwinners were threatened by periodic unemployment and 
financial insecurity. Men realised that growing unemployment was 
eroding their marital power, and the 1984 march through 
Phuthaditjhaba demonstrated this realisation. In contrast, 
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middle- class men were more arrogant and confident of their 
ability to control women. They allowed their wives a certain 
amount of economic autonomy and freedom of association, but only 
within limits they considered desirable. Working-class men in 
Phuthaditjhaba fell between these two extremes. On the one hand, 
they found less difficulty finding employment than men in the 
closer settlements, but on the other their wives were also able 
to earn independently, although usually not at the same levels. 
This situation heightened tensions in these households and 
resulted in constant struggles over the definition of male and 
female roles within domestic units. 
Women and the Bureaucracy 
Recent literature on the post-colonial state in Africa has 
strongly criticised the notion that the state can be seen as a 
neutral arbitrator in public disputes (cf. Leys 1975, Shivji 
1976, Mamdani 1977, Saul 1979). These authors all argue that the 
state can be seen to consistently represent the interests of the 
dominant classes in African societies as opposed to those of 
workers and peasants. But the new critical approaches to state 
power have said little about the role of the state in 
perpetuating notions of patriarchy and male control of resources. 
Hirschman (1985: 61) makes the following observation about recent 
analyses of the bureaucracy in Africa: 
It has been ••• asserted that the bureaucracy - as a very important 
segment of the beneficiary class - will tend to resist reform 
that threatens its class interest: hence its conservatism. It is 
less often suggested that bureaucrats, as men, may have an 
inherent resistance to reforms which enhance the status and role 
of women and thereby jeopardise privileges they enjoy by virtue 
of being men. 
Hirschman, in his analysis of bureaucratic attitudes to women in 
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rural Malawi, suggests that women have effectively been excluded 
from rural development projects because bureaucrats regarded . it 
as 'customary' for men to control resources and make decisions. 
This perception endorsed the notion, Hirschman argues, of women 
being merely reproductive agents in a rural migrant labour 
economy. The strong male bias in the administration of rural 
development programmes, he concludes, has ensured that 
) 
"patriarchy extended from the family and the village to the 
central government, and later to the decentralised agencies of 
government" (p.62). 
Hirschmans 1 observations about patriarchy in rural Malawi are 
pertinent to our discussion of bureaucratic attitudes in Qwaqwa 
where male civil servants had similar perceptions of the role of 
women in the reserve economy. Like their Malawian counterparts, 
leading Qwaqwa bureaucrats believed that it was customary for 
women to be confined to domestic units, while men went out to 
earn a living as migrants. As the Minister of Interior plainly 
put it in 1981 when referring to the increased levels of female 
employment in Qwaqwa: 
It is not desirable that our wives should be the slaves of other 
nations. It is better for them to be the slaves of their own 
homes so that we know what to do with them (QLA 1981: 46). 
Evidence of sexism in the bureaucracy was widespread in Qwaqwa. 
In my 1983 research, for instance, I noted that without .the 
support of men married, and especially single women struggled to 
extract basic resources such as accommodation, pensions and 
labour contracts from the bureaucracy. In Phuthaditjhaba cases 
were recorded of divorced or separated women forced to reside 
with relatives for long periods of time because local housing 
officials refused to provide them with accommodation unless they 
'. 
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produced supportive letters from their husbands. Simi.lar 
practices were noted at the labour offices where male bureaucrats 
often verbalised their objections to women obtaining what they 
considered to be mens' work. Women responded to these practices 
by accepting work illegally and by waiting at factory gates 
rather than queuing at established recruitment points. Women also 
complained that bureaucrats tended to single them out in their 
attempts to extract bribes and sexual favours. Although these 
claims are difficult to verify in quantitative terms, it was 
recorded that in 1979 sexual harassment at the Phuthaditjhaba 
housing office was sufficiently widespread to merit an official 
investigation into the issue. The report tabled in the 
Legislative Assembly in April 1979 revealed that leading town 
councillors and government bureaucrats were demanding sexual 
favours from women in exchange for their right to occupy houses 
in the town (QLA 1979: 593-638). 
Against the backdrop of these findings, it is not surprising to 
find that female traders complained bitterly about their 
difficulties in securing trading permits. They maintained that 
hawking licences were relatively freely granted to women before 
1984, but that licences for more substantial businesses such as 
general dealer stores, clothing shops and brickyards were 
difficult to obtain without a recommendation from their husbands 
or a close male relative. These complaints were endorsed by 
official estimates that by 1984 more than 90% of all registered 
trading licences in the homeland were held by men. In my sample 
of 40 licensed stores it was noted that five were owned by women. 
Only one of these women acquired her licence without male support 
(cf. Case 5.2). The other four owners relied on men to negotiate 
with bureaucrats on their behalf. The wives of influential 
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bureaucrats were seen to acquire licences relatively easily. 
Single women, on the other hand, were virtually excluded from 
licensed commerce because they could not demonstrate that they 
had the support of a man. In a compensatory gesture the Minister 
of Interior announced in 1982 that he would support the 
applications of single women for hawker licences: 
Widows should be able to obtain business licenses [read: Hawker 
licences] because they are breadwinners. The cabinet has already 
indicated that it will not stand in the way if I were to speak on 
behalf of such people and attempt to obtain licences for them 
(QLA 1982: 92}. 
The sincerity of the minister's claims to want to assist female 
breadwinners in obtaining licences and protection as hawkers was 
brought into question in August. 1984 when the Qwaqwa police 
dispersed female hawkers at the Setsing shopping centre after 
established traders complained that they were cluttering up the 
walkways and stealing their profits (see H1rsch 1985 for similar 
action in the Ciskei). The women I spoke to at the shopping 
centre she claimed that they were thoroughly confused by police 
action because, when they had approached the Bakwena tribal 
authority earlier for hawking permits, they had been told that 
such permits were no longer needed! 
~he harassment of women in the informal sector was a significant 
reflection of bureaucratic attitudes towards the economic 
independence of women. From the point of view of the Qwaqwa 
police, women provided an easy target for the extraction of 
bribes and the imposition of their authority. Evidence collected 
on shebeen raids during 1984 provided ample evidence of 
unnecessarily violent and unscrupulous action in police dealings 
with female shebeeners. According to local magistrates the 
excessive violence and unconventional nature of shebeen-raiding 
made it difficult for them to find legal justification for 
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prosecuting these women. A magistrate at the Phuthaditjhaba 
District Court explained: 
It is almost impossible to find these women guilty when they 
recount the way they were treated by the police. In shebeen 
raiding it is necessary for the police to trap the offender 
while actually selling liquor. The Qwaqwa police do not follow 
this procedure. They just barge into homes, upturn tables, abuse 
these women and sell the liquor for themselves. There is often no 
legal ground for a conviction (personal communication, Feb.1985). 
When I approached the Chief of Police in Qwaqwa he maintained 
that police action was completely justified in view of the role 
of shebeens in spreading crime. However, if law-and-order was the 
main concern of the Qwaqwa police, it is surprising that they 
found no reason to prosecute pirate taxi operators who were 
regularly engaged in violent clashes with competing groups and 
were known to be involvemed in smuggling rackets. The reasons for 
selective police harassment in Qwaqwa are complex and will be 
dealt with in more detail in Chapter Seven. It is significant to 
note however that predominantly female informal sector 
occupations such food hawking and shebeening bore the brunt of 
police action against unlicensed traders in Qwaqwa, while illegal 
male-dominated activities were largely ignored. 
The evidence suggests that the commercial aspirations of women in 
Qwaqwa were not only hampered by restrictions placed on them by 
men in domestic units, but also by the attitudes of bureaucrats 
and police officials towards their involvement in commerce. 
Bureaucracy sexism hit single women hardest, preventing them from 
obtaining urban accommodation and trading permits, and thereby 
acting as a safety net for generalised male control in Qwaqwa. In 
short, it is evident that strong bureaucratic sanctions existed 
to prevent women from breaking out of their accepted roles as 
homemakers and married mothers. 
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Given these manifestations of patriarchy, I now turn my attention 
to the strategies employed by female traders in my sample to deal 
with the kinds of restrictions and controls placed on them. 
Strategies for Economic Independence 
Staying single 
1n her study of urban women in Uganda Christine Obbo (1980) 
places great stress on the role of single women as innovators and 
entrepreneurs.· "Single women", she claims, "are at the forefront 
of social change" (p.87)~ The idea of women remaining single for 
the purpose of pursuing independent careers and asserting their 
economic independence has recently been taken up 1by Van der Vliet 
(1984) in her study of urban women in the Eastern Cape, who 
argues that staying single, although a radical strategy for urban 
women, was nevertheless increasingly widely used by employed 
women. 
~ 
fin Qwaqwa single women were active in commerce, probably more so 
than in most urban areas. In fact, some 65% of the shebeeners in 
my sample were single women.j However, this does not necessarily 
imply that the majority of these women either chose to be single 
or that they were able to further their economic aspirations by 
remaining single. Staying single, as Van der Vliet (1984: 15) 
points out, is a strategy that can only be effectively employed 
in situations where women have access to economic resources, 
especially employment. This was clearly reflected in my case 
material, which illustrated that Phuthaditjhaba women were more 
inclined to consider breaking out of marriage than rural women. 
The following case study, recorded in a working-class 
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neighbourhood in the town, presents a set of typical 
circumstances that encouraged women with stable jobs to become 
single: 
Case 5.1: Unemployment, subsistence and divorce 
Eliza and her husband, John, were removed from the Manaung 
location in Bloemfontein and resettled in the Maqhekung section 
of Phuthaditjhaba. After their arrival John sought employment at 
the local labour offices, while Eliza stayed at home to look 
after their two children, Bongani and Selina. For several months 
John searched for work without success, and by November 1984 it 
was clear that the household could no longer survive on 
remittances from urban relatives and the suppor.t of neighbours. 
Eliza now decided to search for work as a domestic servant and 
left her children in the care of a neighbour. Within two weeks 
she had managed to secure a job with a family in Harrismith at 
R30 a month. But as this was not sufficient to meet the family's 
needs, she decided to use her earnings to set up a shebeen in the 
small Maqekung house by erecting a tin and wood structure in the 
back garden. Eliza recalls that by the end of 1975 her combined 
monthly earnings had increased to over RlOO. 
John, however, was not tolerant of Eliza's newfound, economic 
independence, especially since he had only been able to find 
occasional casual employment since their arrival. He accused 
Eliza of trying to humiliate him in front of his friends by going 
out to work, of witholding her earnings from him and of lowering 
herself to the level of a prostitute by selling beer to other 
unemployed men in the neighbourhood. Eliza initially ignored 
these accusations, but when her husband started beating her and 
sleeping with other women, she refused to feed him and filed for 
a divorce. 
The divorce transactions were drawn out, and it was only in 1978 
that the court ruled against her husband. The ruling stipulated 
that the Phuthaditjhaba Town Council issue Eliza with a new house 
in the Diapollo section and that she be given custody of the 
children. 
Between 1978 and 1984 Eliza managed to get a new job as a cook at 
a local boarding house. This enabled her to spend more time at 
home and, with the assistance of her growing children, expand her 
shebeen activitie~. Eliza also entered a local stokvel group 
comprised of shebeeners in the neighbourhood. Every two months 
gatherings were h~ld at her home. 
By 1984 Eliza had also attached herself to a new lover, but she 
claimed that there was no prospect of marriage: "I have learnt 
how to cope on my own with the help of my children, marriage will 
only complicate my life". 
Although divorce seemed a logical way out of Eliza's predicament, 
she placed herself at considerable risk. By adopting this course 
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of action she jeopardised the very basis of her economic 
existence, urban residence. Had the court ruled in favour of her 
husband, Eliza would have been forced to find accommodation in 
the villages, and consequently would have had to relinquish both 
her shebeen business and her Harrismith job,~ which depended on 
her access to public transport. This threat of losing basic 
resources, especially town accommodation, caused urban women with 
jobs to be highly ambivalent in their attitude towards divorce. 
~n the closer settlements there was little indecision: women 
chose to remain married, virtually irrespective of the way they 
were treated by their husbands. The main reason for this was that 
they lacked access to employment.~ It was also evident that 
village-based ~nformal sector activities were too involuted and 
competitive to offer single women scope for independent 
subsistence,J let alone accumulation without additional financial 
imputs. This is demonstrated in Case 4.1 where Tumi, a widow from 
Mangaung, is forced to engage in an ever-increasing range of 
small-scale selling activities to support her family. Tumi's 
struggle as a single woman was aggravated by the fact that she 
did not have kin around her in Mangaung to provide her with 
domestic and financial assistance. 
Many of the other single women in the shebeen trade were more 
fortunate than Tumi as they had reliable female kin to assist 
them in their strategies for survival. 'In the shebeen single 
women worked in close co-operation with female kin. In these 
outlets senior women rotated brewing responsibilities to provide 
time for kin to seek employment. Children were also widely 
employed to run errands, purchase ingredients and serve 
customers. JThe division of labour in these shebeens nevertheless 
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[remained flexible enough to facilitate changes in household 
structure. Close co-operation between rural women was also seen 
in the retail trade where groups of kin rotated domestic 
responsibilities to allow women and children to participate in 
hawking._J However. close female co-operation was not in itself a 
means of increasing profits, since without other sources of 
household income single women remained bound to subsistence-
oriented activities. 
Obbo (1980: 95) highlights this problem in her study when she 
suggests that "for lasting change women must have resources such 
as land. money and the solidarity of other women as a basis for 
support". But what Obbo's analysis ignores is the importance of 
'other men' in the operations of single women. Indeed, her notion 
of 'unattached women' implies the total exclusi-0n of men from the 
commercial activities of single women. Now, while this was 
certainly a feature of the neighbourhood shebeen trade. r~ingle 
women in more lucrative commercial activities could clearly not 
afford to exclude men from their social circles._) This was 
illustrated by the attitudes of single women in the relatively 
(- I, 
successful 'club shebeen' trade in Phuthaditjhaba. The owners of 
these liquor outlets were usually middle-class divorcees in their 
mid-thirties who often held clerical or teaching jobs with the 
Qwaqwa government. \ Their resource base was stable and their _. 
demands for domestic assistance from female kin was limited as 
they did not brew.rThese women seldom sought to incorporate other 
women into their operations, but instead looked to men for 
support in negotiating liquor purchases from bottlestores and in 
extracting information about police raids . .J 
Reliance on male support by middle-class women was a central 
factor in the ability to increase profits. An illuminating 
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the shebeen trade. Yet, chooosing to remain single, even from a 
stable economic base, did not free urban women from the . 
discriminatory local bureaucracy which sought to crush their 
illicit commercial activities and exclude them from the town • .J In 
this context staying single remained a precarious option, which 
was only really successful for women such Pulane who were able to 
secure the support of men in the local bureaucracy and police 
force. 
Staying married: The role of 'domestic struggle' 
In this section I will consider some of the economic strategies 
employed by married women within my sample. I will suggest that 
in some instances where women were able to gain access to 
economic resources independently of men they were able to 
struggle within marriage for a measure of economic autonomy. 
(1) Disguising earnings from .!TI!!! 
rColin Murray (19~1) has argued that, although absent migrants 
from Lesotho usually sent home clear instructions as to how they 
intended their remittances to be spent, women often disobeyed 
these instructions~ rln Qwaqwa the ability of rural women to use 
their husband's remittances to engage in hidden commercial 
activities was one means by which they were sought to assert a 
measure of economic autonomy within marriage._) The initial 
motivation for the wives of migrants to enter commerce was often 
related to their. husbands' reluctance to send money home on a 
regular basis. Selali, the wife of a Welkom migrant, explained 
how she became in~olved in the shebeen trade in Namahadi: 
When we got married in 1980 my husband sent money home from the· 
mines every month. But as time passed he becam~ forgetful. It was 
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difficult for me to go to his mother's home every month to ask 
for money for the children, so I decided to start selling beer. 
Between June 1983 and September 1984 Selali sold liquor from her 
home. She explained that she had not told her husband of her 
activities because she knew that he would beat her up if found 
out that other men were visiting the house. She explained that 
she did not want to tell him about the shebeen until she had 
/graduated from Bonamelo Teachers Training College, where she had 
enrolled in 1982. She maintained: 
When he finds out about the shebeen I want to be sure that I can 
support myself and the children without him. I want to know that 
I can get a teaching job in Qwaqwa and want to ensure that my 
shebeen is running well. I think that when he finds out that I am 
an independent women he will not be able to criticise for me for 
trying to feed his children. 1 
_,; 
Selali 1 s biggest problem was keeping her activities secret. She 
explained that over the past 18 months her husband had only 
returned home twice, and on both occasions she had managed to 
persuade the neighbours not to tell him about her activities. 
Selani was unusually successful, as men sooner or later found 
out about their wives' activities. In these cases marital 
relations underwent considerable strain. The following case 
study of a Tseseng general dealer highlights the close 
relationship between marital tension and disguised earnings. It 
also points to the inevitability of 'domestic struggle' as an 
ongoing process for women seeking economic independence in 
marriage: 
Case 5.2: Storekeeping, gambling and marital breakdown 
Madidi moved to Qwaqwa from Bethlehem in 1970 after her marriage. 
Her husband who worked as a policeman in Johannesburg, had 
insisted they adhere to Basotho custom and start off their 
married life in his parents' homestead. 
For the first two years in Qwaqwa Madidi stayed with her 
husband's parents. She was not happy and returned home a number 
of times. In 1974, however, her husband received promotion and· 
they could afford to build their own home in Tseseng. Madidi was 
still not used to village life, but decided to alleviate her 
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and wives divided their responsibilities equally: women took 
control of shebeen sales and customer service, while men 
negotiated with suppliers and the local police force. Part of the 
reason for the success of these agreements lay in the nature of 
the shebeen business, where male control was limited by the power 
enjoyed by 'shebeen queens'. However, as long as shebeening 
remained a lucrative investment, men were prepared to exchange 
diminished domestic power for growing household profits. Men in 
these operations realised that the dynamism of the business 
depended on the personal presence of their wives, and that to 
disrupt domestic affairs could seriously undermine their 
earnings. Consequently, to compensate for feelings of domestic 
insecurity men in these operations often concentrated on their 
careers as bureaucrats, teachers and skilled workers. 
i B • '· us,ness partnerships between men and women outside of the 
shebeen trade were less harmonious. Husbands were more reluctant 
to allow their wives to dominate commercial endeavours._) In these 
operations men were inclined to become domineering and assertive 
as they attempted to control decision-making, resource allocation 
and domestic labour, while women struggled to liberate themselves 
from male control. The following case study illustrates struggles 
women faced in these arrangements: 
Case 5.4: Retailing, marital strain and reconciliation. 
Thabo began his working life as a policeman in Thaba 'Nchu, but 
moved to Qwaqwa in the mid-1970s when the Bophuthatswana police 
force took over there. In Qwaqwa he worked as a CID agent until 
1979 when his wife and a fellow female employee at a furniture 
store in Phuthaditjhaba convinced him to join them in a venture 
in the retail trade. Thabo agreed and used his contacts in the 
bureaucracy to acquire a cafe licence. 
By 1981 Thabo and his associates had 
stores in Qwaqwa, each managed by a 
partnership. Of the three stores 
successful, especially after 1982 when 
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managed to acquire three 
different member of the 
Thabo's was the least 
he spent considerable time 
literature on small traders in Africa and common in the 
perceptions of leading bureaucrats in Qwaqwa, that extended 
family structures are necessarily dysfunctional to the 
organisation and expansion of small business operations. In the 
second part of the chapter, I focus specifically on the 
interactions between traders and clients as a means of exploring 
their relationship with the rural working class in general. I 
argue that this relationship, while necessarily exploitative, is 
nevertheless one of interdependence, and therefore of 
ambivalence. 
Kin and Control 
It is widely recognised that kin are of fundamental importance in 
the organisation of small-scale business operations in Third 
World countries. 'Informal sector' studies in particular have 
drawn attention to the extensive use made by small-scale 
operators of family labour and household resources in reducing 
operating expenses and maintaining their enterprises in the face 
of growing competition. In fact, some informal sector analysts 
such as Wilkinson and Webster (1982), suggest that in theorising 
the 'informal sector' in countries which lack. social welfare 
structures, it is imperative to see these activities against the 
backdrop of the family or household, the basic units of the 
production of labour power. But, while kin are central for 
survival in the 'informal sector', their importance is also 
recognised in more successful small business undertakings. 
Studies of entrepreneurship in African countries such as Ghana 
and Kenya have stressed the centrality of kin in the operations 
of licensed traders and artisans. and have argued that the 
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retention of extended family structures has militated against the 
growth of small businesses in these areas. Kilby (1968). for 
instance, argues that the consistent demands made by kin on 
business profits in Ghana has served to dissuade entrepreneurs 
from reinvesting savings and has reduced the potential for growth 
in the small business sector. 
This view was also commonly expressed by QDC officials who argued 
that the significance of kin in the small business sector in 
Qwaqwa militated against the emergence of 'scientific' management 
techniques and the formation of economically sound business 
partnerships. One leading official explained: 
r~ne of main problems with black traders in Qwaqwa is that they 
rely almost entirely on unskilled family labour. They refuse to 
consider placing skilled people in their stores because they 
believe that these people will betray them and steal their money. 
They will also not engage in business partnerships for the same 
reason •••• The job of the QOC is not just to help these ·people 
with business loans, it is also to change their attitudes on 
issues such as the family (personal communication 1984)~ 
The importance of the family in the small business sector is not 
a unique African phenomenon. This is demonstrated in studies of 
the petty bourgeoisie in nineteenth-century Europe which identify 
the family as a critical force in the world of small enterprise. 
Crosswick & Haupt (1984: 20), for instance, remark in their 
overview of the operations of storekeepers and master artisans 
that: 
the introspection of the petit bourgeoisie family is no mere 
cultural eccentricity, but the outcome of close family ties an9 
their very demanding enterprises. Such demands would carry out 
into a dependence ·on wider family and kin, for financial support 
in launching the enterprise, in supporting it at times of 
difficulty, and in warding off the threat of bankruptcy (1984: 
20). 
But if the dependence on kin and family was particularly acute in 
periods of economic difficulty, these relationships were not 
necessarily dysfunctional to processes of capital accumulation. 
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fluctuated and household earning patterns were irregular. 
Case 6.1: Fluctuating demand and the dilemma of kin 
After resigning her job at Standard Woolen Mills in 1980, Sophia 
opened a small neighbourhood shebeen in Phuthaditjhaba to 
supplement her husband's irregular earnings as a freelance 
bricklayer in Qwaqwa. Sophia initially experienced some 
difficulty establishing her shebeen in a neighbourhood where 
numerous other operators existed. She claimed that for the first 
six months in the trade she only worked over weekends and 
occasionally on We~nesday evenings when some of her husband's 
friends would come round after work. 
In June 1981 the conditions in Sophia 1 s shebeen changed 
significantly when her husband, Bernard, obtained his first 
stable building job since 1980. Working on the QDC housing 
scheme in Phuthaditjhaba, he now earned a regular salary of R480 
a month. This injection of finances into the household enabled 
Sophia to persuade her husband to purchase new lounge furniture 
and build on a small 'drinking courtyard' onto the back of their 
municipal house. These improvements greatly enhanced the 
popularity of Sophia's shebeen, which by December 1981 was doing 
business on a daily basis. In March 1982 Bernard's activities in 
organising the Phuthaditjhaba Grasshoppers Soccer Club further 
stimulated business as all club functions were held within the 
ihebeen. 
By June 1982, with the soccer season at its height, Sophia found 
it increasingly di.fficult to cope with the shebeen without 
assistance. She maintained that, although her teenage daughter 
was a great help to her, the combined responsibility of tending 
to clients, brewing liquor and keeping the house clean were too 
demanding for them to cope with alone. In respohse to Sophia's 
complaints, Bernard decided to call on the assistance of two of 
his unmarried cousins living in Tseki to help them out until the 
soccer season was over. Both women had visited Bernard on a 
previous occasion to ask for his help in finding them 
accommodation in the town. 
The relief provided by Ida and Mary enabled Sophia to CQnsolidate 
her business during the busy winter months, but by November it 
was evident that she could again cope without both relatives. The 
burden of having to cater for additional family members was 
increased in February 1984 when Bernard finished his contract 
with the QDC and again entered a cycle of periodic unemployment. 
In October 1984 when I visited Sophia she explained that Ida had 
returned home to Tseki, but complained bitterly about the 
continued presence of Mary in the household. 
In contrast to shebeens where domestic and commercial relations 
were inevitably intertwined, the spacial separation of retail 
stores from domestic units provided no necessary precedent for 
• 
the use of family labour in these operations. However, when 
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considering business organisation, particularly in the rural 
retail trade, it is evident that both family and wider kin we,re 
of central importance in this sector. The growing levels of 
family involvement in these operations was closely related to the 
overall decline in retail profits after 1980 and the growing 
necessity for owners to jettison monthly wage bills. This trend 
served 
sector. 
to accentuate the general dependence on kin in this 
Most rural storekeepers, as I pointed out in chapter three, came 
to Qwaqwa from white-owned farms where they obtained little 
formal education and few marketable labour 
r-
sk i 11 s. They were 
accustomed to an extended family structure based on male control 
and economic co-operation in part-time agricultural activites 
(Sharp & Spiegel 1986). This structure of control, perpetuated 
by the distribution of economic resources within Qwaqwa, served 
as a convenient model for business organisation in rural areas 
where male storekeepers often lacked educational and technical 
skills.~ The dependence of these owners on intuition and 
experience over 'scientific' managerial techniques was clearly 
reflected in the almost 'complete absence of cash registers, 
calculators and bookkeeping techniques in rural stores~ In fact, 
in 1984 when OFS local authorities threatened to have rural 
businesses closed if they did not comply with sales tax 
regulations, widespread confusion prevailed in the rural retail 
sector as owners approached Phuthaditjhaba bookkeepers and local 
schoolteachers to help them compute their monthly earnings. In a 
context where most storekeepers were unable to monitor cash flows 
in their business with any precision, reliance on trustworthy kin 
had obvious advantages. 
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wealthier traders to separate themselves geographically from the 
demands of poorer kin and neighbours. This tendency was. howev~r. 
not without exceptions, as the following case of Raboroko, a 
wealthy bottlestore owner from Namahadi, demonstrates. 
Case 6.3: Diveriffication through kin in the specialised sector 
Raboroko first came to Qwaqwa in 1971 from his home town Benoni 
to complete his schoolin~ under the supervision of his aunt, 
Sekele. He stayed in Sekele s home in Namahadi until 1976 when he 
obtained his matric certificate and returned to Benoni to take up 
a job as a traffic officer. In 1978, after achieving succe£s in 
his first job, he returned to Qwaqwa to visit his aunt and to 
obtain information from the QDC about the issuing of bottlestore 
licences to blacks in Qwaqwa. The QDC informed Raboroko that the 
1977 Liquor Act had opened up this possibility and that he should 
contact them at a later date when he had secured financial 
support. 
In 1981 Raboroko returned to Qwaqwa with his accumulated savings 
and with the support of a R64 000 loan from the QDC managed to 
successfully obtain a bottlestore licence. In June 1982 he opened 
his new store and began to conduct.a brisk trade in the Namahadi 
area. Although Ra~oroko claims that he had numerous requests from 
kin and friends for jobs in his new enterprise, he decided to 
recruit experienced cashiers and drivers from Phuthaditjhaba. 
Only Sekele and her daughter, Saraha, were given jobs as shop 
floor assistants •. In view of the constant demands made on him by 
relatives, Raboroko decided to move out of his aunt's house in 
Namahadi and set up his own home in Phuthaditjhaba. 
Despite these attempts to exclude kin -from his new business 
venture, by 1984 Raboroko had begun to re-establish his links 
with local kin to spread his interests in the liquor trade and 
beyond. These attempts at diversification began in mid-1983 when 
Raboroko struck an agreement with Sekele to set up an illegal 
after-hours off-sales depot at her home. According to Raboroko, 
Sekele was given a small percentage of the profits in exchang"e 
for managing the enterprise. In September 1983 Raboroko set up a 
similar agreement with Saraha, who now lived with her husband in 
Mangaung village. The initial success of both these operations 
encouraged Raboroko to enter a further agreement with his younger 
brother, Khauoe, for the establishment of a cafe in Bolata, which 
he purchased directly from a local owner. After investing 
several thousand rand in the business, Raboroko handed it over 
to his brother to manage. 
In contrast to the sectors decribed above, family labour was 
rarely used in taxi trade. The reason for this was that most taxi 
owners needed no additional labour - they owned and drove their 
own vehicles. Consequently, it was only when owners wished to 
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expand their operations that kin became important as either 
drivers or even co-owners. In view of the small number of 
multiple taxi owners in the sample it was difficult to establish 
any general patterns. From the data collected it did. however, 
seem that while commuters tended to hire out their additional 
licences to the highest bidder, pirate taxi owners relied more 
heavily on kin as partners and henchmen to help them in 
struggle against competing associations. I will discuss 
issue in greater detail in the next chapter. 
their 
this 
Contrary to the views expressed by members of the QOC that the 
family basis of small enterprise in Qwaqwa was detrimental to 
business organisation and accumulation, the evidence collected in 
the field suggests that the use of kin by traders and taximen in 
the sample was neither irrational nor inefficient. The extensive 
use of kin, especially women, by shebeeners and poor rural 
retailers not only served to reduce business overheads in a 
context of declining profits, but also enhanced the personal 
control owners were able to exercise over their commercial 
operations. This was evident in the Phuthaditjhaba shebeen trade 
where brewers and retailers relied on junior female kin whom they 
could control and trust as domestic and business assistants. In 
the male-dominated rural retail trade the exploitation of female 
kin was more intense as male enterprise heads manipulated their 
control over women in domestic units to extract of cheap, 
reliable labour. 
But it has also been noted that while kin could be exploited to 
meet the labour requirements in the small business sector, they 
were also helpful as an effective means to diversify business 
assets without relinquishing initial control. The strategies 
e~ployed by Qwaqwa owners, consequently bear some comparision to 
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They realised that in a situation where markets were shrinking 
and under constant threat from larger concerns, their ability to 
remain competitive depended largely on their success in placating 
clients by means other than low prices. 
Attempts by traders and taximen to portray an image of caring for 
their clients and showing public benevolence were indicated in a 
number of ways. At one level this concern was reflected in the 
names they gave to their businesses. ~any general retailers and 
cafe owners used names such as: ~ Bantu (Help the People), 
Ratanang (Love each Other) Basotho, Phela Q Phedisa (Live and Let 
Live) and Thaka Bafutsana (Among the Poor). Clans names, such as 
Bakwena, Bafokeng and Bataung, and symbols were also often 
r-
painted above the e~trances of rural stores [l]. Taxi association 
names conveyed their own images: Majakathata (The Strugglers), 
Banna ba Kgotso (Men of Peace) and Thusanang Basotho (Help the 
Basotho).~ In ~he upper reaches of the urban shebeen trade where 
outlets had names as Mauritius, The Colliseum and Beirut more 
attention was given to the bourgeois fantasies of the local 
elite.~ 
~trategies to attract clients went beyond such tokenism as small 
business operators strove to invest considerable amounts of time 
and money in fmproving customer service. In the taxi trade many 
owners fibre-brushed the outer panels of their kombis, installed 
expensive air conditioning, lined seats with sponge coverings and 
er-
tinted their car windows. 1They also often delivered passengers to 
~ 
their front doors after dark and guaranteed that lost property 
would be kept until customers came to claim it.1 On the 16 March 
1984 the Qwaqwa Taxi Association placed an advertisement in the 
Qwaqwa newspaper The Pinnacle stating that, in accordance with 
passengers' requests, items left behind on com~uter taxis could 
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be collected at their new offices in Setsing. In the shebeen 
trade owners were increasingly purchasing refrigerators to 
accommodate the growing demand for cold beer and were seen to 
spend money regularly on improving hi-fi equipment and furniture. 
Storekeepers in rural area also pandered to consumer demands by 
installing TV sets in their stores for the benefit of local 
residents and were delivering goods, especially maize meal bought 
in 60 kg bags, to the houses of their regular customers. The 
delivery system, extensively used by bottlestore owners, was only 
introduced in the rural retail trade during 1983 when these 
owners were rapidly losing clients to local supermarkets. 
'i>romotional schemes were also utilised in community services and 
recreation. Phuthaditjhaba Butcheries, for instance, sponsored 
the main local soccer league in Qwaqwa,..J while smaller owners set 
themselves up as the sponsors of individual teams. Even 
shebeeners ran their own informal league in Phuthaditjhaba. They 
bought equipment, hired coaches and facilities. Boxing was 
another popular sport in which small traders played an active 
role as promoters and organisers. One bottlestore owner in the 
sample travelled as far as Newcastle and Welkom to find 
competition for 'his' fighters. In addition to these activities 
donations were also made to school PTA committees in return for 
advertising space on the school premises., One 
~ 
storekeeper in 
Phuthaditjhaba provided tracksuit tops to school children who 
could not afford uniforms. Church groups and other voluntary 
associations such as burial societies also received support from 
local businessmen; who helped raise funds and provide transport 
in order to promote contact with other groups outside the 
homeland. In 1984 one Namahadi trader claimed that he had agreed 
to foot the transport bill for a local choir to attend an 
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although effectively denying it to his clients, by having a large 
cardboard sign posted on his counter which read: "Credit is only 
given to pensioners over the age of ninety-nine". 
All the larger rural storekeepers in the sample offered credit in 
some form or other. The largest creditor in the sample had 58 
regular customers in her 'black book' borrowing a total of about 
R800 a month. The system employed by this owner demanded that all 
credit purchases were accompanied with at least a 50% deposit, 
except mealie meal on which people only paid 20%. Individual 
credit customers were also given a credit rating on the basis of 
their previous purchases and payments, with R70 a month as the 
absolute maximum. This basic system was duplicated in most other 
stores, although in cases where business profits were smaller, 
owners often restricted the range of items available on credit. 
Yet, these varia,tons notwithstanding, it is important to note 
that virtually all owners insisted on some form of deposit so as 
to exclude households with no income. As the above owner 
explained: "I am only prepared to help people that can help 
themselves. I will not support families without wage earners". 
But, while the deposit system reduced credit risk, it could not 
be infallible in a situation where employment was almost by 
definition temporary. All rural storekeepers had stories of 
credit customers that 'suddenly disappeared' or 'have been unable 
to pay their account for more than four months'. In these 
instances it was noted that, although traders constantly 
threatened to take legal action against credit defaulters, they 
never followed these threats up for fear of losing clients. 
Credit relations in the shebeen trade were important but not as 
extensive as in the retail trade. In the illicit liquor trade 
only liquor runners refused to grant credit to customers, arguing 
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" 
believed that local businessmen made constant use of bebebe 
(local slang for medicine containing human flesh) to enhance 
their interests and ward off competitors. The foundation of witch 
accusations in all the above cases derives from a single source, 
the social proximity of traders to the rural poor and their 
inability to extricate themselves from the redistributive ethos 
of life in working-class neighbourhoods. Indeed, the close 
proximity of Mokwena to neighbourhood life in Phuthaditjhaba and 
the relative separation of Kumalo from the urban working class in 
Qwaqwa - he lived in a luxury home on the outskirts of the town -
seems to explain the differing forms of community resistance to 
these two traders. It seems likely that had Kumalo lived in a 
municipal house in Phuthaditjhaba, alongside commuter and migrant 
families, and adopted the same attitude towards neighbours as he 
did towards clients, he would also have been exposed to a 
personalised form of community ostracism. 
Yet if the decisi-0ns by traders to distance themselves from the 
dense social relationships that surrounded them in working-class 
residential areas embodied potential dangers for themselves and 
their businesses, close involvement in community affairs and 
local-level politics could be threatening in other ways. The 
following case study, which investigates the relationship between 
youth gangs and a shebeener in Phuthaditjhaba, is illuminating: 
Case 6.6: Caught i.n the crossfire of youth politics 
Incidents of student-on-student violence erupted frequently in 
Phuthaditjhaba during 1984. Between August and December there 
were at least six separate clashes between. armed gangs of 
students from various residential training coll€ges in Qwaqwa. A 
number of these occurred in Phuthaditjhaba between youths from 
Bonamela, Tshiya and Makabalane; the first two are teacher 
training centres and the latter a technical school for 
bricklayers and mechanics. During 1984 clashes invariably 
involved students at either one of the teacher training colleges 
and Makabalane pupils, who had the reputation of being a rough-
and-ready bunch. In preparing for battle the arenas for conflict 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
BUREAUCRATS ANO RETAINERS: 
PROTECTION AND PATRONAGE IN QWAQWA 
Because the homelands are underdeveloped, the possibilities of 
upward mobility lie in the civil service or in trading. Few of 
the homelands have escaped charges that access to both routes is 
dependent on government patronage and position (Haysom 1986: 57). 
In Chapter Two I argued that since the 1980 election in Qwaqwa 
there has been an increasing centralisation of political power 
within the homeland. This process, I suggested, made it necessary 
for traders wishing to expand their assets to seek relationships 
of patronage with the bureaucratic and political elite in Qwaqwa. 
In this chapter I wish to elaborate on the general importance of 
patronage to traders in Qwaqwa through an analysis of the 
interactions between traders, bureaucrats, police officials and 
urban street gangs. 
Patronage in Context 
The term 'patron' derives from the Spanish patron, meaning a 
person of power, status and influence. It is, however, always a 
relational concept since patrons are seen in association with 
less powerful 'clients', who seek protection and security (Hall 
1973: 506). Relations of patronage are reciprocal social 
relations contracted between partners of unequal wealth and 
status, in which the patron grants favours to dependent clients 
in return for goods, loyalty, political allegiance and other 
services (Eisenstadt & Roniger 1984: 48). Patron/client relations 
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unions operating inside Qwaqwa - and has no local party political 
mouthpiece [l]. At the community level there is no evidence ·of 
• 
the formation of civic or residential associations. In fact, the 
only extant bodies noted were those created by the Dikwankwetla 
party for the purpose of political control. The new village 
committees set up in 1983, for instance, were designed primarily 
to assist the tribal administration with the provision of basic 
services, while in Phuthaditjhaba the local town council served a 
similar function. The lack of popular interest in the latter body 
was demonstrated in 1983 when only 9% of the town's adult 
population voted in the town council elections (Bank 1984: 56). 
Indeed, the only activit1es at the neighbourhood level which 
produced any group cohesion were church organisations, burial 
societies, shebeens and stokvels. The general apathy and 
disorganisation of the Qwaqwa underclasses suggests that the 
vast majority of rural and urban families in the homeland were 
more concerned with meeting their basic subsistence needs and 
keeping on the right side of the oppressive structures which 
govern them than in challenging these structures [2]. 
Furthermore, it was evident that the local elite in Qwaqwa were, 
to use Eisenstadt and Roniger's terms both 'distant from the 
centres of power' and 'lacked control over societal resources'. 
The structure of the bantustan system has subordinated Qwaqwa's 
ruling elite to the wishes of the South African government, on 
whom they depend for their salaries, budgets and policy 
directives. This dependence is exemplied by the fact that all 
laws passed by the Qwaqwa Legislative Assembly have to be 




Finally, as a result of its continued status as a labour reserve, 
Qwaqwa is characterised by low levels of economic specialisation 
and limited middle class development. In fact, in line with 
Eisenstadt and Roniger's observations, the middle-class in the 
homeland is confined exclusively to the service sector and the 
bureaucracy. 
In view of the broad correlation between conditions in Qwaqwa and 
those described as typical of clientalistic societies in general 
I will attempt to use patronage as a heuristic tool for the 
analysis of a number of specifically assymetrical relationship 
involving traders and taximen outside of their immediate 
business enviroments. 
Relations with the Bureaucracy 
Peter Blau (1963} in his seminal work The Dynamics of the 
Bureaucracy argues that optimal bureaucratic efficiency is seldom 
achieved by following the stipulated formal rules and procedures. 
He takes issue with Weber on the notion of bureaucratic 
rationality by asserting that bureaucrats tend to generate their 
own informal rules and procedures within the formal structure of 
bureaucratic control. This argument is relevant to our 
understanding of interaction between traders and bureaucrats in 
Qwaqwa insofar as it highlights the extent to which bureaucrats, 
for different reasons, employ their own strategies to bypass 
existing rules and regulations. 
The bureaucracy in Qwaqwa, like that in most other homelands, is 
locally renowned for its tardiness and inefficiency. One of the 
main reasons for this is that it operates as a dependent branch 
of the broader South African bureaucracy, which remains a basic 
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point of reference for information, clarification and advice. A 
wide variety of mundane bureaucratic procedures in Qwaqwa sti·ll 
depend on confirmation from Pretoria. In addition, it was also 
evident that inefficiency related to the politicisation of the 
bureaucracy. As the Chief Minister explained in 1982: 
We appoint supporters of the government into the civil service, 
even if they are inefficient. We appoint them to thank them for 
their support (QLA 1982: 453). 
This tendency to place greater emphasis on political support than 
on efficiency created considerable confusion, especially at the 
lower bureaucratic levels where civil servants were reluctant to 
take any initiative without direct orders from their superiors. 
Inertia at the lo~er levels was combined at the middle and upper 
levels with growing bribery and corruption. Allegations of misuse 
of bureaucratic position and embezzlement were rife. In the 
Qwaqwa Legislative Assembly the Chief Minister regularly referred 
to bribery as the root cause of bureaucratic inefficiency and 
appealed to the Ministers in all government departments to 
attempt to curb these activities. In 1981 the Department of 
Justice was a particular focus of attention and it was revealed 
that both police and magistrates were distorting evidence in 
order to acquit friends and relatives (QLA 1981: 362ff). These 
activities were also noted in the tribal courts where it was 
alleged that "court verdicts differ like night and day" (QLA 
1979: 409). 
Business licensin~ 
The permeation of bureaucratic inefficency and 
throughout the local bureaucracy in Qwaqwa had 
corruption 
important 
implications for traders seeking to extract licences from the 
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Qwaqwa government. Traders were well aware of the existence of 
'informal' procedures and were quick to appreciate their 
advantages. As one own~r pointed out: 
It is a fact of life ~ere in Qwaqwa that every rubber stamp has a 
price. When applying for a business licence it is always 
necessary to have extra cash in your pocket, because civil 
servants are stubborn; they will not give you what you want 
without extracting a fee. They are not reluctant to ask rewards, 
saying that traders are wealthy people and should expect to pay 
for their services. 
In fact, of all the licensed traders in the sample some 70% 
admitted to having paid monies to bureaucrats at various levels 
to ensure the rapid passage of their licence applications. The 
attractiveness and expense of this process becomes clear when one 
considers the labyrinth of red tape associated with licence 
applications. In 1984 traders wishing to open rural stores had to 
have their application endorsed at five different bureaucratic 
levels, ranging from the village headman or chief through to the 
final inspection of the store by the Qwaqwa Health Department 
officials. Traders realised that this could be a long and 
cumbersome process if bribery was not used. 
However, in spite of the high incidence of bribery and corruption 
in the licensing bureaucracy, there was little evidence to 
suggest that these exchanges formed the basis for the 
establishment of patron/ client relationships. The main reason 
for this was that licensing transactions were in most cases once-
off exchanges. After receiving their licences the interests of 
traders quickly shifted to others areas, such as the acquisition 
of stock and the establishment of relationships with clients. It 
was consequently only in a small minority of cases, where 
diversification was perceived as a short-term possibility, that 
longer term relations within the licensing bureaucracy were seen 
as important. In contrast to this situation, in the unlicensed 
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sector, where conditions were considerably mori insecure, it is 
possible to note that clientelistic type of relationship more 
readily emerged between bureaucrats and traders. 
Police protection and unlicenced traders 
Once you know you have fallen victim to a policeman all you need 
to do is wink at him and then give him some money. He would then 
pretend to be looking at your pass and later will tell you to go. 
- M. Mofutsanyane (QLA 1978: 331). 
Although clientelism was not always the most effective method of 
realising business objectives in the sphere of licensed commerce, 
these kinds of relationships were common among unlicensed traders 
who did not have the security of a licensing certificate. For 
both shebeeners and taximen in Qwaqwa long term security depended 
on obtaining protection from police harassment, 
increasingly prevalent in both sectors after 1982. 
which was 
In 1984 the Qwaqwa Chief of Police expressed his unequivocal 
opposition to the expansion of the shebeen trade in Qwaqwa. He 
explained that: 
The police force in Qwaqwa is committed to stamping out the evil 
of shebeens. Shebeens do not contribute to the welfare of the 
nation. They are dens of vice where people get drunk and 
senseless, and it is here that many crimes start. The shebeen 
owner is also not a pleasant type and there have been many 
reports of shebeen queens selling dagga and dealing in stolen 
goods. 
This attitude was reflected in the concerted efforts made by the 
Qwaqwa police to arrest shebeeners after 1982. The identification 
of unlicensed drinking as a prime target for police harassment 
was demonstrated by the fact that as many as 60% of the 
shebeeners interviewed had been visited by the police between 
1982 and 1984. Indeed, one owner recalled that between June 1983 
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and September 1984 she had been arrested six times and had lost 
over R2 000 in fines· and liquor confiscations. A summary of the 
escalation of polJce harassment in the sample between 1978 and 
1984 is presented in the table below: 
Table 6.1: Frequency of police arrests in shebeen sample (1978-84) 
14 + 
Ladybrand Liquor Qwaqwa Police 












1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Noto: I t must be remembered that a number of the 
shebeens in the sample were only established after 1980. 
In this harsh environment shebeeners increasingly sought ways to 
circumvent police harassment. One of the most reliable of these 
was to set up an alliance with police officials involving the 
exchange of information for protection. Scharf (1984) has 
referred to this strategy in his discussion of shebeeners on the 
Cape Flats. He argues that the close links between Cape Flats 
shebeening, drug trafficking and trade in stolen goods in the 
Western Cape encouraged clandestine agreements between SAP 
officials and township shebeeners. In these cases the police 
would afford certain shebeeners protection from arrest in 
exchange for information about local crime. Although there was 
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little evidence to suggest that Qwaqwa shebeeners deal 
extensively in narcotics or stolen goods, similar types of 
agreements were seen to emerge in Qwaqwa. For the Qwaqwa police 
force, forging alliances with shebeeners had important 
advantages, especially in a situation where law enforcement had a 
poor public image. They felt that shebeeners could be used as 
important sources of information about the location of criminals 
and conditions within neighbourhoods. Leading police officials 
also explained that access to this kind of information carried 
with it the prospect of promotion. The Qwaqwa Chief of Police 
endorsed these activities when he suggested that: 
I do not want to say that there is only a dark side to the 
shebeen business. There are some shebeens here in Phuthaditjhaba 
which are an example to the maintenance of law and order and are 
always willing to assist the police with their investigations. 
These are model shebeens and theses are given police protection. 
During the course of my fieldwork it was possible to identify two 
shebeeners who enjoyed close relationships with the Qwaqwa 
police. Both of these owners ran a relatively high-profile 
general drinking house and had much to gain from police 
protection. The first owner, Theo, was an ex-policeman from 
Bloemfontein who in 1984 worked as a debt collector for a large 
South African retail company. Theo's experience in the police 
force, as well as his subsequent activity as a company 
investigator, made him a prime candidate for the police, who felt 
that his local knowledge could be invaluable in their 
investigations •• Consequently in 1983 Theo was recruited as a 
police informer. Meetings were arranged on a fortnightly basis 
where details of information were exchanged of mutual benefit to 
both parties. In return for his cooperation Theo was given a 
guarantee that his shebeen would not be raided. The relationship 
between Theo and the Qwaqwa police was, however, not entirely 
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should also be remembered that there were significant fringe 
benefits associated with the practice of shebeen raiding. As one 
Legislative Assembly member pointed out: 
When a person is in possession of 20 cases of liquor the police 
hasten to investigate this matter. Is this perhaps because they 
use, or do they sell the liquor? However, when they are called 
out on a case where somebody has suffered bodily harm they do not 
go because they do not benefit from the situation (QLA 1982: 
345). 
Conditions in the taxi trade in Qwaqwa in 1984 in many ways 
resembled those in the shebeen trade. After 1982, with the 
publication of the Welgemoed Enquiry into commuter transport, the 
South African authorities instructed local law enforcement 
agencies to clamp down on the operation of unregistered taxis. 
This directive was actively pursued from June 1982 onwards, and 
exposed unregistered taximen in Qwaqwa to escalating operating 
costs in the form of traffic fines and arrests. Under these 
conditions, taximen were forced to seek strategies to circumvent 
~ 
the law. Initially, they resorted to attempts at bribing SAP 
officers, but when this failed, they started using alternative 
routes to avoid roadblocks (see Chapter One). These tactics 
alleviated some of the problems they experienced travelling in 
South Africa, but left a question mark surrounding their presence 
in Qwaqwa. From the beginning of 1983 leading Qwaqwa politicians 
and bureaucrats began to question their right to use homeland 
roads and parking facilities. It was pointed out in the 
Legislative Assembly that taxi drivers were using local 
facilities without generating any form of revenue within the 
homeland. Their vehicles were not registered in the area, nor 
were they paying any sales tax on their transactions (QLA 1983: 
99-107). But, in spite of these complaints, the Qwaqwa police 
were reluctant to take punitive action. In August 1984 a leading 
traffic policemen explained that: "The official position on 
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unregistered taxis is to turn a blind eye. After all, they render 
an invaluable service to the public". 
The adoption of this position by the Qwaqwa government appears to 
be based on the realisation that long-distance taxis, for all 
their faults, were performing an essential economic service in 
the homeland by providing workers with cheap transport. 
Experiences from the Ciskei and Kwazulu during the early 1980s 
have indicated the political combustibility of worker grievances 
over transport. In both cases the lack of alternatives to 
monopoly state transport had escalated into political crises for 
these homeland administrations (cf. Swillings & McCathy 1985, 
Swillings 1985). The Qwaqwa administration was clearly wary of 
closing off transport alternatives to workers. Yet, the. 
administration's position was not completely clear cut, since 
while it accepted the legitimacy of pirate taxi~ in principle, it 
was finding it increasingly difficult to accommodate the entire 
spectrum of groups that had come to fall under the pirate taxi 
umbrella by 1985. In particular, there was a growing antagonism 
towards the new urban-based associations which had infiltrated 
the homeland since the middle of 1983. This was highlighted in a 
Legislative Assembly debate on the issue in 1983 when one member 
explained: 
In my opinion it is not the local Majakathata that are the 
problem, it is the people who only come for dinner when 
everything is prepared, in other words they ar.e the people who 
only come to eat •••• My request is that we protect the local 
Majakathata (1983: 108). 
In this context where groups were competing for access to optimal 
loading facilities and free passage in and out of the homeland, 
conditions favoured the establishment of patron/client relations 
between bureaucrats and taximen. Conditions especially suited the 
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former group who, through their control of parking facilities, 
could effectively play taximen off against each other and even 
develop multiple alliances. In 1985 when I was researching the 
taxi business, there were already a number of solid alliances in 
existence. Firstly, a close alliance had been established between 
members of the Welkom-based Mohahlaula car-hire company and 
leading officials in'the Qwaqwa Police Department, who allegedly 
accepted monthly payments in return for rank space in 
Phuthaditjhaba. It was also alleged that one Qwaqwa traffic 
policeman had been given a brand new motor car and a substantial 
petrol allowance at a local garage in Phuthaditjhaba by the owner 
of the Welkom company. Secondly, and in response to this 
agreement, the Qwaqwa based NOLC company, which also operated on 
the Welkom route, was in the process of establishing contacts in 
the Phuthaditjhaba town council which, at least nominally, had 
the power to evict their competitors. The chairman of NOLC 
explained: "We have come to understand the tactics of our 
competitors and are preparing to give them a dose of their own 
medicine". The strategy of establishing links at the highest 
political level in Qwaqwa was also being pursued by another ex-
Majakathata group, Thusanang Basotho, which appo{nted the wife of 
a leading Qwaqwa parliamentarian onto the association executive. 
By the end of February 1985 this kind of political manoeuvring 
had permeated down to commuter 'pirates' who, in spite of strong 
opposition from the recognised Qwaqwa Taxi Association succeeded 
in striking a prot~ction pact with key members of the Qwaqwa 
traffic police. 
When I left the field in February 1985 the balance of forces in 
the taxi 
jostled 
business was precariously poised as dozens of 





Phuthaditjhaba. The atmosphere was tense and always threatened to 
erupt into open violence. Members of the various associations 
stuck closely together, seeking new strategies to secure optimal 
loading space and carefully watching the moves of their 
competitors. The animosities between taximen had also begun to 
take their toll within the bureaucracy. Serious rifts, for 
instance, had begun to emerge between the Phuthaditjhaba town 
council and the Police Department. The town council had 
autonomously decided at a meeting held in February 1985 that it 
would build its own taxi rank for Qwaqwa 'pirates' on a site 
adjoining the Setsing complex. These plans did not include some 
of the taxi associations supported by the Qwaqwa police which had 
their bases outside the homeland. According to the distict 
magistrate, however, it appeared unlikely that the town council 
would be able to realise its proposal since it had not yet 
received any funding from Pretoria. 
The relationships described above are in many ways similar to 
those which were seen to exist between shebeeners and Qwaqwa 
police in the previous section. They were intended to serve as 
long-term relationships between taximen and bureaucrats which 
depended on the reciprocal exchange of goods and favours for 
their survival. They were also essentially unequal relationships 
which favoured the local bureaucrats who could monitor economic 
competition by offering police protection in both sectors. 
Taximen and Retainers 
In this section I wish to turn my attention to a different form 
of patronage 
latter half 
which emerged in the Qwaqwa taxi trade during the 





it did not revolve around contact between traders and 
bureaucrats, but rather involved the incorporation of urban 
street gangs and local vigilantes into the long-distance taxi 
trade as the clients of wealthy owners • ...j In this instance, the 
1 patronage of taxi owners provided an essential resource in return 
the survival of certain segments of the urban 
lumpenproletariat,) while the protection offered by urban gangs 
served to regulate competition in the taxi business~ I will 
attempt to show that the arrangements established between taximen 
and street gangs, particularly ~he Ma-Rashea gangs, were not 
simply contractual agreements, but increasingly embodied a whole 
set of additional obligations which were not initially 
anticipated by taximen • .J 
Working with the Ma-Rashea 
Before I begin my analysis of the role of street gangs in the 
Qwaqwa taxi trade, it is necessary to contextualise the 
discussion by providing a brief history of the Ma-Rashea. The Ma-
Rashea is one the best known and tenacious urban gangs in the 
modern history of South Africa. It has its origins in the 
turbulent times of early black urbanisation on the Witwatersrand. 
According to Guy and Thabane (1984: 9), the Ma-Rashea first 
emerged in the townships of Newclare and Sophiatown at precisely 
the time that the South African economy was switching away from 
mining and agriculture towards manufacture. Their emergence 
coincided with the deteriorating conditions in rural areas and 
the forced migration of Afri~ans into sprawling and overcrowded 
'freehold' locations. Despite boom conditions in the economy, 
life in the cities was harsh, unemployment levels were high and 
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poverty was widespread with limited state intervention in the new 
residential areas. Crime rates soared along with the formation of 
urban gangs. Lodge (1983), writing of the 1940s in Sophiatown, 
claims that the new social conditions acted as an incubator for 
location gangs, who fed on the media myths of the glamour and 
ostentation of American gangsterism. By the late 1940s imported 
styles and names cluttered the streets of new African areas. 
Gangs with foreign names such as The Americans, 
Koreans and the Green Archers all mapped out their 
territories (Coplan 1986: 163). 
Berliners, 
respective 
But the newly established Ma-Rashea was of a different ilk. Its 
headquarters lay in the predominantly Basotho surburb of 
Newclare, where living conditions were appalling. For this group 
there was no question of flirting with imported styles: the Ma-
Rashea comprised a hardy group of unemployed Basotho migrants 
who clung tenaciously to their rural identities. They wore black 
trousers and blankets, and carried fighting sticks (melamu) 
rather than guns and knives. Lodge (1983: 176) maintains that 
their actions and the use of rural symbols to construct group 
identity can be explained without recourse to ethnic 
generalisations. He argues that their greater freedom of movement 
(as non-Union citizens), and their limited job skills, family and 
capital resources all moulded their distinctive style and mode of 
operation. 
Much like the District Six gangs of the 1960's described by 
Pinnock (1984), 'The Russians' of Newclare were chiefly engaged 
in extortive protection rackets. Huddleston (1956) writing of the 
Ma-Rashea in the 1950s claims that their purpose was simple and 
their methods effective. Protection was offered for a fee. They 
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would protect storekeepers and workers against tsotsis and other 
criminals and in this role they were seen as differing from 
ordinary gangsters. In 1955 Drum magazine made the following 
analysis of their actions: 
Funnily enough, the greatest obstacle to these 9angs is the 
behaviour of the 'Russians' ••• The joke is that the Russians' are 
not primarily interested in organised crime. They do not care 
much for robbery and theft. They are just thugs that make life 
tough for ordinary people and gangsters alike. 
Some of the big boys behind the scenes wonder how they could 
organise the 'Russians' to serve their ends. But this is not 
likely to be achieved because the 'Russians'are an independent 
lot ••• (Guy & Thabane 1984: 24) 
In one sense the Ma-Rashea, like the earlier Amalaita groups 
described by van Onselen (1982) and Coplan (1986), were the 
predecessors of the modern township vigilantes. They were 
politically unscrupulous and sold their services to the highest 
bidders. In 1955, for instance, at the time of the Evaton bus 
boycotts when popular resistance to the state-run transport 
service was at its height, the Ma-Rashea came out in defence of 
the bus owners, assaulting picketers and protecting commuters 
(Lodge 1983: 172). 
Although conditions in the cities have changed and relocation has 
divided communities, the Ma-Rashea have managed to survive these 
dislocations. But, in the process, they have lost organisational 
unity. Gang cells have been scattered across the Reef and into 
other cities with large Basotho minorities such as Welkom. This 
loss of territorial coherence spawned competition between new 
cells now constantly engaged in tussles for regional supremacy. 
Yet, despite organisational change, the Ma-Rashea appears to have 
remained true to its original aims - it still exists primarily as 
a protection racket [3]. 
It is against this backdrop that one can interpret the operation 
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of Ma-Rashea groups in the Qwaqwa taxi trade during 1983 and 
1984. As I have pointed out earlier, the advent of the car-hire 
movement in competition with Majakathata taxis marked a turning 
point in the taxi trade in Qwaqwa. For the first time long-
distance operators were faced with significant competition: 
Competitors who had found a solution, at least temporarily, to 
police harassment. The new movement had its base in the major 
urban areas. It was considerably more capitalised, centralised 
and professional than its competitors. Confrontation seemed 
inevitable as Majakathata mobilised to prevent its competitors 
from loading their vehicles in Qwaqwa. The new associations for 
their part attempted to control taxi ranks in the cities. But 
since this could not be achieved by taximen alone, it became 
increasingly necessary for them to employ allies. In Qwaqwa this 
protection, as we have already seen, could be achieved through 
agreements with the local administration. The situation in urban 
areas differed in that both administrators and the police alike 
took a strong stand against taxi pirating and were not tempted by 
association bribes. As a result competition in these areas could 
not be regulated peacefully from within the urban bureaucracy. 
Taximen were forced to seek other strategies to regulate 
competition, and in this context alliances with street gangs 
presented themselves as a viable option for the car-hire movement 
in its attempt to muscle its way into the market. 
From the middle of 1983 the Ma-Rashea became an important feature 
of the homeland taxi trade. The initial contacts with the Ma-
Rashea were struck by the Welkom car-hire company Mohahlaula in 
about June 1983 in response to resistance from Majakathata taxis 
on the Maseru route. Majakathata owners were effectively 
preventing Mohahlaula from loading. According to informants, 
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Mohahlaula reacted by employing a Welkom based Ma-Rashea group to 
attack the rank at Ficksburg in September 1983. In the ensuing 
'battle' the Ma-Rashea were driven out of the town and, shortly 
afterwards, resolved not to venture too close to Majakathata 
strongholds. But these events did not deter Mohahlaula owners 
from operating in Qwaqwa. In fact, it was widely alleged that the 
Ficksburg incident served to heighten competition at the Qwaqwa 
rank. Between October 1983 and January 1984 Ma-Rashea hit-groups 
policed the roads.between Virginia and Welkom, using ambush as 
their tactic. Majakathata responded by travelling in convoy under 
the protection of vigilantes assembled in Qwaqwa. The stalemate 
was broken at the end of January 1984 when the first Ma-rashea 
attack on the Qwaqwa rank was planned. News of attack, however, 
reached Majakathata members who informed the police and about 
thirty Ma-Rashea were arrested on their arrival in 
Phuthaditjhaba. The local police, by this stage themselves 
reaping profits from the taxi business, had a vested interest in 
establishing a truce and called the leaders of the two 
associations together to sign a non-aggression pact in Qwaqwa. 
This agreement was not entirely effective though and by February 
local vigilantes and the Ma-rashea continued to operate behind 
the scenes. 
< (Dev e 1 op men ts on the Germiston line took a similar course. 
However, here it was not the car-hire companies that initiated 
r-
conf 1 i ct, but a break-away group of Majakathata owners. In April 
1984 four leading taximen Aisassociated themselves from the 
Majakathata affili~te, Koloi Tsa Baeti, because they felt that 
the association was cluttering the line with newcomers:)According 
to the Majakathata owners this was a breach of the association 
code and a punishable offense as such. The break-away group had 
214 
• 
anticipated that Majakathata might take retaliatory action and 
used the links their leader, Mareka, had with the Sowetan 
underworld to make contact with the Ma-Rashea of the Phiri 
location. Mareka and his associates employed the Ma-Rashea to 
protect their interests, but the Koloi Tsa Baeti was adamant that 
their credibility rested on taking action against all dissidents. 
r 
In May they made contact with the Germiston Ma-Rashea, a faction 
which had for some time been engaged in struggles with the Soweto 
r. group.J As in the case of the Mohahlaula/Majakathata conflict, the 
situation on the Joh~nnesburg line soon reached an impasse: Koloi 
would harass their competitors in Phuthaditjhaba, while the Phiri 
Ma-rashea would do the same to Majakathata taxis travelling in 
and around Soweto.J Yet while this form of badgering remained 
widespread in February 1984, the clashes between groups were not 
,-.. 
without their high-water marks. In June a gun battle involving 
both gangs and taximen broke out in the streets of Alberton. 
Later, in September a similar incident occurred at the Sedi~eng 
garage in Qwaqwa.~ It seems that by this time the feuding had 
become self-perpetuating. By January 1985 taximen on both sides 
were complaining that they had become wary of the Ma-Rashea using 
their resources to settle their own disputes. One Majakathata 
owner explained: 
I think that many of the Koloi people are getting tired of 
working with the Ma-Rashea because they are starting to exploit 
us. Every month they demand something else. Last month it was 
money to take the body of one of their member to Lesotho for 
burial. I have no quarrel with the Phiri Ma-Rashea. This fighting 
must stop! 
How do we conceptualise these alliances? At first glance they 
appear to involve relationships between groups rather than 
individuals. They also, at one level, present themselves as 
simple contractual relations which lack social depth. But when 
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considered more closely, rthese relations, although manifest as 
alliances between collectivities, were indeed constructed between 
individuals with prior social contact. They were built out of 
instrumental friendships between taximen and street gangsJ In the 
case of the Johannesburg taximen, for instance, it was alleged 
that Mareka's r~lationship with the Ma-Rashea was established 
r 
through earlier contact with the Sowetan underworld. He had lived 
in Soweto before coming to Qwaqwa in the late 1970s and was 
believed to have been engaged in numerous illegal commercial 
activities which involved Ma-Rashea support.J Similarly, the 
((., . t. 1 , n, , a contact between Koloi and the Germiston Ma-Rashea was 
made by an ex-gang member who had subsequently entered the taxi 
business. Like Mareka, he mediated in all agreements with the 
street gang and stood at the centre of the relationship~0 In time 
other taximen who worked closely with the Ma-Rashea also 
established independent social relationships with gang members. 
In the case of Welkom taximen, it appears that the relationships 
set up with the: Ma-Rashea more closely resembled a purely 
economic transaction between a white attorney at the head of the 
Mohahlahuala association and gang members. The relationship 
between the Welkom Majakathata and its supporters stood in 
contrast to this, insofar as the support Majakathata mobilised on 
the Welkom line came primarily from friends and kin. 
Yet in classifying these as relations of patronage in this way, I 
am not suggesting that they are static. In fact, as the above 
quote suggests, they were subject to frequent power shifts as 
time 
junior 
passed. Initially it seemed that these 
,~ 
gangs were weak 
partners· in simple contractual relationships. They 
performed their service for a set fee.~ However, as the 
relationship between the parties deepened and the Ma-Rashea came 
216 
• 
to perceive the dependence of taximen on their services, their 
demands became more exacting. As clients they began exercising a 
considerable amount of leverage and by 1985 had managed to 
equalise their transactions to the extent that the taximen were 
beginning to reconsider their association with the Ma-Rashea. 
Some owners spoke of developing contacts with new groups which 
could do the same job more cheaply, while others, such as the 
owner quoted above, wished to withdraw from such relationships 
altogether. He claimed: "We are losing more money on the Ma-
Rashea than we would lose if Mareka was allowed to run his own 
show". But other owners feared that this kind of concession would 
undermine the basic ground rule of the business. In addition, 
those in close contact with the Ma-Rashea pointed to the 
difficulty of withdrawing their support and they maintained that 
pul 1 ing the carpet· out under the Ma-Rashea could prove counter-
productive if the gang decided to retaliate. 
The predicament of these taxi owners had become deeply engrained 
as the trade depended on escalating violence and bureaucratic 
protection. ~n this respect the conditions in the taxi trade were 
not dissimilar to those described by Catanzano (1985) for rural 
Sicily in the mid-nineteenth century. Here, rural entrepreneurs 
who were without representation within the state were forced to 
rely on bands of campieri (guards} to defend their assets against 
competitors.~ In this system bureaucrats provided limited 
protection for entrepreneurs because they could not guarantee 
public order. Catanzano (1985) maintains that violence became the 
chief means by which economic competition was regulated. He 
a r g u e s th a t a k i n d o f ..J. b r o k er ca p i ta 1 i s rn-J,· e me r g e d b a s e d o n 
relations of patronage.J Market transactions were no longer 
peaceful, but dominated by the use of predatory and violent 
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methods. "Business undertakings", he contends, "had a temporary 
life in that the possibility of violence precluded long-lasting 
trust and thus long-term investments" (1985: 41). The predicament 
of Sicilian entrepreneurs, as described by Catanzano (1985), was 
in many ways similar to that which characterised long-distance 
owners in Qwaqwa trapped in the claws of two different 
bureaucracies. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has dealt with the relationships between 
bureaucrats, traders and lumpenproletarian elements. It has 
attempted to come to terms with the nature of these relationships 
through the prism of patronage rather than through the use of 
concepts developed 
and alliances. 
for the analysis of horizontal 
The reason for this has been 
solidarities 
that the 
relationships described above neither represent authentic class 
alliances - they are still too personalised and fragmented - nor 
do they necessarily point in that direction. They have been 
constructed to obtain limited economic and political objectives 
and have promoted rather than contained intra-class conflict. 
In this sense they are analogous to the relationships which 
characterise the activities of the co-opted segments of the new 
African elite in the urban areas. This elite, in the face of 
mounting political opposition, has increasingly resorted to 
patronage as a means of mobilising support and of achieving short 
term objectives. This has been strikingly demonstrated in 
Haysom's (1986) report on the relationships between community 
councillors and right-wing vigilantes. These relationships, like 
the ones described in this chapter, are constructed to bolster 
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the power of local 1 bigmen 1 and curtail competition for scarce 
resources. They individualise political power and mitigate 
against class solidarity. Yet Haysom (1986: 138) warns that it is 
important not to see these relationships as conspiratorially 
orchestrated since they are closely linked to the structural 
position of the police and black local authorities in the current 
phase of resistance to apartheid. 
In the same way it is important not to see relationships between 
traders, bureacrats and street gangs in Qwaqwa merely at face 
value. Li Causi (1975) in reviewing the literature on patronage 
criticises anthropologists for analysing these relationships 
purely in terms of the actors' perceptions. This, he argues, 
decontextualises these relations because it separates them from 
broader relations of power and exploitation. To be sure, my 
argument above is not that the emergence of patron/client type 
relations are undermining relations of domination and economic 
privilege, but rather that it serves to reproduce them in a 
context where class solidarities are weak. 
Footnotes 
[1] Haysom's (1984) book Rule by the !!..!:!.!E. provides an excellent 
description of the kind of~itra~powers available to homeland 
governments for the suppression of political oppostion. The study 
is unfortunately limited to the Ciskei. 
[2] Haines, Tapscott et al (1984) in their paper The Silence of 
Poverty provide an outstanding analysis of political apathy in 
the Transkei by considering the extent of chiefly control of 
local resources. Segar (1986) has added weight to this analysis 
with findings from the Matatiele district. She argues that the 
historical depth of rural repression in St Paul's village has 
generated notions of racial inferiority and powe~lessness. 
[3] The tenacity of the Ma-Rashea in a context where other gangs 
have disintegrated, it might be hypothesised, lies in one crucial 
factor which separated them from the other gangs of the 1950s: 
~hey were comprised of single, unemployed migrants. As a result, 
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the basic gang structure was not necessarily critically 
undermined by Group Area removals, which spelt the demise of many 
other Mafia-type street gangs. A good example of the way Group 
Area removals influenced Mafia-type gangs in Cape Town is 
provided in Pinnock's work on Distict Six. He argues that the 
extended family base of Mafia gangs like the notorious Globe gang 
of District Six were seriously undermined when the su6urb was 
demolished and families were broken up and dispersed across the 
Cape Flats in the 1970s. In the new environs of Bonteheuwel and 
Hanover Park these gangs could not be reconstituted and 
eventually gave way to new gang structures. Precisely the same 
conditions seem to lie at the basis of the demise of Sophiatown 
gangs which also operated from extended family situations. The 
notable exeption to this rule, as Lodge (1983) has observed, were 
the Ma-Rashea gangs which were constructed as quasi-chieftaincies 
based on rural affiliations. The rural life in Lesotho has been 
far removed from urban dislocations: unemployed migrants could 





At the outset of this study it was suggested that the literature 
on the homelands has dealt almost exclusively with the Transkei. 
Studies of class formation were seen to reflect this pattern. 
One of the aims of this study, therefore, has been to broaden 
this focus by considering the experiences and responses of small 
traders and taximen in Qwaqwa. In view of this objective, it 
seems appropriate that the study be concluded on a comparative 
note. 
In comparing the emergence of a commercial petty bourgeoisie in 
Qwaqwa and the Transkei, it is evident that there are striking 
differences in both the timing and the form that this process 
took in both areas. In the Transkei the creation of commercial 
opportunities for Africans, although initiated as early as the 
1930s, only began to occur on any significant scale after 1960 
with the creation of the Xhosa Development Corporation (XDC), 
which aimed to transfer the ownership of white trading stores to 
Africans. Between 1965 and 1975 the XDC handed over 562 of the 
. ' 
Transkei's 653 white trading stations, issued 692 business loans 
and ensured that an average of 150 trading licences were granted 
to blacks annually. By 1973 the total number of African traders 
in the Transkei had increased fivefold over the preceding decade 
(Southall 1983: 169). These initiatives duri~g the 1960s and 
early 1970s set a precedent for state intervention in the 
Transkeian commercial sector. The South African state, through 
its local representative the XDC, acted as the driving force 
behind the creation of this local commercial petty bourgeoisie. 
Black traders were initially resentful of the XDC presence, but 
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became more accepting of the Corporation once local Africans had 
been incorporated into its administrative structures and given 
so~e control over business licensing. The relationship af 
dependence that had developed between African traders and the XDC 
was perpetuated through the establishment of its successor body 
the Transkeian Development Corporation after 'Independence'. The 
greater degree of ·involvement of Africans, especially in the 
upper echelons of the Corporation, won the support of the 
Transkei Chamber of Commerce. This created the climate for close 
collaboration between local businessmen, the Transkei government 
and the South African state. Thus, Southall argues that there was 
a convergence of commercial and political interests in the 
Transkei after 'Independence'. 
In contrast to the considerable success achieved by the XDC 
between 1965 and. 1975 in inaugurating a commercial petty 
bourgeoisie in the Transkei, it was noted in Chapter One that the 
local equivalent in Witsieshoek, the BIC, played an 
obstructionist role in its dealings with local entrepreneurs. In 
1965 the Corporation undermined a number of local dairy co-
operatives by placing them under state control, in 1967 it 
crushed the long-standing independent bus movement in Qwaqwa and 
in 1974 shut all independent brickyards in the reserve. Moreover, 
in the period prior to 1975 only one white trading store was 
expropriated. This situation was aggravated by the restrictive 






in the early 1970s when white 
expanding consumer market in 
These developments resulted in the widespread rejection of the 
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role of the South African state in Qwaqwa. Complaints were not 
confined to traders, but also extended to the local tribal 
authorities, who had effectively been excluded from the business 
licensing bureaucracy - a situation the XDC had been careful to 
avoid in the Transkei. These objections were reflected at the 
party political level in the build-up to the 1975 Qwaqwa 
elections, with the Dikwankwetla party claiming that one of its 
key objectives was to put an end to BIC tyranny in the homeland. 
It claimed that it would set up an independent Qwaqwa Development 
Corporation 
and would 
committed to the interests of black 
take full responsibility for ensuring 
entrepreneurs, 
that business 
licenses were fairly distributed. Both of these objectives were 
realised immediately after the party came to power in 1975. The 
exclusion of central state intervention in the field of business 
licensing was achieved by transferring this process directly into 
the hands of the Minister for the Interior and the Qwaqwa 
Cabinet. This created a very different situa~ion to that which 
existed in the Transkei, where the process of political 
transition through self-government into 0 Independence 1 left the 
central state via its representatives in the Transkei Development 
Corporation (TDC) very much in control of the allocation of 
licences and loans. Indeed, with a large number of local traders 
indebted to the Development Corporations, the Transkei government 
was naturally reluctant to ostracise this body, lest they 
withdraw financial assistance from an important segment of their 
political constituency. 
In Qwaqwa, where no pre-existing relationship of dependence 
existed, the Dikwankwetla party adopted a more oppositional role 
to state intervention in the business sector by attempting to set 
itself up, politically, as the benefactor of small business. In 
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the· period after 1976 it sought to win political credibility by 
issuing business licences virtually on demand. Yet, at the same 
time, through the creation of the Qwaqwa Development Corporation 
the South African state remained influential in the homeland. 
This was seen in 1977 when it entered into a number of Tripartite 
Agreements with white wholesale companies. These agreements 
provoked resistance from local traders who demanded that 
Dikwankwetla reaffirm its commitment to black commercial 
advancement by curbing the activities of the QDC. However, the 
ruling party was not empowered to implement such a move and their 
failure to check QDC intervention resulted in growing tensions 
between the commercial and political elites in Qwaqwa. These 
tensions were heightened in the late 1970s with the announcement 
that the QDC was embarking on an elaborate shopping centre 
scheme, intended to accommodate large white retailing concerns in 
the area. Growing tension led to the establishment of formal 
political opposition to Dikwankwetla in the 1980 elections. Thus, 
by comparision with the Transkei, where Southall (1983) suggests 
a convergence of the political and commercial elite with the 
creation of the TDC, the equivalent development in Qwaqwa caused 
serious ruptures between these groups. 
The intense political opposition of small traders to 
Dikwankwetla, while related to the party's initial attempts to 
placate traders as a political constituency, was also based on 
their experience of the impact of white capital in the homeland. 
In contrast to the Transkei or Kwazulu, where the introduction of 
white chain stores in selected urban areas had little impact on 
the vast majority of rural traders, these stores threatened the 
entire general retail trade in Qwaqwa. Profits plummeted 
dramatically in this sector after 1980, wage labourers were 
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retrenched in favour of kin, and credit networks were extended to 
retain the custom of rural clients. Similar conditions were seen 
to exist in other commercial sectors in Qwaqwa. Commuter and 
local taxi owners faced growing competition from the rapidly 
expanding Setsokotsane bus service, which offered heavily 
subsidised fares. In the long-distance pirate taxi-trade the 
existing pressures were mainly of an extra-economic nature in the 
form of growing police harassment. The shebeen business, which in 
the late 1970s existed as a fairly lucrative sector for those 
individuals with some initial capital, also declined after 1980 
with the establishment of a number of local bottlestores. 
The only category of operators in the sample that were able to 
escape the mounting pressures in key economic markets were those 
specialised traders who existed in a 'benign relationship' to 
white capital. With the stores located alongside the large 
supermarkets in the QDC shopping centre they were able to feed 
off the dense flow of consumers that passed through these centres 
daily. For these owners the selective expansion of white capital 
in the homeland promoted accumulation. In the 1980s they formed 
the only collaborationist segment of the local commercial petty 
bourgeoisie. They dominated the new Qwaqwa Chamber of Commerce, 
which sought a political compromise with the Dikwankwetla party, 
and were in the process of working their way onto the QDC Board 
of Directors. In 1984 the Qwaqwa Chamber of Commerce had, for 
instance, used its influence in the QDC to enter negotiations 
with OK Bazaars and Checkers for the establishment of additional. 
supermarkets in the Setsing centre. In 1984 this segment of the 
Qwaqwa commercial elite was only beginning to pursue the strategy 
that their counterparts in the Transkei had been engaged in 
since the mid-1970s. 
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With the explicit interest of the new Chamber of Commerce in 
promoting white capital investment in Qwaqwa in precisely the 
area that threatened rural retailers most, it is small wonder 
that these operators widely boycotted the new Chamber. Indeed, 
following the Dikwankwetla's hostile stance after 1980, these 
rural retailers found themselves in a precarious and isolated 
position. In 1984 they remained a voiceless group without 
leverage in the local state and without local class allies. 
Although they were in a similar economic position to taximen and 
some shebeeners their political interests differed significantly. 
It was in the political interests of taximen to lend some support 
to the local regime because these were the only authority 
structures that were not out to criminalise their activities. The 
susceptibility of the local administration to bribery had, in 
fact, secured them a place in the local transport market 
alongside their legal counterparts in the commuter business, with 
whom they were allowed to share rank facilities. Some wealthier 
shebeeners, who also received protection from the local police, 
found themselves in a similar position. The sources of their 
political dissatisfaction lay beyond the boundaries of Qwaqwa and 
was directed at the central state, which refused to recognise the 
legitimacy of their activities. 
In view of these observations it appears that although the 
largest section of the commercial petty bourgeoisie in Qwaqwa 
increasingly shared the same economic predicament of declining 
profits based on the expansion of state and capitalist interests 
in Qwaqwa, their political responses were being directed at 
different levels of domination. These responses were founded on 
narrow economic interests that stifled the development of a 
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broader class consciousness. Crosswick and Haupt (1982} suggest 
that while a class consciousness is uncharacteristic of the petty 
bourgeoisie fragmented by their economic heterogeneity, it does 
emerge in times of crisis (ie. when this class is faced with the 
threat of proletarianisation). The political weakness of the 
commercial petty bourgoeisie in Qwaqwa, manifested in the growth 
parton/client relations, can be related to the diffuse (and often 
mask} structures of domination, but should also be seen in the 
context of the political disorganisation and lack of leadership 
provided by the working class in Qwaqwa. Analyses of the 
nineteenth-century European petty bourgeoisie (as provided by 
Marx and others}, suggest that local and national working-class 
organisations played in critical role in sharpening the political 
consciousness of this class. In Qwaqwa it was evident that 
although traders were able to identify strongly with the rural 
working class, with which they were intertwined through kinship 
ties, mutually dependent credit ·systems, participation in 
voluntary associations and common residential experiences, these 




it seems that by contrast 
tendencies of the commercial petty 
with the 
bourgeoisie 
in the Transkei, its smaller and more disorganised counterpart in 
Qwaqwa displayed a different political profile, one based 
primarily on opposition to both the local ruling class and the 
South African state. In this context traders and taximen in 
Qwaqwa might be seen as a potentially progessive political force, 
but lack class allies to enable them to transcend their specific 
economic interests. This role could, however, change dramatically 
if the present cycles of urban unrest and strengthening working-
227 
class organisation in South Africa were effectively able to 
penetrate the homeland through the system of labour migration. 
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